



Security Council

Distr.: General
30 December 2025

Original: English

Letter dated 30 December 2025 from the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council

The members of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, whose mandate was extended pursuant to Security Council resolution [2783 \(2025\)](#), have the honour to transmit herewith, in accordance with paragraph 6 of that resolution, the midterm report on their work.

The report was provided to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [1533 \(2004\)](#) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo on 24 November 2025 and was considered by the Committee on 30 December 2025.

The Group would appreciate it if the present letter and the report were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

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Midterm report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Summary

In North and South Kivu, despite progress in ongoing mediation efforts, the security situation deteriorated, marked by heavy armed clashes. The humanitarian situation further deteriorated, with an alarming surge in widespread and systematic attacks against civilians, and in conflict-related sexual violence.

Following the signing of the Peace Agreement between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of Rwanda and the Doha Declaration of Principles, negotiations continued between the Governments of the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda, as well as between the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Alliance Fleuve Congo/Mouvement du 23 mars (AFC/M23), in an effort to resolve outstanding points of contention. Some progress was achieved, including the establishment of confidence-building and verification mechanisms to support the implementation of operational plans to neutralize the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR). However, divergent interpretations of key provisions continued to impede implementation of the agreements. All parties simultaneously pursued mobilization and offensive operations, in violation of ceasefire agreements, undermining the peace process. AFC/M23 sought to position itself as an alternative governance authority to the Congolese State, establishing administrative, judicial, fiscal and security structures and assuming core State functions. AFC/M23 leaders have expressed a long-term objective of governing an autonomous region in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.

AFC/M23 expanded its military campaign in North and South Kivu, with sustained support from and operational coordination with the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF), combining coordinated offensives, strategic deployments and preparations for further operations. Spoofing and jamming technologies continued to be employed by RDF, disrupting navigation systems and communications. After consolidating control around Goma, AFC/M23 and RDF focused on neutralizing FDLR, conducting operations marked by heavy clashes and widespread, systematic targeting of civilians, in particular in Hutu-inhabited areas of Bwito and Bwisha.

In Masisi and Walikale, AFC/M23 and RDF sought to secure control over key logistical corridors and population centres, with the objective of taking Walikale town. Simultaneously, AFC/M23 deepened its territorial entrenchment in South Kivu, securing strategic axes and mining zones. Coordinated deployments across multiple front lines, notably in Masisi, Walikale and Lubero, positioned AFC/M23 and RDF to pursue further territorial expansion.

AFC/M23 also consolidated its access to mineral resources in South Kivu, seizing the strategic mining locality of Nzibira and the Twangiza industrial gold mine in Luhwindja. As a result, AFC/M23 came to control nearly half of South Kivu's cassiterite and coltan production and over two thirds of its wolframite output.

The Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) and Wazalendo groups continued to contain AFC/M23 and RDF advances, undertaking joint operations to mitigate further territorial losses and preserve key supply routes. Despite diplomatic commitments to address the presence of FDLR, FARDC continued to rely on operational support from FDLR and FDLR-aligned groups.

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* The annexes are being circulated in the language of submission only and without formal editing.

I. Introduction

1. The mandate of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo was extended on 30 June 2025 by the Security Council in its resolution [2783 \(2025\)](#).
2. Five members of the Group were appointed by the Secretary-General on 29 August 2025 ([S/2025/545](#)). The humanitarian expert has not yet been appointed.
3. The midterm report of the Group is submitted pursuant to paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution [2783 \(2025\)](#). In light of the aforementioned delays, the Group focused its reporting on the Alliance Fleuve Congo/Mouvement du 23 mars (AFC/M23) crisis, the most complex and consequential set of developments affecting regional stability, the implementation of the peace process and multiple aspects of the sanctions regime. The Group nevertheless continued to investigate other areas of concern for subsequent reporting.
4. The Group expresses its gratitude for the support and collaboration provided by the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) during the reporting period.

Methodology

5. The Group used a rigorous methodology built on evidentiary standards recommended by the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions ([S/2006/997](#)). Annex 1 fully details the Group's methodology.
6. The present report covers investigations conducted up to 10 November 2025, including a field visit in the Democratic Republic of the Congo between 18 and 24 October. Owing to word count limitations, the Group placed certain evidence, analysis and findings in the annexes. Annexes constitute an integral component of the present report and are to be read in conjunction with its main findings and analysis.

II. Alliance Fleuve Congo/Mouvement du 23 mars crisis in North and South Kivu

A. Peacemaking initiatives in Washington and Doha

7. Regional and international efforts to end the conflict related to AFC/M23 in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo culminated on 27 June 2025 in the signing of the Peace Agreement between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of Rwanda in Washington, D.C., brokered by the United States of America in consultation with Qatar and Togo (as African Union mediator).¹ Less than a month later, following agreement on trust-building measures (see annex 2), the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and AFC/M23 signed the Doha Declaration of Principles (see annex 3), initiating direct negotiations, a step the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo had resisted since 2021.

Washington Agreement

8. Under the Washington Agreement, the Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda committed to respecting each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity, ceasing hostilities, refraining from military incursions and fully implementing the concept of operations for the harmonized plan for the neutralization

¹ www.state.gov/peace-agreement-between-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-the-republic-of-rwanda.

of Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR) and the disengagement of forces and the lifting of defensive measures by Rwanda of 31 October 2024 (S/2024/969, paras. 76 and 77). They committed to ceasing support for armed groups, facilitating the safe and voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons, supporting the conditional reintegration of former combatants into the security forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and enabling MONUSCO to fulfil its mandate effectively. A joint security coordination mechanism and a joint oversight committee were established to implement the concept of operations. An operational order² was signed on 18 September, outlining the modalities, sequencing and timelines for implementing the concept of operations. However, there were delays in the implementation of both the concept of operations and the operational order (see para. 13 below).

9. Under the Washington Agreement, regional economic cooperation was also envisaged under a new regional economic integration framework, including responsible mineral trade (see annex 4). The framework was initialled by the Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda on 7 November 2025, but its implementation remains contingent upon the satisfactory execution of the concept of operations and the operational order.³

Doha Principles

10. Under the Doha Principles, the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and AFC/M23 reaffirmed their commitment to a permanent ceasefire and the setting up of a joint mechanism to define its practical implementation. They agreed upon prisoner exchanges, the return of State authority to areas held by AFC/M23, the return of displaced populations and the signing of a formal peace agreement by no later than 19 July 2025. At the time of drafting, this comprehensive peace agreement had not yet been concluded.

11. The talks stalled due to difficulties reaching an agreement on the demands of AFC/M23, including the prisoner releases. However, the parties maintained active engagement in Doha and, on 18 September, they signed a formal prisoner exchange agreement as part of confidence-building measures.⁴ On 14 October, both sides concluded an agreement establishing a ceasefire monitoring and verification mechanism (see annex 5).

Challenges to the peace processes

12. Between August and November 2025, several rounds of negotiations followed the signing of the Washington Agreement and the Doha Principles, aimed at addressing remaining contentious issues.⁵ However, persistent mistrust, continued war rhetoric and mutual accusations of ceasefire violations continued to create challenges for both peace initiatives (S/2025/446, annex 5).⁶

13. Both the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda continued to interpret key provisions of the Washington Agreement differently, resulting in disagreements and delays in the implementation of agreed-upon measures. A central point of contention was the sequencing of measures outlined in the concept of operations, notably the synchronization of timelines, responsibility for the neutralization of

² www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/11/joint-statement-on-the-fourth-joint-oversight-committee-for-the-peace-agreement.

³ Ibid.

⁴ https://x.com/US_SrAdvisorAF/status/1966505628160954775?s=20.

⁵ Diplomatic sources, civil society, researchers and intelligence sources.

⁶ Civil society, researchers, intelligence and diplomatic sources, and media reports.

FDLR and the withdrawal of the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) from Congolese territory.

14. The concept of operations and corresponding operational order assigned sole responsibility for neutralizing FDLR to the Congolese authorities. The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo expressed its commitment to this objective, publicly stated that it did not support FDLR and called on FDLR combatants to disarm and surrender (see annex 6). However, the bulk of FDLR forces operated in areas controlled by AFC/M23 and RDF, beyond the operational reach of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC), affecting the latter's ability to neutralize FDLR elements that refused to surrender. Meanwhile, RDF and AFC/M23 have been conducting their own military operations against FDLR since April (see paras. 36–45 below).

15. Representatives of FDLR and the Volontaires pour la défense de la patrie (VDP)/Wazalendo criticized the peace process for excluding key stakeholders, including FDLR (see annex 7). Furthermore, the absence of a precise definition of who constitutes “FDLR and associated groups” reinforces a long-standing tendency to conflate Hutu communities with FDLR (S/2024/969, para. 77), a pattern that has historically fuelled stigmatization and cycles of retaliatory violence against civilians (see para. 38 below). Such a definition should specify both the structures that constitute FDLR as an armed group and the criteria for identifying any “associated groups,” whether these are armed entities or actors aligned through ideology or operational cooperation (S/2024/969, annex 41).

16. Differences also persisted over the interpretation of the Doha Declaration. The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo expected AFC/M23 to withdraw and accept cantonment, while AFC/M23 leaders insisted on maintaining control of current positions and seeking integration into State structures.⁷ Concomitantly, AFC/M23 advocated autonomy from the Government, touting federalism,⁸ and continued to build its parallel State-like structure and its army towards that long-term objective (see paras. 29–33 below).

17. Despite the ongoing negotiations, heavy armed clashes continued and expanded across North and South Kivu, with FARDC and VDP/Wazalendo opposing AFC/M23 and RDF forces (see para. 46 below). AFC/M23 and RDF increased mobilization efforts, transfers of troops and materiel, offensive operations and internal repression of resistance (see paras. 19–21 below). Rwanda continued to deploy troops and conduct military operations in contravention of the provisions of the Washington Agreement and Security Council resolution 2773 (2025) (see paras. 67–71 below) and failed to exert pressure on AFC/M23 to relinquish territory, halt its consolidation efforts or cease military operations.⁹ FARDC carried out air strikes on AFC/M23 and RDF positions to halt their advancement and disrupt their reinforcement (see paras. 75 and 76 below), in violation of the ceasefire.

18. Finally, the negotiations have yet to result in the establishment of enforcement mechanisms to ensure consistent implementation of the agreed measures.

⁷ <https://x.com/PatrickMuyaya/status/1946501932748837042>; www.radiookapi.net/2025/07/19/actualite/politique/declaration-de-principes-entre-la-rdc-et-lafcm23-patrick-muyaya-salue; and https://x.com/bbisimwa/status/1946515573502030199?s=12&t=_n75XfLAiYYaxKQtM7ZzVg.

⁸ https://x.com/benmbonimpa/status/1951169743940907395?s=46&t=_n75XfLAiYYaxKQtM7ZzVg; https://x.com/benmbonimpa/status/1952769634912092619?s=46&t=_n75XfLAiYYaxKQtM7ZzVg; and www.msn.com/fr-xl/politique/gouvernement/le-m23-suspend-sa-participation-aux-pourparlers-tant-que-ses-prisonniers-ne-sont-pas-lib%C3%A9r%C3%A9s/ar-AA1JiBii.

⁹ AFC/M23 sources, intelligence and civil society sources, and researchers.

B. Alliance Fleuve Congo/Mouvement du 23 mars objective of entrenchment through military operations and parallel governance

19. Since April 2025, AFC/M23 has intensified efforts to consolidate military control through expanded recruitment, intensified military training, and coordinated troop redeployments and operations across North and South Kivu (see paras. 22–27 below). These efforts were accompanied by sustained operational coordination with RDF (see paras. 28, 34–41, 46–49, 51, 53, 55 and 67–71 below), enabling AFC/M23 to reinforce its territorial gains and expand its sphere of influence.

20. AFC/M23 also sought to position itself as a viable governance alternative to the Congolese State, through the systematic establishment of State-like administrative, judicial, fiscal and security structures and the usurpation of State functions (see paras. 29–33 below).¹⁰ The stated aim of AFC/M23 was to govern the conquered territories in the long term through the establishment of an autonomous region in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/2025/446, para. 11). In July 2025, Benjamin Mbonimpa, the permanent secretary and chief negotiator of AFC/M23 at Doha, stated that AFC/M23 was proposing federalism as a form of governance.¹¹

21. These developments are in direct contravention of the peace commitments of AFC/M23 and the sanctions regime.

Recruitment, military training and deployment

Forced recruitment

22. Systematic forced recruitment intensified in all areas under AFC/M23 occupation.¹² Men and underage boys were systematically rounded up, often under the pretext of identity verification or security operations, and forcibly recruited (S/2025/446, paras. 20–24).¹³ Recruitment campaigns during public rallies calling for voluntarily conscription also continued.¹⁴ Testimonies of former recruits interviewed by the Group, as well as verified photographs and video footage, attest to this continued practice throughout North and South Kivu (see annex 8).

Training and troop reinforcements

23. From early July onwards, large-scale troop reinforcements and redeployments, comprised of new recruits, occurred across areas under AFC/M23 control.¹⁵ A first group of graduated recruits was deployed in July.¹⁶ On 14 September, AFC/M23 publicized the “pass-out” of 7,437 “commandos” who had finished their training in Rumangabo.¹⁷ On 1 October, it announced the graduation of an additional 9,350 “commandos” at the Tchanzu training centre.¹⁸ The Group could not independently

¹⁰ https://x.com/simarongongomba/status/1978063010947027338?s=46&t=_n75XfLAIIYaxKQtM7ZzVg; and https://x.com/afcongo/status/1989066726080692569?s=46&t=_n75XfLAIIYaxKQtM7ZzVg.

¹¹ <https://x.com/GrandeOrientale/status/1948751440207380897>.

¹² United Nations and humanitarian sources, civil society, FARDC, intelligence sources, researchers and former recruits.

¹³ United Nations and humanitarian sources, civil society, FARDC, intelligence sources, researchers, former recruits and AFC/M23 insiders.

¹⁴ Eyewitness accounts, AFC/M23 sources, FARDC, and intelligence sources, in addition to <https://x.com/NordKivu4716/status/1987309251681833338?s=20>.

¹⁵ Eyewitness accounts and AFC/M23 sources.

¹⁶ United Nations, FARDC and intelligence sources, and an AFC/M23 source.

¹⁷ https://x.com/lawrencekanyuka/status/1967311327652913270?s=46&t=_n75XfLAIIYaxKQtM7ZzVg; and www.bing.com/videos/riverview/relatedvideo?q=AFC%2fM23+242+defense+locale&mid=2703FE94BCAF53290CF72703FE94BCAF53290CF7&FORM=VIRE.

¹⁸ https://youtu.be/H5KFhXu5VfA?si=OOahSBI7pYwX1_BU.

corroborate these figures. The deployments included former members of FARDC, the Congolese National Police and Wazalendo who had been captured or recruited following the fall of Goma¹⁹ (see annex 9).

24. Despite undergoing more than seven months of training and political indoctrination, most recruits were not fully trusted by the AFC/M23 command. They were often deployed in unfamiliar areas, inadequately equipped and, in some cases, unarmed²⁰ or deployed under duress to the front lines.²¹

25. High rates of desertion reflected persistent challenges faced by AFC/M23 in consolidating loyalty among its ranks, compelling it to ensure command and control primarily through coercive means. Attempted desertion or refusal to comply with orders, in particular at training sites such as Rumangabo and Tchanzu, led to inhumane punishments and summary executions. Escapees reported recruits being forced to endure hunger, untreated illness, physical abuse and torture.²²

26. AFC/M23 also continued the recruitment and training of its “local defence” forces, tasked with maintaining security in towns and villages controlled by AFC/M23 (see annex 10). However, these forces were frequently implicated in clashes with FDLR and Wazalendo combatants and in human rights abuses.²³

27. AFC/M23 ideological and leadership training sessions for regular and political “cadres” continued during the reporting period,²⁴ including with the participation of members of the Congolese diaspora and the political opposition (S/2025/446, paras. 20 and 24 and annexes 12 and 14).²⁵

Establishment of Alliance Fleuve Congo/Mouvement du 23 mars police brigade

28. On 24 August 2025, “General” Sultani Makenga (CDi.008) unveiled the AFC/M23 “elite police force” operating under the movement’s internal security structure.²⁶ Named Police révolutionnaire congolaise (M23/PRC) (see annex 11), it was placed under the command of “Colonel” Guillaume Eboko, a former FARDC officer.²⁷ The new police units were deployed primarily in Goma and Bukavu, allowing military troops to focus on the front lines.²⁸ AFC/M23 insiders, as well as intelligence and security sources, reported the presence of RDF elements embedded in M23/PRC (S/2025/446, para. 98). The newly established M23/PRC continued to conduct large-scale operations in Goma and Bukavu (S/2025/446, paras. 105–108),

¹⁹ United Nations and humanitarian sources, civil society, FARDC sources, intelligence sources, researchers and former recruits.

²⁰ AFC/M23 insiders, former AFC/M23 recruits, and security and intelligence sources.

²¹ United Nations and community sources, and researchers.

²² Ex-AFC/M23 recruits, eyewitnesses, FARDC, United Nations and intelligence sources, and researchers.

²³ United Nations and intelligence sources.

²⁴ https://x.com/lawrencekanyuka/status/1782711316618093046?s=46&t=_n75XfLAIIYaxKQtM7ZzVg; https://x.com/lawrencekanyuka/status/1942123503475388669?s=46&t=_n75XfLAIIYaxKQtM7ZzVg; https://x.com/lawrencekanyuka/status/1826027143387812316?s=46&t=_n75XfLAIIYaxKQtM7ZzVg; https://x.com/lawrencekanyuka/status/1964970444550701127?s=46&t=_n75XfLAIIYaxKQtM7ZzVg; and https://x.com/lawrencekanyuka/status/1972227230127280251?s=46&t=_n75XfLAIIYaxKQtM7ZzVg;

²⁵ Intelligence and AFC/M23 sources.

²⁶ https://x.com/lawrencekanyuka/status/1960742523909103636?s=46&t=_n75XfLAIIYaxKQtM7ZzVg.

²⁷ https://x.com/lawrencekanyuka/status/1962121306209456236?s=46&t=_n75XfLAIIYaxKQtM7ZzVg.

²⁸ https://x.com/lawrencekanyuka/status/1960742523909103636?s=46&t=_n75XfLAIIYaxKQtM7ZzVg; <https://x.com/SimaroNgongoMba/status/1959678356238344457>; and <https://kivumorningpost.com/2025/08/25/rdc-deploiement-de-policiers-formes-par-la-fc-m23-a-goma-et-bukavu>.

resulting in arbitrary detentions and the forcible conscription of boys and men.²⁹ The Group interviewed victims of arrest who had witnessed torture, inhumane treatment – including detainees stripped naked and held without food and water – and summary executions in detention centres in Goma.³⁰

Consolidation of parallel administration

29. Despite ongoing engagement in negotiations in Doha (see paras. 10 and 11 above), AFC/M23 continued to set up and operationalize its parallel governance structures.

30. The replacement of customary authorities with individuals loyal to AFC/M23 continued (S/2025/446, para. 27), including the unlawful appointments of new *mwami* to the thrones in Bukumu chiefdom in Nyiragongo territory³¹ and the Bashali chiefdom in Masisi territory,³² in contravention of traditional succession procedures (see annex 12).

31. AFC/M23 further implemented measures that effectively usurped core State functions. It proceeded to reform administrative entities, and issued new property and land management laws, effectively interfering with land administration, including taxation and property registration. It began controlling entry and exit from territories under its control, stamping passports and issuing visas.³³ It also announced reforms to the educational system, and ordered universities to sever ties with Kinshasa (see annex 13).

32. As AFC/M23 faced major liquidity constraints and struggled to avoid economic collapse – following the suspension by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo of formal banking operations and the reluctance of private businesses and financial institutions to engage with a sanctioned entity (S/2025/446, annex 19) – AFC/M23 established parallel fiscal and financial structures aimed at sustaining revenue collection and managing liquidity (see annex 14).

33. AFC/M23 also extended its de facto authority over the justice sector by establishing courts and tribunals, recruiting magistrates and creating a “transitional justice mechanism”³⁴ (see annex 15). At the time of reporting, judicial and administrative acts were already being issued. The Government declared that it would invalidate all judicial acts undertaken by AFC/M23 in violation of the country’s constitutional order (see annex 16).³⁵

²⁹ United Nations, FARDC, intelligence and government sources, and civil society.

³⁰ In addition, United Nations sources, researchers, civil society sources, A/HRC/60/80 and www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2025/05/drc-m23-kill-torture-and-hold-civilians-hostage-at-detention-sites-new-investigation.

³¹ <https://kivumorningpost.com/2025/05/15/nyiragongo-intronisation-de-mwami-butsitsi-kahembe-iv-isaac-sous-lafc-m23>.

³² <https://youtu.be/XpFIVMKn8Pg?si=RTWEig1auG2D39Nh>.

³³ Goma residents, Congolese authorities and diplomatic sources. See also <https://x.com/afrikarabia/status/1924516214316949637?s=20>.

³⁴ www.youtube.com/watch?v=etY7slYoDxc.

³⁵ www.youtube.com/watch?v=XQoCxJrqb2A and <https://x.com/StanysBujakera/status/1961535493381722510?s=20>.

C. Alliance Fleuve Congo/Mouvement du 23 mars and Rwanda Defence Force military operations

34. Between April and October 2025, AFC/M23, with sustained RDF support, conducted a coordinated military campaign across multiple fronts in North and South Kivu and undertook preparations for offensive operations (see annex 17).

North Kivu

35. After seizing Goma, AFC/M23 and RDF redirected their efforts towards suppressing local resistance, conducting offensive operations against FDLR positions, in particular in Rutshuru territory. Progressively, AFC/M23 expanded offensive operations to Masisi and Walikale territories and began reinforcing its northern front in Lubero territory.

Alliance Fleuve Congo/Mouvement du 23 mars-Rwanda Defence Force operations targeting Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda strongholds

36. Since April 2025, RDF units have led joint operations with AFC/M23 aimed at neutralizing FDLR (S/2025/446, paras. 39 and 71 and annex 23). Initially, the operations targeted FDLR factions, allied Wazalendo groups and residual FARDC elements operating in and around Goma, in particular near the Nyiragongo and Nyamulagira volcanoes in Nyiragongo territory (S/2025/446, paras. 39 and 71). After being dislodged towards Rutshuru territory (S/2025/446, para. 71), FDLR combatants operating alongside VDP/Wazalendo groups continued to exert pressure on RDF and AFC/M23 and retained partial control in areas of the Bwito and Bwisha chiefdoms. RDF and AFC/M23 military strategy focused on targeting both known and perceived FDLR strongholds in these areas (S/2016/466, annex 9; S/2016/1102, para. 16; and S/2018/531, paras. 16–18), where predominantly Hutu populations live.

37. In Bwito chiefdom, western Rutshuru, RDF and AFC/M23 launched coordinated operations in late April and early May targeting FDLR and allied forces of the Collectif des mouvements pour le changement/Forces de défense du peuple (CMC-FDP), including in and around Nyanzale, Bukombo, Tongo and Bambo.³⁶ Heavy clashes spiked again in July and resumed from October onward. Since September, the Group has documented a partial redeployment of RDF forces from this area towards other front lines, notably in Masisi (see paras. 46–48 below). In their place, AFC/M23 deployed its newly constituted “Fourth Brigade,” reportedly composed of recent recruits, including former Wazalendo and FARDC elements, under the command of Mapenzi,³⁷ the former leader of the Wazalendo-affiliated Nduma défense du Congo-Rénové/Mapenzi (NDC-R/M), who joined AFC/M23 in March 2025.³⁸

38. The fighting was marked by heavy ground combat and systematic cordon-and-search operations conducted by RDF and AFC/M23 forces targeting FDLR and associated armed groups, as well as civilians accused of collaborating with FDLR and associated armed groups, including women and children.³⁹ AFC/M23 frequently issued forced evacuation orders to civilians, warning that anyone who remained in

³⁶ United Nations and intelligence sources, AFC/M23, FDLR and CMC-FDP sources, civil society, humanitarian sources, researchers and diplomatic sources.

³⁷ United Nations, intelligence and AFC/M23 military sources.

³⁸ https://x.com/lawrencekanyuka/status/1898673259593261421?s=46&t=_n75XfLAIIYaxKQtM7ZzVg; and <https://actualite.cd/2025/03/10/rdc-le-chef-milicien-kabido-du-fpp-ap-fait-allegeance-au-m23-des-analystes-pas-surpris>.

³⁹ Intelligence, civil society and humanitarian sources, United Nations sources, local witnesses, community leaders and researchers.

the area would be treated as a target.⁴⁰ Many locations targeted were agricultural fields managed by FDLR and affiliates in and around Virunga National Park, such as Mozambique and Kazaroho,⁴¹ which were also targeted in the past (S/2023/431, paras. 67 and 88 and annexes 40–42). RDF and AFC/M23 forces carried out summary executions, arbitrary arrests and detentions, and the deliberate destruction and burning of civilian infrastructure, including homes and villages, triggering the mass displacement of civilians.⁴² Since operations began in April, United Nations and humanitarian sources reported that over 300 civilians were killed in Bwito chiefdom alone, both as collateral casualties and through targeted executions.⁴³

39. Since mid-July 2025, RDF and AFC/M23 have resumed military operations following significant redeployments.⁴⁴ This phase targeted areas in eastern Rutshuru territory, in particular localities in Binza village within the Bwisha chiefdom, where elements of the FDLR splinter group RUD-Urunana⁴⁵ operated. Large-scale cordon-and-search operations were conducted by RDF forces in farmlands along the main road between Kiwanja and the border town of Ishasha. AFC/M23 forces established a security cordon around the area, restricting civilian movement in and out. Multiple witness and survivor testimonies confirmed indiscriminate killings and executions, including of women and children.⁴⁶

40. Between 9 and 27 July, over 300 civilian casualties were reported across Binza, notably in Nyamilima, Kisharo, Burambo, Kiseuro, Katwiguro, Musinga, Kigarigari and surrounding areas.⁴⁷ Many victims were farmers and their families camping in their fields during the cultivation season. Corroborating witness accounts, confirmed by photographic and video evidence,⁴⁸ indicated that civilians were summarily executed, following arbitrary accusations of collaboration with FDLR or other Wazalendo armed groups. Bodies were frequently disposed of in rivers, and burials were prohibited by local AFC/M23 authorities.⁴⁹

41. Throughout these operations, RDF and AFC/M23 systematically destroyed and burned civilian settlements inhabited by members of FDLR, their families or alleged supporters.⁵⁰ Analysis of photographic evidence, satellite imagery and the fire-sensing system of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration of the United States corroborated several incidents (see annex 18).

⁴⁰ United Nations sources, civil society, witnesses and researchers. For example, according to United Nations sources, on 30 May 2025, AFC/M23 ordered the evacuation of over 240 households from five villages (Burambo, Kiyeye, Mayi ya Chumvi, Ngeri and Kiganda), leading to mass displacement of civilians. See also <https://actualite.cd/index.php/2025/08/08/rutshuru-encore-des-habitants-contraints-par-lafcm23-de-quitter-leurs-villages-dans-la>.

⁴¹ United Nations sources, civil society and humanitarian sources, eyewitnesses, intelligence sources, researchers, and AFC/M23 and FDLR members.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ S/2011/345, para. 38; and S/2011/738, paras. 123–128.

⁴⁶ United Nations and humanitarian sources, witness testimonies, civil society, community leaders and researchers. See also www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/08/drc-turk-appalled-attacks-against-civilians-rwandan-backed-m23-and-other; www.hrw.org/news/2025/08/20/dr-congo-m23-mass-killings-near-virunga-national-park; www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/ffmk-drc/a-hrc-60-80-auv-en.pdf; and www.msf.hk/en/latest/news-and-stories/news/massacres-in-binza-msf-patients-testify-to-july-atrocities-in-north-kivu-drc.

⁴⁷ United Nations, civil society and humanitarian sources, eyewitnesses, intelligence sources, researchers, AFC/M23 and FDLR members.

⁴⁸ On file with the Secretariat.

⁴⁹ Civil society, humanitarian sources, FARDC, United Nations sources, local witnesses, researchers, Democratic Republic of the Congo authorities, and audiovisual evidence.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

42. Humanitarian actors, civil society and local leaders denounced the AFC/M23 practice of expelling civilians and subsequently denying access to their lands in these areas, leading to loss of livelihoods and a looming famine (see annex 19). The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Uganda reported the arrival of over 70,000 refugees between January and 21 September 2025, noting a sharp increase in refugee arrivals from Rutshuru territory recorded since April, coinciding with the start of anti-FDLR operations (see annex 20).

43. The deliberate and systematic targeting of a particular group – FDLR and civilians associated with them, primarily from the Hutu community – may amount to war crimes or crimes against humanity.

44. Operationally, Bwito and Bwisha chiefdoms fall under the AFC/M23 “First Defence Zone” command, led by “Brigadier General” Baudoin Ngaruye (CDi.019).⁵¹ Ngaruye was sanctioned by the United Nations in 2014 for his involvement in operations that led to targeted killings of civilians, and for having ordered, in the context of anti-FDLR operations in 2009, the killing of any young men found and the capture and return to Rwanda of all children, women and elders (S/2009/603, paras. 182, 362–364 and 366).

45. The operations in Bwito and Bwisha chiefdoms did not achieve the neutralization of any senior FDLR figures.⁵²

Masisi and Walikale

46. From late May 2025, AFC/M23, supported by RDF,⁵³ prepared renewed offensives from Masisi towards Walikale, which they had vacated in April 2025⁵⁴ due to logistical constraints and diplomatic pressure.⁵⁵ AFC/M23 and RDF deployed reinforcements into Masisi territory along the Masisi–Kashebere and the Nyabiondo–Kashebere axes, at the boundary with Walikale territory, with the objective of taking Walikale centre (see annex 21).⁵⁶

47. Throughout June and July, military activity intensified across Masisi and Walikale as AFC/M23 and RDF pushed westward and fortified key positions, while VDP/Wazalendo coalitions escalated harassment to delay advances, resulting in heavy clashes around Pinga and Mpeti and along the Masisi–Kashebere–Kibati axis. By early September, AFC/M23 and RDF had repositioned forces around Pinga and northern Masisi, including Bibwe, a critical junction on the corridor linking Rutshuru, Masisi and Walikale, which coincided with RDF troop redeployments from Rutshuru (see para. 37 above). In mid-September, AFC/M23 and RDF launched operations across northern Masisi, seizing Bibwe and several surrounding localities – an estimated 100 km² – while advancing towards Lukweti, the Alliance des patriotes

⁵¹ S/2024/432, paras. 36, 53 and 107. See also <https://kivumorningpost.com/2025/07/31/rutshuru-lafc-m23-encourage-les-jeunes-de-bwito-a-rejoindre-larc-pour-securiser-leurs-villages>.

⁵² United Nations and humanitarian actors reported that the overall civilian death toll has surpassed 500 throughout Bwito and Bwisha chiefdoms since April 2025. The Group could not independently establish verified casualty figures.

⁵³ United Nations and intelligence sources, combatants, AFC/M23 sources, civil society, confidential local operatives, researchers and diplomatic sources.

⁵⁴ <https://kivumorningpost.com/2025/04/04/rdc-lafc-m23-annonce-son-retrait-de-walikale-et-met-en-garde-contre-toute-attaque-de-larmee>; and www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20250403-rdc-walikale-centre-aux-mains-des-fardc-apr%C3%A8s-le-retrait-de-l-afc-m23.

⁵⁵ Intelligence, diplomatic, United Nations and AFC/M23 sources, and researchers.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

pour un Congo libre et souverain (APCLS) headquarters and a key entry point into Walikale.⁵⁷

48. By late September, AFC/M23 and RDF operations had expanded on three fronts, with the aim of encircling Pinga. From late September into early October, VDP/Wazalendo groups intensified efforts to disrupt supply lines along the Bibwe-Pinga axis, which is also used for the movements of VDP/Wazalendo, notably APCLS and FDLR.⁵⁸ Clashes continued around Bibwe in October, with AFC/M23 and RDF capturing additional villages. To halt the advancement of AFC/M23 and RDF, between mid- to late September and October, FARDC increased air strikes, notably in Bibwe, Mpeti and Minjenje between 19 and 21 September, relying on VDP/Wazalendo and FDLR elements to conduct asymmetric ground operations.⁵⁹

Lubero

49. Simultaneously, AFC/M23, reinforced by RDF, consolidated its positions in Lubero territory, in anticipation of future operations.⁶⁰ In mid-October, AFC/M23 and RDF redeployed additional troops from Tchanzu to the Lubero front line, along the Kanyobagonga–Kirumba axis, which reportedly included recruits that had graduated on 1 October (see para. 23 above).⁶¹

50. This northward movement signaled the ambition of AFC/M23 to extend its influence towards Butembo, Beni and Kisangani,⁶² as affirmed by AFC/M23 sources and revealed in public statements by senior AFC/M23 officials (see annex 22).

South Kivu

51. AFC/M23 and RDF progressively expanded and consolidated their presence in South Kivu, along various axes across Walungu, Mwenga, Uvira and Kalehe territories (S/2025/446, para. 171). Operational deployments indicated a strategic aim of securing transit corridors and mining areas, as well as reinforcing Twirwaneho in the Hauts Plateaux.

52. Since late-April, reinforcements have been documented in strategic locations such as Kamanyola, Katogota, Nyangezi, Luhwinja and Kaziba (see annex 23), including convoys that crossed the border with Rwanda (see para. 67 below).⁶³ These deployments enabled AFC/M23 and RDF to maintain control over key transit hubs, including Kaziba, Katogota and the Tubimbi–Luhwinja corridor (see annex 24) and to sustain operations extending from the Ruzizi Plain to the Hauts Plateaux.⁶⁴ Continued advances into Walungu and Shabunda in September and October, culminating in the capture of Nzibira, Luntukulu, Chulwe, Lubimbe and positions

⁵⁷ United Nations, intelligence, FARDC and combatant/armed group sources, including AFC/M23, civil society, confidential local operatives, researchers and diplomatic sources.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ United Nations, FARDC, security and intelligence sources, AFC/M23 insiders, civil society and researchers.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² United Nations, security and intelligence sources, and AFC/M23 insiders.

⁶³ United Nations, FARDC, security and intelligence sources, researchers, and civil society sources.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

along provincial route 503 (RP 503),⁶⁵ suggest an attempt to seize key logistics nodes connecting Walungu, Shabunda and Mwenga territories, as well as airstrips and mineral trading hubs.

53. AFC/M23 and RDF⁶⁶ also continued to provide critical military support to besieged Mouvement des républicains pour la dignité des peuples (MRDP)-Twirwaneho-controlled enclaves in the Hauts Plateaux (see annex 25), deploying troop reinforcements despite heavy pressure from FARDC, the Burundi National Defence Force (FDNB) and Wazalendo forces.⁶⁷ After AFC/M23 reinforcements led by “Lieutenant-Colonel” Japhet Gakufe reached Minembwe in March 2025 (S/2025/446, para. 178), a second reinforcement, led by “Lieutenant-Colonel” Oscar Ndabagaza, was blocked as it attempted to cross hostile areas before finally reaching Mikenge at the end of August.⁶⁸ AFC/M23 and RDF assistance remained essential as MRDP-Twirwaneho’s access routes and supply chains aimed at Banyamulenge population centres have collapsed, and the area remained economically strangled and increasingly encircled.⁶⁹

54. The FARDC–Wazalendo–FDNB coalition continued to contest the advances of AFC/M23 and RDF across multiple fronts. AFC/M23 advances towards Uvira were blocked by FDNB and FARDC positions defending the Ruzizi plain (S/2025/446, para. 171).

Expansion into mineral-rich areas in South Kivu

55. AFC/M23, with RDF support, continued to expand control over strategic mining areas in South Kivu, consolidating access to mineral resources that contribute to the financing of its armed activities.

“3T” minerals and gold

56. AFC/M23 maintained control over the main mining areas for “3T” minerals (tin, tantalum and tungsten) around Lumbishi, Numbi and Nyabibwe in Kalehe territory (S/2025/446, para. 109).⁷⁰ On 21 September, AFC/M23 captured Nzibira, a strategic mineral trading hub in Walungu territory, which also serves as a transit point for minerals originating from Shabunda territory, especially cassiterite and coltan sourced from mining areas around Nzovu.⁷¹

57. As a result of this expansion, approximately half of South Kivu’s cassiterite and coltan production, and over two thirds of its wolframite output, now originates from the territories currently under AFC/M23 control (see annex 26).

58. The bulk of artisanal and semi-mechanized gold mining in South Kivu is concentrated in Shabunda, Mwenga and Fizi territories, in areas controlled by FARDC and Wazalendo groups. Conversely, territory in the province controlled by AFC/M23

⁶⁵ United Nations, security and intelligence sources, civil society and open-source reporting. See also www.radiookapi.net/2025/09/22/actualite/securite/le-m23-sempare-de-la-cite-de-nzibira-apres-dintenses-combats-contre; www.congoquotidien.com/2025/09/22/m23-rebelles-prise-nzibira-sud-kivu; <https://x.com/kivunews24/status/1975332172593549662?s=20>; www.nouveaumedias.cd/sud-kivu-le-m23-prend-le-controle-des-villages-chulwe-et-kishadu-a-kabare-et-lubimbe; and <https://x.com/AganzeRafiki/status/1975521242628104215?s=20>.

⁶⁶ United Nations, Rwandan intelligence and security sources, researchers and civil society sources.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ United Nations, FARDC, security and intelligence sources, researchers and civil society sources.

⁷⁰ United Nations sources and media reports.

⁷¹ United Nations sources, mining officials and www.itsci.org/2025/09/03/ongoing-situation-in-north-and-south-kivu-province-drc.

province included three key gold mining operations: a large artisanal mining site in Luhihi, Kabare territory (see paras. 59–62 below); the Twangiza mine in Mwenga territory (see paras. 63–66 below); and a semi-mechanized mining operation near Karhembu, Walungu territory.

Alliance Fleuve Congo/Mouvement du 23 mars control over gold mining in Luhihi

59. Luhihi has seen a sharp increase in artisanal gold mining following the discovery of rich deposits at the “Lomera” site in January 2025. Satellite imagery confirms the rapid expansion of mining activities and the emergence of a new mining settlement (see annex 27). Local sources estimate that well over 5,000 artisanal miners operated at Lomera during the first half of 2025, exploiting hundreds of active mineshafts.⁷²

60. AFC/M23 established de facto control over mining operations in the area following its takeover in mid-February, replacing official State services with a local “mining office” operating under its authority. The de facto authorities imposed a production tax of 30 per cent on the sale price of ore at pit level.⁷³

61. AFC/M23 agents implemented a structured system to monitor and assess ore quality, including regular inspections of mineral grades in active pits, and to supervise the quantity of ore transported to crushing mills (see annex 28). Additional taxes were levied on various mining actors and activities.⁷⁴

62. On 30 August, AFC/M23 suspended mining activities in Lomera due to tensions with the mining community, caused by the combined effect of unregulated mining expansion and the rent-seeking practices of AFC/M23, which promised to resume mining activities following the registration of artisanal miners. Delays in implementing the registration process have led to speculation that the de facto authorities intend to transition towards semi-mechanized exploitation.⁷⁵

Twangiza Mining

63. On 8 May 2025, AFC/M23 took over the industrial open-pit gold mine in Luhwindja chieftdom, Mwenga territory, owned by Twangiza Mining SA.⁷⁶ The mine had previously ceased exporting gold at the end of 2019.⁷⁷ Twangiza holds key strategic importance as the only industrial-scale gold mine in the Kivus, with extensive processing facilities (see annex 29).

64. High-resolution satellite imagery analysis reveals a significant level of activity between the takeover in May and September, notably extensive rehabilitation works such as road repairs and the clearing of landslides. Over a dozen heavy vehicles were observed at the open-pit mine (see annex 30).

65. On 15 and 23 October 2025, FARDC carried out air strikes on Twangiza to prevent further efforts to operationalize the mine, damaging its power-generation

⁷² Artisanal miners, mining officials and civil society sources.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Artisanal miners, mining officials and civil society sources.

⁷⁶ Testimonies from the employees and civil society.

⁷⁷ Ministry of Mines annual export statistics: https://mines.gouv.cd/fr/wp-content/uploads/simple-file-list/statistiques/STATISTIQUES_MINIERES_ANNEE_2019.pdf; and https://mines.gouv.cd/fr/wp-content/uploads/simple-file-list/statistiques/STATISTIQUES_MINIERES_ANNEE_2020.pdf.

facilities⁷⁸ and destroying two fuel-storage tanks and a portion of the processing plant (see annex 31).⁷⁹

66. Twangiza Mining SA publicly denounced the “systematic looting and destruction of industrial and environmental assets” by AFC/M23, alleging “active support” from RDF.⁸⁰ On 23 October, AFC/M23 coordinator Corneille Nangaa publicly denied the allegations, claiming that the mine was inactive, with only artisanal miners present, and that AFC/M23 lacked the necessary expertise and resources to operate gold mines⁸¹ (see annex 32).

D. Critical support from the Rwanda Defence Force to military operations and territorial occupation

67. The Group obtained further evidence – including testimonies of AFC/M23 sources, a high-ranking AFC/M23 commander and intelligence, diplomatic and security sources – confirming continued cross-border deployments of RDF and its reinforced presence in North and South Kivu, positioning on front lines and direct engagement in combat, including by taking the lead in anti-FDLR operations in Nyiragongo and Rutshuru territories (see paras. 36–39 and 41 above).⁸²

68. At the time of drafting, the Group conservatively estimated that between 6,000 and 7,000 RDF personnel remained deployed across North and South Kivu, comprising at least two brigades and two special forces battalions.⁸³ These were task-organized, mission-tailored formations created specifically for the cross-border operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and included special forces elements and a significant number of reserve forces personnel.⁸⁴

69. One RDF brigade operated within the “first defence zone” of AFC/M23, covering Goma, Nyiragongo, Binza, Bwito and Rutshuru, as well as Kanyobagonga, Kirumba and Kipese in Lubero (see paras. 36–39 and 41 above). Another RDF brigade operated in the “second defence zone”, covering Masisi, Walikale, Bibwe and Kalembe, along the Pinga front line, as well as areas of South Kivu, including Walungu, Mwenga and Minembwe.⁸⁵ Throughout the reporting period, there were frequent reinforcements of and redeployments to and between these operational theatres. RDF had established a base on Idjwi island, which was often used for troop deployments and rotations via Lake Kivu.⁸⁶

70. RDF support was critical to the success of operations, including in taking new areas such as Bibwe (see para. 47 above). AFC/M23 sources, including an AFC/M23 senior commander currently participating in joint AFC/M23 and RDF operations, confirmed that RDF elements, referred to as the “Friendly Force”, “manage the front lines” and “control M23 combatants”. Sources, including eyewitnesses and AFC/M23 sources, consistently distinguished RDF soldiers from AFC/M23 combatants based on their equipment, discipline, operational behaviour and command structures. RDF members deployed with more advanced materiel, operated in separate formations

⁷⁸ Photographs and satellite imagery, and former staff.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Twangiza Mining SA and media reports.

⁸¹ www.youtube.com/watch?v=etY7slYoDxc.

⁸² United Nations sources, FARDC, Wazalendo and FDLR combatants, civil society, local organizations, eyewitnesses and researchers.

⁸³ AFC/M23 sources, including a high-ranking commander, security and intelligence sources, United Nations sources, FARDC and a former member of RDF.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Non-exhaustive list.

⁸⁶ AFC/M23 elements, United Nations, FARDC and intelligence sources, and researchers.

despite conducting joint manoeuvres with AFC/M23, and exhibited distinct movement patterns and speech accents, making them readily identifiable in the field (S/2023/431, annex 31).⁸⁷

71. The Group continued to document the use by RDF of advanced military technology and equipment, including jamming and spoofing systems (annex 33 and S/2025/446, paras. 45–48). The Group also conducted a technical assessment of a tactical radio seized from an RDF soldier in Masisi in March 2025 bearing the marking “RT-7106 TADIRAN COMMUNICATIONS” (see annex 34).⁸⁸

E. Proxies of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Cooperation of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo with Volontaires pour la défense de la patrie/Wazalendo and Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda

72. The Government continued to rely on VDP/Wazalendo as a proxy force to repel AFC/M23 and RDF advances and regain key strategic areas (S/2025/446, paras. 63 and 64). It also continued cooperating with FDLR, despite commitments to “neutralize” the group (see para. 77 below).

Volontaires pour la défense de la patrie/Wazalendo areas of operations and command

73. In North Kivu, VDP/Wazalendo and FDLR remained active on several major front lines across Masisi, Rutshuru, Nyiragongo and Walikale territories, and on the outskirts of Goma. They continued to occupy the first line of defence, supporting FARDC (S/2025/446, para. 63).⁸⁹ Since June 2025, VDP/Wazalendo units, often operating jointly with FDLR, have conducted incursions and ambushes against AFC/M23 and RDF, either to recapture strategic positions or to disrupt AFC/M23 and RDF advances and supply lines.⁹⁰

74. The VDP/Wazalendo command structure remained largely unchanged (S/2024/432, para. 61; and S/2025/446, paras. 67–69), despite some elements shifting allegiance towards AFC/M23,⁹¹ most notably Mapenzi of NDC-R/M (see para. 37 above). Since March, AFC/M23 and RDF have often forced VDP/Wazalendo to retreat or relocate (S/2025/446, paras. 65–67). Guidon Shimiray Mwiswa (CDi.033), leader of NDC-R and VDP commander, moved his headquarters from Pinga to Kibati, Walikale territory, to contain RDF and AFC/M23 advancement along the Walikale-Kibua-Kashebere-Masisi axis. APCLS leader Janvier Karairi Boingo and his troops were based in Lukweti, Masisi territory, while CMC-FDP, led by Dominique Ndaruhutse, was in Virunga National Park, engaging in fighting in areas that included Katsiru, Rwindi, Bukombo, Bambo, Tongo and Kalengera, in Rutshuru territory.⁹²

Continued support by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo

75. On 30 September 2025, VDP/Wazalendo leaders and government authorities met in Kinshasa to redefine counter-offensive strategies and cooperation (S/2024/432,

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ www.scribd.com/document/698602023/CNR-710-1.

⁸⁹ United Nations, FARDC, intelligence and civil society sources, ex-combatants and researchers.

⁹⁰ United Nations, FARDC, intelligence and civil society sources, ex-combatants, researchers and VDP/Wazalendo elements.

⁹¹ VDP/Wazalendo, intelligence sources, FARDC and civil society.

⁹² Ibid.

para. 69).⁹³ Sources privy to the discussions reported that the Government agreed to continue providing financial and logistical support to VDP/Wazalendo. The Government continued to provide \$300,000 monthly to VDP/Wazalendo through the office of the governor of North Kivu. FARDC Colonel Sekololo, based in Walikale, still acted as the liaison between FARDC and VDP (S/2024/969, para. 80). Regular FARDC helicopter rotations to various VDP/Wazalendo-held front lines in Walikale delivered uniforms, weapons and ammunition, and food supplies.⁹⁴

76. FARDC also provided air support to VDP/Wazalendo units (see para. 48 above).⁹⁵ FARDC elements operated jointly with VDP/Wazalendo in some ground operations, indicating a lack of clear command structures and increasing operational interdependence.⁹⁶

Efforts to disarm the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda

77. In an effort to demonstrate the country's commitment to the peace process, and to implement the concept of operations and the corresponding operational order (see para. 14 above), FARDC issued a communiqué on 10 October 2025 in which it called upon FDLR to disarm (S/2024/969, paras. 67–73) and surrender, warning that failure to comply would result in forced disarmament (see annex 35). FARDC elements and local populations were reminded to cease collaboration with FDLR. The announcement triggered tensions between FARDC and FDLR, and between FARDC and certain Wazalendo factions (S/2024/969, paras. 67–77). Subsequently, some FARDC officers and government actors sought to reassure FDLR of their continued cooperation, given the essential role of FDLR in ongoing operations on the ground. Furthermore, FARDC lacked the operational capacity and reach to neutralize FDLR (see para. 14 above).

Private military companies and contractors

78. Since the takeover of Goma by AFC/M23 in January 2025, the private military company Congo Protection has ceased its operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/2025/446, para. 74). The contract of Congo Aviation, formerly Agemira (S/2023/431, annex 23), was abruptly terminated at the end of July, following accusations of responsibility for the fall of Goma and Bukavu (see annex 36). Since that date, Congo Aviation's CH-4 drone pilots, identified as Algerian nationals, have been contracted directly by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.⁹⁷

Kisangani hub for operations of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and private military company deployments

79. Kisangani in Tshopo Province hosts the “third defence zone” headquarters of FARDC, while the international airport functions as a base for drone operations and a logistics centre supplying troops on the front lines in North and South Kivu (see paras. 73–75 above). Kisangani also served as a new hub for private military company deployments. The presence of foreign military contractors, notably from South America (S/2025/446, para. 75), has been confirmed in Kisangani and Walikale.

⁹³ VDP/Wazalendo, intelligence sources, FARDC, government sources and civil society.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ VDP/Wazalendo-combatants, FARDC, intelligence, diplomatic and civil society sources, and researchers.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ FARDC, PMC, United Nations, intelligence and diplomatic sources, and civil society.

Contractors from El Salvador have been deployed alongside FARDC at the Lieutenant Général Bahuma camp in Kisangani since July 2025.⁹⁸

F. Violations of international human rights and humanitarian law

80. In the context of ongoing clashes in North and South Kivu, all warring parties were implicated in violations of international humanitarian law and violations and abuses of international human rights law, with a surge in summary executions and sexual violence.⁹⁹ United Nations human rights monitoring statistics indicated that, between April and October 2025, summary executions were the most frequently documented violation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, with AFC/M23 listed as the main perpetrator, responsible for approximately 45 per cent of all summary executions reported across the country. The number of victims of abduction, including for forced recruitment, and ill-treatment by AFC/M23 surpassed the number of victims killed by the same group. Overall, United Nations human rights sources listed AFC/M23 as the main perpetrator of international human rights law abuses and violations documented during this period, responsible for over 30 per cent of all documented violations¹⁰⁰ (see annex 37).

81. VDP/Wazalendo groups also engaged in retaliatory attacks, including summary executions or targeted assassinations of individuals accused of collusion with AFC/M23,¹⁰¹ albeit on a much smaller scale than the recent systematic violations perpetrated by AFC/M23 and RDF (see paras. 36–43 above). Alliance des nationalistes congolais pour la défense des droits humains combatants have been implicated most frequently in serious abuses against civilians, such as abductions, lootings, rape, unlawful killings and arson.¹⁰²

82. In South Kivu, Wazalendo armed groups have entrenched systems of control through an expanding network of roadblocks that significantly inhibit civilian movement across Uvira, Fizi and Mwenga territories). Civilians were compelled to pay prohibitive fees at checkpoints, and were subjected to extortion, abuse, sexual violence and summary execution (see annex 38).¹⁰³ Humanitarian actors deplored this state of affairs as having a major impact on their freedom of movement, with frequent incidents of harassment and extortion reported.

Alliance Fleuve Congo/Mouvement du 23 mars control over population movements and forcible transfers

83. Since May 2025, AFC/M23 has been implicated in both forcible and voluntary returns of thousands of Hutu refugees living in North Kivu to Rwanda. Joint RDF and AFC/M23 operations targeting FDLR-associated communities, accompanied by the forced expulsion of majority Hutu populations from these areas (see paras. 36–43 above), raised concerns about an intentional effort to reshape local demographics in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.¹⁰⁴

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ United Nations sources, humanitarian sources, intelligence sources, civil society, local witnesses, combatants and researchers.

¹⁰⁰ Confidential statistics provided to the Group.

¹⁰¹ United Nations sources, civil society, humanitarian sources, intelligence sources and researchers.

¹⁰² United Nations and humanitarian sources, civil society and researchers.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo sources and Hutu community representatives displaced by AFC/M23, interviewed by the Group. See also <https://x.com/StanyBujakera/status/1922751265525710986>.

Forcible transfer of Hutu civilians to Rwanda in May 2025

84. On 12 May 2025, AFC/M23 rounded up over 2,000 civilians from collective shelters around Goma and Sake – mostly Hutu civilians forcibly displaced by AFC/M23 in February from villages near Virunga National Park – and transferred them, under coercive conditions, to the transit centre for refugees managed by UNHCR in Goma. Of these, 1,798 individuals were subsequently transferred to Rwanda between 17 and 22 May.¹⁰⁵

85. Despite the framing of the operation by AFC/M23 as a “voluntary return” of Rwandan nationals, the conditions for voluntary returns were not met. Most individuals were denied the opportunity to confirm or contest their nationality status or express their objection to the transfer. AFC/M23 forcibly separated men accused of FDLR affiliation, and interfered with UNHCR screening operations at the transit centre in Goma, which were carried out under armed supervision. The AFC/M23 focal point for humanitarian affairs, Chantal Murekatete Kayitaba, threatened UNHCR staff to abort screenings and proceed with the transfer.

86. Annex 39 provides further details on the circumstances of these repatriations.

87. Repatriations have continued since May. Although UNHCR did not report additional instances of coerced returns, its restricted operating environment prevented it from conducting the in-depth verifications necessary to determine whether coercive factors were absent prior to and during transit.¹⁰⁶ In the context of ongoing systematic abuses against Hutu communities (see paras. 36–43 above), forced evictions and the continued presence of AFC/M23 during repatriation processes,¹⁰⁷ it cannot conclusively be assessed that recent returns occurred free of coercive factors.

Population movements from Rwanda to the Democratic Republic of the Congo

88. AFC/M23 continued to facilitate the covert return of alleged Congolese refugees from Rwanda to Nyiragongo, Masisi and Rutshuru territories, and began implementing measures to facilitate future returns (see annex 40), without any coordination or oversight by the Government and without involving UNHCR (S/2025/446, annex 17).¹⁰⁸ Concurrently, the replacement of legally appointed customary chiefs and the destruction of State archives, including land titles, have enabled AFC/M23 to consolidate control over local administration and land management (see paras. 30 and 31 above), facilitating demographic and ownership changes aligned with their objectives (S/2025/446, paras. 11 and 27 and annex 17).

III. Update on mineral traceability

89. The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) Audit Committee proposed the establishment of an ad hoc commission of inquiry to conduct investigations into alleged smuggling of minerals to Rwanda, in response to a request submitted by the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the ICGLR conference secretariat (S/2025/446, annex 55). This recommendation was endorsed at the extraordinary meeting of ICGLR ministers in charge of mines in Lusaka on 2 May 2025. The ministers also decided to establish a ministerial committee to undertake official visits and facilitate constructive dialogue (see annex 41).

¹⁰⁵ UNHCR.

¹⁰⁶ United Nations source and a confidential source working on refugee-related matters in North Kivu.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ United Nations, humanitarian, intelligence and civil society sources, and researchers.

90. Rwanda opposed the establishment of a commission of inquiry, including in a letter to the President of the Security Council dated 23 May 2025 and during a meeting of ICGLR ministers in charge of mines on 31 July 2025 (see annexes 42 and 43). Nevertheless, the Ministers reaffirmed their earlier decision.

91. The Executive Secretary of ICGLR formally established the ad hoc commission of inquiry on 3 August 2025. The Commission is mandated to investigate instances of smuggling of 3T minerals and gold between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda since 2022, to examine mineral supply chains in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and in Rwanda, and to propose measures against exporters or Member States (see annex 44).

IV. Recommendations

92. The Group makes the recommendations set out below:

To the Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda:

(a) Adopt a clear and operational definition of the term “FDLR and associated groups” in the Washington Agreement and its implementing documents, specifying the structures that constitute FDLR as an armed group and the criteria for identifying any “associated groups”, whether these are armed entities or actors aligned through ideology or operational cooperation (see paras. 15, 38, 43, 83);

(b) Ensure that the Washington Agreement and its follow-up mechanisms incorporate more inclusive consultation frameworks with conflict-affected communities and relevant regional stakeholders (see para. 15);

To the Government of Rwanda:

(c) Cooperate fully with the ad hoc commission of inquiry established by ICGLR to investigate allegations of smuggling of 3T minerals and gold (see para. 91).

To the Security Council:

(d) Call on the conflict parties in North and South Kivu to cease all violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law, and refrain from targeting civilians (see paras. 22, 25, 38–43 and 80–88).

List of annexes

- Annex 1 (para. 5) - Investigative methodology, including in contexts of insecurity, lack of access or access denial
- Annex 2 (para. 7) - Trust-building measures requested by the AFC/M23 delegation in Doha
- Annex 3 (para. 7) – The Doha Declaration of Principles between the Government of the DRC and the representatives of AFCM23
- Annex 4 (para. 9) - Key provisions of the Regional Economic Integration Framework (REIF)
- Annex 5 (para. 11) - Ceasefire monitoring and verification mechanism signed on 14 October 2025
- Annex 6 (para. 14) - FARDC press communique instructing FDLR to disarm and surrender
- Annex 7 (para. 15) - Statements by FDLR and VDP/Wazalendo representatives reacting to agreements concluded in the framework of the Washington and Doha peace processes
- Annex 8 (para. 22) - Statements by FDLR and VDP/Wazalendo representatives reacting to agreements concluded in the framework of the Washington and Doha peace processes
- Annex 9 (para. 23) - AFC/M23 Military trainings and troops reinforcements
- Annex 10 (para. 26) - Announcement on the graduation of 242 Local Defense Personnel in Nyiragongo, 23 September 2025
- Annex 11 (para. 28) - Announcement on the creation of AFC/M23's Police Révolutionnaire Congolaise (M23/PRC)
- Annex 12 (para. 30) - Unlawful replacement of the Mwami of Bashali chefferie by AFC/M23
- Annex 13 (para. 31) - AFC/M23's usurpation of core state functions
- Annex 14 (para. 32) - AFC/M23 - Establishment of parallel financial administration
- Annex 15 (para. 33) - AFC/M23's establishment of a parallel judicial system
- Annex 16 (para. 33) - DRC Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature statement declaring all judicial acts undertaken by AFC/M23 as violation of the DRC's constitutional order, 12 September 2025
- Annex 17 (para. 34) - AFC/M23-controlled territories on 30 September 2025
- Annex 18 (para. 41) - Analysis of photographic evidence, satellite imagery and NASA's fire-sensing system corroborating incidents of AFC/M23-RDF burning civilian infrastructure, between April and October 2025
- Annex 19 (para. 42) - AFC/M23 denying access to civilians to their lands leading to loss of livelihoods and famine
- Annex 20 (para. 42) - Refugee arrivals from Rutshuru territory to Uganda, coinciding with start of AFC/M23-RDF anti-FDLR operations end of April – May
- Annex 21 (para. 46) - Strategic importance of the Kashebere and the Nyabiondo–Kashebere axes at the boundary between Masisi and Walikale territories
- Annex 22 (para. 50) - Public statements by senior AFC/M23 officials announcing intention of further territorial expansion towards Butembo, Beni and Kisangani
- Annex 23 (para. 52) - Strategic importance of Kamanyola, Katogota, Nyangezi, Luhwinja and Kaziba for AFC/M23–RDF operations in South Kivu
- Annex 24 (para. 52) - Strategic importance of the Tubimbi – Luhwinja corridor in South Kivu
- Annex 25 (para. 53) - MRDP-Twirwaneho-controlled areas in the Hauts Plateaux, South Kivu
- Annex 26 (para. 57) - Assessment of 3T production share AFC-M23 controlled areas in South Kivu

- Annex 27 (para. 59) - Development of the Luhihi gold mining site
- Annex 28 (para. 61) - Receipts issued by AFC/M23 for the transport of ore in Luhihi
- Annex 29 (para. 63) - Strategic importance of Twangiza gold mine and Twangiza Mining SA announcing suspension of activities after AFC/M23 takeover
- Annex 30 (para. 64) - Satellite imagery analysis showing a high level of activity between 10 May and 28 August 2025
- Annex 31 (para. 65) - FARDC airstrikes on Twangiza on 15 and 23 October 2025
- Annex 32 (para. 66) - AFC/M23 responses to allegations regarding pillaging of resources and environmental damage caused by AFC/M23 at Twangiza
- Annex 33 (para. 71) - Continued Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) jamming and spoofing in and around AFC/M23 and RDF controlled areas in North Kivu
- Annex 34 (para. 71) - Technical assessment of Tadiran RT-7106 (PRC-710) tactical radio seized from RDF soldier in Masisi territory (North Kivu, March 2025)
- Annex 35 (para. 77) - FARDC press communique instructing FDLR to disarm and surrender
- Annex 36 (para. 78) – Private military company Agemira / Congo Aviation ending its contract in DRC
- Annex 37 (para. 80) - AFC/M23 as the main perpetrator of IHRL abuses and violations documented
- Annex 38 (para. 82) - Wazalendo human rights abuses against civilians in South Kivu, including a surge in conflict-related sexual violence
- Annex 39 (para. 86) - Forcible transfer of civilians belonging to the Hutu community to Rwanda, in May 2025, and subsequent repatriations raising concerns about continued presence of coercive factors
- Annex 40 (para. 88) - AFC/M23's facilitation of the covert return of alleged Congolese refugees from Rwanda
- Annex 41 (para. 89) - Excerpts from the Extraordinary meeting of the ICGLR ministries in charge of mine
- Annex 42 (para. 90) - Letter dated 23 May 2025 from Rwanda to the Security Council to rebut the creation of the ICGLR ad hoc committee
- Annex 43 (para. 90) - Excerpts from the Report of the 8th Ordinary Meeting of Ministers of Mines of the ICGLR
- Annex 44 (para. 91) - Decision concerning the establishment of the ICGLR ad hoc Commission of Inquiry

Annex 1 (para. 5)

Investigative methodology, including in contexts of insecurity, lack of access or access denial

Méthodologie d'enquête, y compris dans des contextes d'insécurité, de manque d'accès ou de refus d'accès

- *Investigative methodology aligned with the recommendations of the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions (S/2006/997)*

The Group based its findings on thoroughly verified and corroborated evidence and information. Given the nature of the conflict in the DRC, few documents provide definitive proof of illicit activities. The Group has therefore relied on eyewitness testimony, including from victims, members of local communities, former and current members of armed groups, and considered expert testimony by government officials and military officers of countries in the Great Lakes region and other countries, as well as by United Nations sources.

Since the Group's establishment in 2004 by Security Council resolution [1533\(2004\)](#), its ability to travel to field locations, including remote or sensitive areas, has often been constrained by logistical challenges, insecurity, or restrictions imposed by official authorities or armed groups. While such constraints have posed operational challenges, they have not prevented the Group from fulfilling its mandate. Regardless of periodic changes in the Group's composition, its work has remained continuous through rigorous handover procedures, the preservation of institutional knowledge, and the maintenance of a stable and long-standing network of interlocutors and information sources. As a result, the Group's investigations routinely extend across several mandates, ensuring sustained, cumulative analysis over time.

- *Investigative methodology in context of insecurity and access denial*

The Group operates in complex and often volatile environments, covering extensive areas of eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo during its investigations. Logistical and security constraints may prevent the Group from travelling to certain areas that are the focus of its investigations. For example, since January 2025, access to Goma and other territories under the control of AFC/M23 has been denied by the latter's leadership. While the absence of physical access these locations have impacted the Group's ability to verify certain specific incidents using standard investigative methods – including the examination of physical evidence and on-site observations – the Group was nevertheless able to pursue its investigations by applying established methodologies tailored to non-permissive environments.

Given these limitations on direct documentation in certain geographical areas, the Group prioritized the verification of incidents for which corroboration could be obtained through multiple, independent, and credible sources. Consequently, the Group's findings in this context focused on substantiated patterns and trends of violations, exemplified through verified individual cases. While maintaining a high evidentiary threshold for the confirmation of specific incidents, the Group's inability to access key locations likely resulted in the underreporting of the full extent and severity of violations committed during the reporting period.

The Group has been applying established methodological practices consistent with United Nations sanctions monitoring and reporting in contexts where direct field access is restricted due to insecurity or denial of access by armed groups. The methodology applied is also consistent with international standards for documentation of grave violations in armed conflict settings, including guidance from OHCHR,¹⁰⁹ the UN Office of Legal Affairs, and relevant jurisprudence from international accountability mechanisms.

¹⁰⁹ OHCHR – [Commissions of Inquiry and Fact-Finding Missions on International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, Guidance and Practice, 2015](#);

In particular, the Group adopted a triangulation-based methodology¹¹⁰ relying on a combination of the following sources and techniques:

- Authenticated documents, photographs, and audio/video recordings.
- In-person interviews with individuals displaced from Goma or other relevant locations after having witnessed the events under investigation.
- Interviews with captured/detained or defected AFC/M23 and RDF elements.
- Remote interviews with victims, witnesses, members of armed groups, including AFC/M23, members of state armed forces, including RDF, trusted key informants, using secure communication platforms and only after rigorous identity verifications when the source was not previously met in person.
- Privileged reliance on primary witnesses and those directly involved or implicated participants in alleged circumstances.
- Triangulation of information across multiple, independent, and credible sources to corroborate facts and assess the reliability of testimony.
- Reliance on trusted and rigorously vetted intermediaries who have worked with the Group in the past.
- Cross-verification of testimonies from multiple independent sources.
- Analysis of satellite imagery, open-source information, and verified multimedia content.
- Use of imagery and third-party verified visual evidence to confirm the presence of military activity, destruction of infrastructure, or civilian impact.
- Confidential inputs from protection actors, researchers, and UN entities operating in adjacent or accessible areas.
- Documentation by UN agencies, NGOs, and other verified humanitarian or protection actors, including incident reports.
- Remote data collection, open-source intelligence, and secondary sources.
- Photographs of injuries suffered by victims of atrocities.
- Authentication of origin for all documentary evidence used.
- Credible media and civil society reporting.
- Studies or contemporaneous reports obtained from UN and other credible sources.
- Statements by the alleged sanctions violators.
- Statements published through official government channels or verified social media accounts.
- Verification of circumstantial evidence based on previously documented patterns.
- Analysis of systemic issues based on previously observed behaviors and documented practices.
- Systematic search for extenuating or exculpatory information.
- Conversations conducted in the presence of at least two experts taking notes and verifying relevant documents, photographs, or videos that confirm or contradict key allegations, independently of each other.

¹¹⁰ S/2006/997, pages 17-32.

Annex 2 (para. 7)

Trust-building measures requested by the AFC/M23 delegation in Doha

Mesures de confiance exigées par la délégation de l'AFC/M23 à Doha

Several days after the signing of the Washington Agreement, on 3 July, Benjamin Mbonimpa, the head of AFC/M23 delegation in Doha, and Freddy Rukema Kanyiki, AFC/M23's deputy coordinator, reiterated the need for the DRC Government to agree to several trust-building measures before a new round of talks in Doha. After the DRC Government agreed with these trust-building measures, the Doha Declaration of Principles, brokered by Qatar, was signed by the DRC Government and AFC/M23 on 19 July 2025, and welcomed by the Government of Rwanda.

The trust-building measures requested by AFC/M23 included:

I. TRUST-BUILDING MEASURES

N° 01	Solemn declaration by Mr. Felix Tshisekedi expressing the political will of his regime to hold direct negotiations with the AFC/M23.
N° 2	To make the holding and the outcome of the political negotiations legal, the National Assembly resolution of November 8, 2022 (that prohibits any dialogue between Kinshasa's regime and AFC/M23) should be abrogated and all other similar restrictive measures taken by the same regime against AFC/M23.
N° 3	The cancellation of all death sentences, prosecutions, warrant arrest and the promising of a reward to anyone who will assist Kinshasa' regime to arrest the leaders and cadres of the AFC/M23 this will enable the holding of political negotiations.
N° 4	Immediate release of any arrested person and/or accused of being in collusion with the AFC/M3.
N° 5	End and criminalize all hate speech, often followed by acts of oppression and cannibalism, as well as all manhunts launched against Congolese people because of their appearance or the language they speak (Swahili, Kinyarwanda) under the pretext of collaboration with the AFC/M23 or of being Rwandan infiltrators. End all acts of discrimination and denial of nationality to the aforementioned communities.
N° 6	Allowing the free movement of persons and goods including the reopening of customs system and banks, in areas under control of AFC/M23, by central Bank and.
N° 7	Signing of a bilateral ceasefire agreement between the Kinshasa regime and the AFC/M23.

1

I. THE EFFECTIVE CONDUCT OF NEGOTIATIONS

- Resizing the delegations of the negotiating parties to ensure equal representation;
- The obligation for the parties to provide a written clear mandate allowing them to negotiate;
- To facilitate the travel and participation of AFC/M23 delegates in the Qatar's negotiations, the Kinshasa's regime should grant them with travel documents (passport).

Done at Goma, Mars 28, 2025.

AFC/M23 Delegation


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Annex 3 (para. 7)

The Declaration of Principles between the Government of the DRC and the representatives of AFCM23 in support of a pathway to a comprehensive peace agreement, facilitated by the state of Qatar

La Déclaration de principes entre le Gouvernement de la RDC et les représentants de l'AFC/M23, en appui à une voie vers un accord de paix global, facilitée par l'État du Qatar

Signed French version:



- Toute tentative de conquête ou de modification des positions par la force sur le terrain.

- Les Parties s'engagent à faire en sorte que le cessez-le-feu s'applique à toutes les forces impliquées dans le conflit. Un mécanisme conjoint de surveillance et de vérification sera mis en place afin de définir les modalités du cessez-le-feu et d'en garantir la mise en œuvre effective.
- Les Parties conviennent de s'abstenir de toute action, déclaration ou comportement pouvant compromettre le bon déroulement du processus de cessez-le-feu.

3. MESURES DE CONFIANCE

- Les Parties s'engagent à prendre des initiatives concrètes visant à rassurer la population de la République Démocratique du Congo et à créer un climat favorable à un dialogue constructif, en vue de parvenir à une paix durable.
- Les Parties reconnaissent l'importance et l'urgence de la mise en œuvre de chaque mesure de confiance, soulignant leur rôle déterminant dans le renforcement de la confiance mutuelle et la suite du processus de paix.
- Les Parties s'engagent à instaurer les conditions nécessaires à l'application effective de ces mesures, notamment :
 - La mise en place, avec la facilitation du Comité International de la Croix-Rouge (CICR) et dans le cadre de la loi congolaise, d'un mécanisme permettant l'organisation de la libération des prisonniers ou détenus d'intérêt détenus par l'une ou l'autre des Parties.

4. RESTAURATION DE L'AUTORITÉ GOUVERNEMENTALE

- Les Parties reconnaissent que la restauration de l'autorité de l'État est la conséquence logique au règlement efficace des causes du conflit, à travers un accord de paix durable.
- Les Parties conviennent que le rétablissement intégral de l'autorité de l'Etat sur l'ensemble du territoire national est un pilier fondamental de l'accord de paix. Cet accord définira les modalités, les étapes et le calendrier de ce processus de restauration.

5. RETOUR DES PERSONNES DÉPLACÉES ET DES RÉFUGIÉS

- Les Parties s'engagent à faciliter le retour sûr, volontaire et digne des réfugiés et des personnes déplacées internes vers leurs zones d'origine ou pays d'origine, en conformité avec l'accord tripartite entre la RDC, les pays d'asile concernés et le Haut-Commissariat des Nations Unies pour les Réfugiés (HCR). Ce processus se déroulera dans le strict respect du droit international humanitaire et des normes relatives à la protection des populations déplacées.

6. MONUSCO ET MÉCANISMES RÉGIONAUX

- Les Parties s'engagent, par principe, à protéger les populations civiles et à faciliter la mise en œuvre du cessez-le-feu, avec le soutien de la MONUSCO et des mécanismes régionaux, le cas échéant, pour un mécanisme de vérification convenu.

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
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7. ACCORD DE PAIX

- Les Parties reconnaissent l'importance d'un accord de paix visant à garantir la sécurité, le développement durable, la justice sociale et la protection des droits humains du peuple de la République Démocratique du Congo. Les Parties soulignent également que cet accord devra permettre le retour sûr et digne des réfugiés et s'attaquer aux causes profondes du conflit.
- Les Parties s'engagent à mettre en œuvre les dispositions de la présente Déclaration de principes immédiatement après sa signature, et au plus tard le 29 juillet 2025.
- Les Parties conviennent d'ouvrir des négociations directes immédiatement après la mise en œuvre des engagements contenus dans la présente Déclaration de principes, en vue de lancer les discussions sur un accord de paix au plus tard le 8 Août 2025. Ces négociations s'inscriront dans le cadre de l'Accord de paix entre la République Démocratique du Congo et la République du Rwanda, signé à Washington le 27 Juin 2025.
- Les Parties s'engagent à mener les négociations d'un accord de paix global dans un esprit de responsabilité, de coopération et de compromis, avec pour objectif de parvenir à un consensus et de signer l'accord au plus tard le 17 Août 2025.
- Les Parties expriment leur profonde reconnaissance à l'État du Qatar pour son rôle déterminant dans la facilitation du dialogue ayant conduit à la présente Déclaration de principes.
- Les Parties remercient également les États-Unis d'Amérique pour leur soutien constructif au processus de paix conduit à Doha.
- Les Parties saluent les efforts continus de l'Union Africaine, engagée depuis le début du processus de paix, et réaffirment leur appréciation pour son engagement constant en faveur de la stabilité et de la réconciliation dans la région.


Signé à Doha, État du Qatar, le 19 juillet 2025, en deux exemplaires, en français et en anglais.

POUR LE GOUVERNEMENT DE LA
RÉPUBLIQUE DÉMOCRATIQUE DU
CONGO



M. Sumbu Sira Mambou
Haut Représentant du Président
chargé des processus de Luanda et de
Nairobi

POUR LE MOUVEMENT DE
L'ALLIANCE FLEUVE
CONGO/23 MARS (AFC/M23)



M. Benjamin Mbonimpa
Secrétaire permanent
de l'AFC/M23

Document obtained from a confidential diplomatic source.

Draft of the declaration in English:

**DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES BETWEEN THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO AND THE REPRESENTATIVES OF ALLIANCE FLEUVE
CONGO/MARCH 23RD MOVEMENT (AFC/M23) (THE PARTIES), IN SUPPORT OF A PATHWAY TO A
COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AGREEMENT, FACILITATED BY THE STATE OF QATAR**

1. GENERAL PRINCIPLES

- The Parties recognize that lasting peace is the essential foundation for building a united, prosperous, and secure nation, for the people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
- In reference to the fundamental principles of the Constitution of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Charter of the African Union, the Charter of the United Nations and its relevant resolutions, and the international law, the Parties reaffirm their commitment to resolving the conflict through peaceful means, in the interest of protecting the people of the DRC.
- The Parties commit to fully cooperate with international and regional organizations to ensure the ability to protect civilians and to advance the implementation of the present Declaration of Principles.
- The Parties commit to a pathway to resolve their disputes by peaceful means grounded in diplomacy and negotiation rather than hostile force or rhetoric, in consistent with the EAC-SADC framework, as endorsed by the African Union.
- The Parties commit to transcend the past and open a new chapter of mutual understanding, peaceful coexistence, and stability.
- The Parties commit to overcoming the divisions that weaken national unity, improving the living conditions of the population, and rejecting all forms of dehumanizing speech in order to promote peace and reconciliation. The Parties reaffirm their attachment to the territorial integrity and national sovereignty of the DRC.
- The Parties reaffirm the commitments made in their Joint Declaration of April 23, 2025.

2. PERMANENT CEASEFIRE

- The Parties acknowledge that peace, security, and stability are essential to increase development opportunities, improve living conditions, and protect human dignity.
- The Parties commit to uphold their commitment to a permanent ceasefire, that includes the following:
 - Air, land, sea or lakes attacks, as well as all acts of sabotage;
 - Hate propaganda;
 - Any attempt to seize by force new positions on the ground;

- The Parties commit to ensure that the ceasefire applies to all forces engaged in the conflict. An oversight and verification mechanism will be created to define the modalities of the ceasefire and insure its proper implementation.
- The Parties convene to refrain from any action that may hinder the normal progress of cease fire process.

3. CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES

- The Parties commit to take measures that reassure the population of DRC and create favorable conditions for dialogue leading to lasting peace.
- The Parties underscore the importance of according to a sense of urgency to the implementation of each confidence building measure, recognizing their critical role in fostering trust and advancing the peace process.
- The Parties commit to creating the necessary conditions for the implementation of confidence-building measures. These measures include the following:
 - Establish a mechanism facilitated by ICRC, in the context of the Congolese law, to arrange for the release of prisoners/detainees of interest held by either Party.

4. RESTORING GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY

- The Parties acknowledge that the restoration of government authority is the logical consequence of effectively addressing the reasons of the conflict through a peace agreement.
- The Parties recognize that the complete restoration of state authority on all national territories constitutes a key component for the peace agreement, which will include the modalities and process of such restoration.

5. RETURN OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS AND REFUGEES

- The Parties commit to facilitating the safe, voluntary, and dignified return of refugees and internally displaced persons to their areas or countries of origin, in accordance with the tripartite, the DRC-Country of exile-UNHCR. This process will be conducted in compliance with the international humanitarian law.

6. MONUSCO AND REGIONAL MECHANISMS

- The Parties in principle commit to protecting, facilitating, and promoting the protection of civilian populations, as well as the implementation of the ceasefire with the support of MONUSCO and regional mechanisms where appropriate for an agreed verification mechanism.

7. PEACE AGREEMENT

- The Parties recognize the importance of having a peace agreement that aim to guarantee security, sustainable development, social justice, and the protection of the human rights of the people of DRC, and the safe and dignified return of refugees while addressing the root causes of the conflict.
- The Parties commit to implementing the provisions of this Declaration of Principles immediately upon its signature and no later than 29 July 2025.
- The Parties further commit to entering into direct negotiations immediately following the implementation of the provisions of this Declaration of Principles, to start negotiating a peace agreement no later than 8 August 2025. These negotiations shall align with the Peace Agreement between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of Rwanda signed in Washington on 27 June 2025.
- The Parties commit to negotiating a comprehensive peace agreement in a spirit of responsibility and cooperation, with the shared goal of reaching consensus and signing the agreement no later than 18 August 2025.
- The Parties appreciate the essential role played by the State of Qatar in facilitating this dialogue between the Parties that led to the present Declaration of Principles.
- The Parties express their appreciation for the constructive role played by the United States of America in supporting the Doha peace talks.
- The Parties express their appreciation for the efforts made by the African Union since the inception of the peace process, and for its continued commitment to supporting regional stability and reconciliation.

Signed in Doha, State of Qatar on 19 July 2025, in duplicate, in the French and English languages.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF
THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF
THE CONGO

Mr. Sumbu Sita Mambu
Senior Representative of the President
in charge of Luanda and Nairobi processes.

FOR THE ALLIANCE FLEUVE
CONGO/MARCH 23RD
MOVEMENT (AFC/M23)

Mr. Benjamin MBONIMPA
Permanent Secretary
of AFC/M23

Document received from DRC Government source

Annex 4 (para. 9)

Key Provisions of the Regional Economic Integration Framework (REIF)

Les mesures clés du cadre d'intégration économique régional

Statement of Tenets for the Regional Economic Integration Framework

For full text and further details see: <https://www.state.gov/releases/bureau-of-african-affairs/2025/08/statement-of-tenets-for-the-regional-economic-integration-framework>

Key excerpts and provisions:

“The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the Government of Republic of Rwanda (Rwanda) (together, “the Participants”)

- *Welcoming* the Declaration of Principles signed by Foreign Minister Thérèse Kayikwamba Wagner of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Foreign Minister Olivier Nduhungirehe of Rwanda in Washington, D.C. on April 25, 2025;
- *Committed* to supporting the implementation of the Peace Agreement dated June 27, 2025 between the DRC and Rwanda by preventing illicit trade from fueling violence or funding armed groups and building a future where cross-border cooperation enhances peace and prosperity for both countries;
- *Recognizing* the potential for synergy with continental and regional organizations, including the possibility of revitalizing Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL);
- *Intending* to chart a future of mutually beneficial partnerships, greater connectivity with international and regional economic development initiatives, and investment opportunities across sectors, including in mining, infrastructure, energy, industrial development, agribusiness, public health, and national park management.

Hereby announce their intent to establish a Regional Economic Integration Framework (REIF). The Participants further intend to finalize the REIF through a separate agreement which will outline the coordination mechanisms to conduct planning and implementation of REIF lines of effort and initiatives. The Participants reaffirm that these initiatives are to be carried out in full compliance with the sovereignty, laws, and regulations of each country. The Participants intend for the REIF to include the Areas of Focus described below, with the overall intention of ensuring the REIF serves as a living platform that allows the Participants to add new mutually agreeable objectives and initiatives.

EXPECTATIONS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE PARTICIPANTS

The Participants affirm their common commitment to promoting peace, regional stability, and sustainable economic development. Rooted in the principles of sovereignty, mutual respect, and regional cooperation, this REIF outlines a shared vision for addressing long-standing challenges and promoting shared prosperity in the Great Lakes region.

As a priority, the Participants seek to combat and progressively eliminate illicit activities associated with the extraction, trade, movement, and processing of mineral resources, which undermine peace, security, and good governance in the region.

Participants recognize that energy and infrastructure development are the preconditions for industrialization, especially in the mining sector, and for uplifting the quality of life of communities.

The Participants aim to promote a professional, rules-based, and productive regional economy, particularly with regard to mineral value chains, that benefits local communities above all.

The Participants affirm that each country has full, sovereign control over the exploitation, processing, and export of its natural resources. Each country deserves to receive the appropriate economic returns from those resources through promoting industrialization of the mining sector consistent with the policies and legal frameworks of each country. Each country also stresses that the communities need to benefit from the revenues and other advantages derived from their extraction, processing, and commercialization.

In pursuit of greater transparency and value retention, the Participants intend to work jointly with relevant stakeholders to progressively eliminate barriers – whether reputational, technical, or commercial – that obstruct the direct and lawful export of minerals sourced in the region, notably tin, tantalum, tungsten, niobium, gold, and other minerals. By doing so, the Participants intend to create a conducive environment to attract investment in both countries and in the region.

The Participants recognize both the importance of developing mineral processing and transformation capacity within both the DRC and Rwanda, and the relevance of existing infrastructure and industrial platforms in the region. Building on these complementarities, the Participants seek to promote a balanced and forward-looking framework for economic cooperation aimed at supporting formal mining activities, strengthening regional value chains, and ensuring the development and responsible management of new infrastructure, particularly in the logistics and energy sectors.

Lastly, the Participants express their intention to identify and promote common areas of cooperation in the Great Lakes region, including cross-border infrastructure, shared industrial zones, cross-border tourism, and transboundary markets, with a view to fostering deeper regional integration and sustainable growth as an anchor for lasting peace.” [...]


It includes key provisions on:


- ENERGY
- INFRASTRUCTURE
- MINERAL SUPPLY CHAINS
- NATIONAL PARK MANAGEMENT AND TOURISM
- PUBLIC HEALTH
- OTHER OPPORTUNITIES TO EXPAND COOPERATION

Annex 5 (para. 11)

Ceasefire monitoring and verification mechanism signed on 14 October 2025

Mécanisme de surveillance et de vérification du cessez-le-feu signé le 14 octobre 2025





Document provided by confidential diplomatic source

Annex 6 (para. 14)

FARDC press communique instructing FDLR to disarm and surrender

Communiqué de presse des FARDC appelant les FDLR à désarmer et à se rendre

REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO
FORCES ARMÉES



ETAT-MAJOR GENERAL
Le Porte-Parole

COMMUNIQUE DE PRESSE N° 29 DU 10 OCTOBRE 2025

Dans le cadre de la mise en œuvre de l'ordre opérationnel adopté le 1^{er} octobre 2025 par le Comité Conjoint de Supervision de l'accord de Washington signé par la République Démocratique du Congo et la République du Rwanda sous la médiation des Etats-Unis d'Amérique, les Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo appellent toutes les factions des Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda, en sigle FDLR, à déposer les armes et à se rendre aux autorités congolaises ou à la MONUSCO en vue de leur rapatriement dans leur pays d'origine, le Rwanda.

Les Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo demandent en outre aux populations en contact avec les FDLR de se désolidariser de ces rebelles rwandais et de les sensibiliser pour se rendre sans condition aux autorités de la RDC et/ou à la MONUSCO. En cas de résistance et de refus d'obtempérer, les FARDC, conformément aux dispositions pertinentes de l'accord de Washington, procéderont au désarmement par contrainte ou par usage de la force.

Aussi, les Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo rappellent-elles à tous leurs militaires l'interdiction de collaborer, d'une manière ou d'une autre, avec les Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda. Toute violation de cette consigne permanente expose son auteur à des sanctions sévères.

Les Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo exhortent les FDLR à faciliter la tâche au processus de paix en cours et à se rendre sans violence et ni effusion de sang.


EKENGE BOMUSA EFOMI Sylvain
Général Major

Contact : +243 971 800 424. Courriel : efomi.ekenge@gmail.com – site internet : www.fardcnet.mil.cd
Facebook : Forces Armées de la RD Congo – YouTube, X et Instagram : FARDC OFFICIEL SCIFA.

Document provided by confidential intelligence source.

Annex 7 (para. 15)

Statements by FDLR and VDP/Wazalendo representatives reacting to agreements concluded in the framework of the Washington and Doha peace processes

Déclarations des représentants des FDLR et des VDP/Wazalendo réagissant aux accords conclus dans le cadre des processus de paix de Washington et de Doha

FDLR claims

FDLR expressed its support for the ongoing various peace initiatives and vowed to continue protecting the refugees until their safe and dignified return to Rwanda.

Representatives of the FDLR leadership, FDLR combatants, elements of Wazalendo groups, including Nyatura factions, members of the Hutu community, have expressed concern over what they perceived as the systematic targeting of Hutus in the DRC, regardless of an actual or proven affiliation with the FDLR. They emphasized that many among the Hutu population in North Kivu are Congolese-born or refugees who arrived after 1994. Others were described as economic migrants who had settled in search of better livelihood opportunities and had no connection to the genocide or its ideology.

In a letter addressed to the US President, acting as facilitator of the Washington peace process, the FDLR leadership alleged that the FDLR's assigned mission consisted of protecting the Rwandese refugee community in the DRC. They expressed concern that the neutralisation plan was being implemented in an indiscriminate manner, potentially targeting civilians. FDLR reiterated its stated willingness to support all initiatives aimed at achieving lasting peace, including those facilitating the safe and dignified return of the refugees to Rwanda.

- **FDLR letter of 2 July 2025 addressed to the President of the United States as the facilitator of the peace process:**



BUREAU DU PRESIDENT / IBIRO BYA PEREZIDA / OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

Homepage: <https://urugaga.org> Tel: +243 858 820 862 Email: fdlr2020@proton.me

A Son Excellence Monsieur le Président des États-Unis d'Amérique
 The White House
 1600 Pennsylvania Ave NW
 Washington, DC 20500
 USA

Le 02 Juillet 2025

**Objet : Contribution des Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda pour
 ramener la paix dans la Région des Grands Lacs Africains.**

Monsieur le Président

Permettez-nous de vous adresser, avec tout le respect dû à votre haute fonction, nos sincères félicitations pour la signature de l'Accord de paix de Washington intervenue le 27 Juin 2025 entre la République Démocratique du Congo et la République du Rwanda. Vous avez brillamment réussi dans les délais record où d'innombrables acteurs ont échoué pendant trois (3) décennies d'insécurité à l'Est de la République Démocratique du Congo.

Les Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) accueillent favorablement et soutiennent toutes les initiatives sincères visant à ramener une paix véritable et durable dans la Région des Grands Lacs Africains (RGLA) en mettant fin définitivement aux conflits armés récurrents qui ravagent la Région depuis plus de trois décennies et qui avaient déjà coûté la vie à plus de dix (10) millions d'êtres humains en RDC (ex-Zaïre) en 2010 (cfr le rapport Mapping de l'ONU, 2010, toujours classé sans suite et le rapport Gersony).

Les FDLR remercient toutes les personnes physiques ou morales qui ont œuvré pendant ces trois décennies passées à trouver les voies et moyens pour résoudre l'épineux problème de l'insécurité persistante dans la RGLA. Elles remercient particulièrement le Président américain M. Donald TRUMP qui s'y est investi personnellement et dont les efforts ont abouti à l'Accord de paix du 27/06/2025 entre la RDC et le Rwanda. Elles remercient aussi la SADC, la Communauté Sant'Egidio, l'Eglise du Christ au Congo, l'Union Africaine, l'Union Européenne, la Communauté des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Est (EAC) et l'ONU pour leurs efforts inlassables dans la recherche d'une paix juste et durable dans la Région.

Les FDLR soulignent néanmoins que, contrairement à la propagande du régime rwandais et ses soutiens politiques, elles n'ont jamais été une menace pour le Peuple Rwandais dont elles sont par ailleurs l'émanation et pour lequel elles luttent.

De même, contrairement au narratif que le régime rwandais ne cesse de chanter pour tromper l'opinion publique internationale, les FDLR ne sont pas une organisation génocidaire ou terroriste. Kigali tient ce narratif afin que l'opinion internationale détourne son regard des crimes contre l'humanité, des crimes de guerre et crimes de génocide dont il est coupable dans la Région.

En effet, dès sa création en Mai 2000 par des réfugiés rwandais disséminés à travers le monde, et après le calvaire inédit vécu par les survivants des différents massacres commis par le Front Patriotique Rwandais (FPR-Inkotanyi) au Rwanda et en RDC, et abandonnés à leur triste sort après le désengagement des institutions internationales en charge des réfugiés, le mouvement « Les Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda, FDLR en sigle » s'est donné pour mission de protéger les réfugiés rwandais rescapés, contre les récurrentes menaces d'extermination proférées et exécutées par les forces du FPR-INKOTANYI sans discontinuer depuis trois décennies.

Par ailleurs, les FDLR se sont impliquées activement, et ont toujours manifesté leur volonté de participer dans toutes les initiatives visant à ramener la paix et la stabilité dans la Région.

Parmi ces initiatives il y a lieu de citer:

- le désarmement et le cantonnement des combattants à Kamina et la destruction des armes devant la Communauté Internationale à Kinshasa en 2001 ;
- la déclaration de Rome par les FDLR devant la Communauté Internationale et sous la facilitation de la Communauté Sant'Egidio (Mars/Avril 2005) ;
- les rencontres de Chambucha et de Ntoto avec les représentants de la RDC sous les auspices de l'Eglise du Christ au Congo (2007 et 2011) ;
- la rencontre de Nyabiondo entre les représentants du Gouvernement de la RDC, de la MONUSCO et des FDLR sous la facilitation de l'Eglise du Christ au Congo (2008) ;
- la contribution à la Conférence de Goma (2008) ;
- le désarmement de plus de 1500 combattants, la remise de leurs armes à la SADC/MONUSCO et le cantonnement des combattants désarmés et de leurs dépendants dans les camps de Kisangani, Kanyabayonga et Walungu (2014), en présence de la Communauté Internationale et des journalistes internationaux ;
- la participation à la réunion de Rome en 2014 sous la médiation de la Communauté Sant'Egidio représentée par Monseigneur Matteo Maria Cardinal ZUPPI, réunissant des représentants des USA (Sénateur Russell D. FEINGOLD, envoyé spécial des USA dans la RGLA), M. Martin KOBLER, Représentant Spécial du Secrétaire-Général des Nations Unies en RDC, les représentants des Etats de l'UE et des représentants de la RDC.

En réponse à toutes ces initiatives de paix auxquelles les FDLR ont répondu présentes, le Rwanda a brillé par son absence et son sabotage, tandis que la Communauté Internationale n'a pas respecté ses engagements d'accompagner positivement et activement ces initiatives.

C'est ainsi que les engagements pris par la RDC et la Communauté Internationale à Rome en 2005 et en 2014 ont été jetés aux oubliettes en prônant et encourageant plutôt la destruction des FDLR par le feu des armes.

Par ailleurs, de 2009 à 2015, les FARDC, en collaboration avec les forces spéciales des Forces Rwandaises de Défense (RDF) et de la MONUSCO ont mené des opérations militaires contre les

FDLR à l'Est de la RDC. Ces opérations ont fait plusieurs centaines de milliers de morts et de déplacés au sein des populations Congolaises et des réfugiés Rwandais.

Il s'agit des opérations:

- UMOJA WETU (Nord-Kivu, Janvier 2009)
- KIMIA I et II (2009)
- AMANI LEO (FARDC/MONUSCO 2010)
- AMANI KAMILIFU (MONUSCO/FARDC Février 2012)
- SOKOLA II (FARDC Nord et Sud-Kivu, 2015)

Dans un souci de mise en application des préconisations des maîtres à penser dans la création du chaos et le sabotage des processus de paix dans le monde, certains membres de la Communauté Internationale ont planifié et mis en exécution dès 2007 la décapitation par tous les moyens du leadership des FDLR.

C'est ainsi que le Président des FDLR M. Ignace MURWANASHYAKA, le Vice-Président M. Straton MUSONI et le Secrétaire-Exécutif M. Callixte MBARUSHIMANA ont été arrêtés et mis en prison en Allemagne et en France, puis trainés devant les tribunaux nationaux et internationaux pour leur « rôle présumé » dans les crimes de guerre et crimes contre l'humanité commis dans les provinces du Nord et Sud-Kivu (RDC) en 2009.

Il sied de noter que le Président Ignace MURWANASHYAKA est mort en prison en Allemagne en 2019 dans des circonstances non élucidées, que le Vice-Président Straton MUSONI a été condamné en Allemagne à une peine de 8 ans puis libéré et déporté au Rwanda où il est souvent exhibé comme un trophée de guerre et que le Secrétaire-Exécutif Callixte MBARUSHIMANA a été relaxé en 2011 par la Cour Pénale Internationale faute de preuves. Le Général Sylvestre MUDACUMURA, feu-Commandant des forces des FDLR, quant à lui, a été froidement abattu dans un raid coalisé des FARDC et des RDF en 2019.

Enfin, en 2018, la RDC avec la complicité de Kigali, a décidé unilatéralement de rapatrier de force et dans des conditions inhumaines, après une longue période de privations alimentaires avec risques d'inanitions délibérées, les ex-combattants des FDLR et leurs dépendants cantonnés à Kisangani, Walungu et Kanyabayonga. Certains d'entre eux ont été recyclés par le régime rwandais et retournés en RDC pour combattre dans l'armée rwandaise (RDF). La situation actuelle des autres n'est pas connue.

Il n'est pas inopportun de signaler que, dans une tactique d'accusation en miroir dont le régime rwandais est passé maître, les exactions imputées faussement aux FDLR par le FPR-INKOTANYI et ses thuriféraires sont plutôt celles délibérément commises par ses propres forces qui les font endosser aux FDLR afin de les discréditer et ainsi salir leur image.

En guise d'illustration, pour ne citer qu'un cas, en Février 2021, le FPR a assassiné dans une embuscade tendue sur la route Goma-Rutshuru l'Ambassadeur italien M. Luca Attanasio et s'est empressé d'attribuer ce forfait aux FDLR.

Les FDLR déclarent que le projet visant à les neutraliser n'a pour objectif que de décimer les réfugiés rwandais présents à l'Est de la RDC, survivants des massacres successifs orchestrés depuis 1990 par les forces du Front Patriotique Rwandais (FPR-Inkotanyi) au pouvoir à Kigali.

La neutralisation des FDLR ne résoudra pas le problème de fond qui est d'essence politique et qui, par conséquent, ne peut se résoudre que politiquement à travers des pourparlers francs, sincères et inclusifs entre toutes les parties concernées. C'est ce que les FDLR sollicitent depuis des années.

Les FDLR restent convaincues et déclarent haut et fort qu'elles ne sont en rien impliquées dans la déstabilisation de la RGLA, et que s'il y a une force nuisible à neutraliser dans la Région, c'est bel et bien les Forces de Défense Rwandaises (FDR) qui sèment la mort et la désolation au sein des populations de la Région et sont à l'origine de l'insécurité persistante au Rwanda, en RDC et dans toute la Région depuis 1990 dans l'intérêt de piller des richesses immenses de la RDC et massacrer des Bantous de la RGLA.

Les FDLR réaffirment leur ferme attachement à la paix et sont convaincues que l'ouverture de l'espace politique libre et sécurisé au Rwanda, et un dialogue franc, constructif et hautement inclusif entre toutes les parties sont et restent la seule voie viable pour la recherche d'une paix durable dans la Région.

Les FDLR restent attachées à la paix et réaffirment leur plein engagement à toutes les initiatives visant à ramener la paix, la sécurité et la prospérité dans la RGLA et l'épanouissement harmonieux de tous les peuples frères auxquels elles seront conviées.

Les FDLR restent déterminées à mener à bien leur mission de protéger les populations rwandaises réfugiées à l'Est de la RDC jusqu'à leur retour définitif dans leur mère-patrie le Rwanda en toute sécurité et dignité.

Veillez agréer, Excellence Monsieur le Président, l'expression de notre très haute considération.

Victor BYIRINGIRO

Lt-Général



Président ai des FDLR

CPI à:

- Monsieur le Président de la République Démocratique du Congo
- Monsieur le Président de la République du Burundi
- Madame la Présidente de la République Unie de Tanzanie
- Monsieur le Président de la République de l'Ouganda
- Monsieur le Président en exercice de l'Union Africaine
- Monsieur le Président de l'Angola
- Monsieur le Président de la République Sud-Africaine
- Monsieur le Président du Rwanda
- Monsieur le Secrétaire Général de l'ONU
- Monsieur le Président de l'Union Européenne
- Monsieur le Président en exercice de la SADC
- Monsieur le Président en exercice de la Communauté des États de l'Afrique de l'Est
- Monsieur le Président en exercice de la Conférence Internationale sur la Région des Grands Lacs

VDP/Wazalendo claims

VDP/Wazalendo spokesperson Jules Mulumba called for the recognition of the VDP/Wazalendo as legitimate stakeholders and requested their inclusion in peace negotiations. He stated that the VDP-Wazalendo rejected any agreements from Doha that did not consider their demands, warning against agreements that could further fracture national cohesion.

- **Letters of 9 and 14 November 2025, signed by Jules Mulumba, spokesperson of VDP/Wazalendo :**



COMMUNIQUÉ DE PRESSE OFFICIEL N° 013/11/JM/ PP/VDP-RDC/025

Réaction face aux pourparlers de Doha entre le Gouvernement Congolais et la Rébellion M23-RDF-AFC

Les Volontaires pour la Défense de la Patrie (VDP Wazalendo–RDC) suivent avec une attention soutenue et un sens élevé de responsabilité patriotique les informations faisant état d'un accord en voie de signature entre le Gouvernement de la République Démocratique du Congo et la coalition rebelle M23–RDF–AFC, sous la médiation du Gouvernement de l'État du Qatar.

1. Notre position de principe

Les VDP Wazalendo–RDC, acteurs engagés sur le terrain pour la défense de la souveraineté nationale et la sauvegarde de l'intégrité territoriale du pays, expriment leur profonde inquiétude face à la tournure que prennent ces discussions de Doha.

Aucune solution durable, ni aucun accord crédible ne saurait être conclu sans la participation des véritables défenseurs du sol congolais, ceux qui, au prix de leur sang, font face chaque jour à l'agression rwandaise et à ses supplétifs du M23.

2. Le rappel des processus inclusifs antérieurs

Les VDP Wazalendo–RDC tiennent à rappeler à l'opinion nationale et internationale que leur mouvement a pris part activement aux processus de paix de Nairobi, lesquels avaient regroupé tous les groupes armés congolais, y compris le M23, qui, bien que boycottant certaines étapes, avait été officiellement inclus dans ce cadre.

Ces pourparlers avaient ensuite débouché sur le processus de Luanda, placé sous la médiation du Président João Lourenço, où le Gouvernement congolais devait rencontrer le Rwanda. Malheureusement, ce processus s'est enlisé à cause de la mauvaise foi notoire du Président Paul Kagame, principal artisan de la déstabilisation de l'Est du Congo.

Le processus de Washington, sous la facilitation américaine, avait conduit à la signature d'un accord dit de Washington, et aujourd'hui, le processus de Doha prétend poursuivre cette logique. Cependant, il est inacceptable et injustifiable que les VDP Wazalendo-RDC, parties prenantes légitimes, en soient exclus ou ignorés.

3. Notre refus des résolutions imposées

En tant que forces populaires enracinées dans la lutte patriotique, les VDP Wazalendo-RDC ne peuvent accepter les résolutions issues de Doha tant que leurs desiderata ne seront pas pris en considération.

Nous mettons en garde contre toute tentative de conclusion d'un accord en vase clos qui, loin d'apporter la paix, réparerait une cassure tout en créant une nouvelle fissure dans la cohésion nationale.

Nous demandons avec insistance que les VDP Wazalendo-RDC soient consultés, écoutés et considérés comme contrepoids légitime face aux revendications du M23-RDF-AFC, afin d'assurer une paix fondée sur la justice et la vérité.

4. Référence aux résolutions du Conseil de Sécurité

Nous rappelons la résolution du Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies 2773 (2025) du 21 février 2025 exigeant la cessation immédiate des hostilités et le retrait du M23 vers ses positions initiales de Runyoni, avant tout engagement politique. Selon cette même résolution, le cantonnement du M23 devait se dérouler à Rumangabo, puis à Kindu, préalablement à toute négociation.

Or, pendant que les pourparlers se tiennent à Doha, le M23-RDF-AFC poursuit ses offensives meurtrières contre les positions des VDP Wazalendo-RDC, pendant que les FARDC demeurent relativement épargnées.

Nous rappelons à la communauté internationale que sans les VDP Wazalendo-RDC, les FARDC auraient déjà été la première cible de cette agression. Nos lignes de défense tiennent, et elles tiendront, jusqu'au dernier souffle, contre toute forme de diktat étranger.

5. Appel à la communauté internationale et au Gouvernement congolais

Les VDP Wazalendo-RDC invitent la communauté internationale à comprendre que toute solution durable pour le Congo doit impérativement inclure toutes les forces congolaises, sans exception.

La voix du peuple congolais, celle des humbles, des déplacés, des combattants de la liberté, s'exprime à travers les VDP Wazalendo-RDC. Nous demandons au Gouvernement congolais de respecter également cet impératif d'inclusivité, gage d'une paix véritable et non d'un compromis de façade.

6. Message au Chef de l'État

Enfin, les VDP Wazalendo-RDC rappellent au Chef de l'État, Son Excellence Félix Antoine Tshisekedi Tshilombo, sa promesse solennelle de ne jamais trahir les

Wazalendo, ces fils et filles du Congo qui se sont levés pour la Patrie. Agir sans eux, c'est risquer de briser la confiance des alliés les plus fidèles de la République.

Nous restons convaincus que le Chef de l'État demeure le symbole d'un patriotisme sincère et dévoué, et qu'il saura écouter la voix du peuple résistant, avant toute signature engageant l'avenir du Congo.

La Patrie ou la mort, nous vaincrons.

Fait à Rutshuru, le 09 Novembre 2025

Ne jamais trahir le Congo !

La Patrie ou la mort, nous vaincrons !

Sé Jules MULUMBA,



Communicateur de VDP-RDC.

Document obtained from confidential VDP/Wazalendo source



COMMUNIQUE DE PRESSE OFFICIEL N° 014/11/JM/ PP/VDP-RDC/025

Renforcement des attaques de la coalition RDF-UPDF-M23 en violation flagrante du cessez-le-feu signé à Doha et du processus de Washington

Les Volontaires pour la Défense de la Patrie (VDP-Wazalendo RDC) tiennent à informer l'opinion nationale et internationale qu'en date du 13 novembre 2025, les éléments de la coalition RDF-UPDF-M23, ont de nouveau mené une série d'attaques simultanées contre plusieurs de nos positions en territoire de Masisi, précisément sur les axe Nyabiondo et Pinga.

Les positions de Kazinga, Ntente et Shoa, situées dans le groupement Nyamaboko 1er et celui de Bapfuna dans le secteur Osso Banyungu, ont été la cible d'opérations offensives menées de manière coordonnée.

Au cours de la même journée, d'autres assauts ont été rapportés sur les collines de Buhaya, qui dominent la cité de Pinga, confirmant une stratégie d'escalade délibérée et clairement préméditée.

Ces actions militaires constituent une violation manifeste du cessez-le-feu bilatéral signé à Washington et à Doha entre le Gouvernement de la République Démocratique du Congo et le Rwanda d'une part et entre le Gouvernement congolais et les pantins du mouvement M23. Ceci compromet aussi le processus de Washington.

Alors que la RDC respecte scrupuleusement les engagements pris pour favoriser le retour de la paix, ces attaques répétées démontrent un manque de volonté réelle de la part du Rwanda et l'Ouganda de s'inscrire dans une dynamique de désescalade et de recherche de solutions pacifiques.

Les VDP rappellent que toute initiative visant à torpiller les efforts nationaux, régionaux et internationaux pour la stabilisation de l'Est de la RDC expose gravement les populations civiles de la région de grands lacs et fragilise la sécurité collective. Nous appelons les garants du processus de Doha et de Washington, ainsi que la communauté internationale, à prendre acte de ces violations récurrentes et à en tirer toutes les conséquences afin de préserver l'esprit et la lettre des accords signés.

Nous en profitons pour informer l'opinion qu'à chaque fois que le cessez-le-feu est décrété et qu'une phase importante est à franchir, la coalition RDF-UPDF-M23 fait les enchères en occupant de nouvelles cités.

Ce que nous les VDP-Wazalendo ne saurons tolérer aucunement.

Dans le strict respect du droit, des institutions nationales et de notre devoir républicain, les VDP-Wazalendo RDC réaffirment leur engagement constant à protéger les populations, tout en maintenant une posture responsable, disciplinée et orientée vers la paix.

Nous rappelons ici que le processus de Doha comme de Washington doivent tenir compte de notre existence, notre lutte et nos desiderata car nous sommes l'émanation du peuple congolais.

La Patrie ou la mort, nous vaincrons.

Fait à Rutshuru, le 14 Novembre 2025

Ne jamais trahir le Congo !

La Patrie ou la mort, nous vaincrons !

Sé Jules MULUMBA,

Communicateur de VDP-RDC.

Document obtained from confidential VDP/Wazalendo source

Annex 8 (para. 22)

Systematic forced recruitment by AFC/M23

Pratique de recrutement forcé systématique par AFC/M23

During the reporting period, the Congolese government, civil society, human rights activists and humanitarian actors, researchers and international organizations have denounced the continued widespread and systematic practice by AFC/M23 to arrest and forcefully conscript underage boys and men, including during cordon-and-search operations, under the pretext of identity verification or security operations (S/2025/446, paras. 20-24). Testimonies of former recruits interviewed by the Group, as well as verified photographs and video footage attest to this continued practice throughout North and South Kivu.¹¹¹ This enabled AFC/M23 to expand its troop strength, consolidate military control, and reinforce administrative influence over local populations, preparing conditions for further territorial expansion.

For example, on 26 May, AFC/M23 carried out a cordon-and-search operation in a locality in Walikale, near the Rutshuru border, during which approximately 80 young men suspected of affiliation with Wazalendo factions were apprehended. These individuals were reportedly transferred by force to the Rusamambo axis two days later, dressed in AFC/M23 uniforms, and deployed to the frontlines to serve as human shields.¹¹² This incident forms part of a broader pattern wherein men and boys were arbitrarily rounded up, often under the pretext of identity verification or security operations, and subsequently subjected to forced conscription.¹¹³

On 3 July, the Congolese Minister for Human Rights, Chantal Chambu, denounced that more than 300 young men, including minors, have been captured in Rubaya without any valid legal justification and taken to an unknown destination.¹¹⁴ Local sources, civil society and eyewitnesses have confirmed the incident.

Reports also indicated that some recruits, including members of FARDC and PNC who were captured after the takeover of Goma in January 2025, have been executed by AFC/M23 for attempted desertion or refusal to comply with orders, particularly at training sites such as Rumangabo.¹¹⁵ Testimonies gathered from escapees and other credible sources suggest that such killings were intended to deter future defection and to reinforce control over conscripts.¹¹⁶

In one instance, two individuals who were abducted by AFC/M23 with a group of 35 young men in April 2025 managed to escape and provide testimony in June. These individuals confirmed that conscripts who knew each other had been separated to prevent solidarity among recruits or their escape. The two escapees described that trainees at Rumangabo were kept in difficult conditions marked by hunger, untreated illnesses, and physical abuse, including torture. They also indicated that 13 individuals in their group had been executed.¹¹⁷

In early July, massive troop reinforcements were reported throughout the AFC/M23 held territories, reportedly including new recruits who had undergone training in recent months. Several recruits had escaped shortly after deployment and testified that the new recruits were intentionally ill-equipped to survive on the frontlines, as AFC/M23 did not trust them. These recent deployments did not yet include FARDC, PNC or former Wazalendo who had been captured or recruited after the fall of Goma, as these were still undergoing special training and reconditioning at Rumangabo, with their deployment not foreseen before the end of July 2025.¹¹⁸

¹¹¹ UN and humanitarian sources, civil society, FARDC sources, intelligence sources, researchers, former recruits. See also <https://www.radiookapi.net/2025/10/13/actualite/securite/la-rdc-denonce-les-exactions-de-lafcm23-devant-le-conseil-de-securite>; <https://actu7.cd/2025/07/03/rdc-la-ministre-des-droits-humains-alerte-sur-les-kidnappings-de-300-jeunes-par-lafc-m23/>; <https://www.radiookapi.net/2025/11/06/actualite/securite/lafc-m23-accuse-de-recrutement-force-des-jeunes-masisi>.

¹¹² UN sources.

¹¹³ UN and humanitarian sources, civil society, FARDC sources, intelligence sources, researchers, former recruits, AFC/M23 insiders.

¹¹⁴ <https://actu7.cd/2025/07/03/rdc-la-ministre-des-droits-humains-alerte-sur-les-kidnappings-de-300-jeunes-par-lafc-m23/> ;

¹¹⁵ AFC/M23 sources, including testimonies of former AFC/M23 recruits from Tchanzu and Rumangabo interviewed by the Group, UN sources, humanitarian and civil society sources, FARDC, intelligence and security sources.

¹¹⁶ Former AFC/M23 recruits, civil society source

¹¹⁷ Idem.

¹¹⁸ UN and humanitarian sources, civil society, FARDC sources, intelligence sources, researchers, and former recruits.

Annex 9 (para. 23)

AFC/M23 Military trainings and troops reinforcements

Activités de formation militaire et envoi de renforts de l'AFC/M23

During the reporting period, AFC/M23 announced the graduation and deployment of nearly 17,000 “commandos”, while it continued building its “local defense” forces. The Group could not independently confirm the numbers of 7,437 and 9,350 publicized by AFC/M23 (see below). Nonetheless, this is yet another show of force and military build-up during two diplomatic processes calling for restraint and good faith in negotiations. Troop movements, redeployment, and mixing new recruits with older units have been observed across multiple locations in M23 territory, including in Goma.

- On 14 September, AFC/M23 publicized the “pass-out” of 7,437 “commandos” who had finished their training at the Rumangabo training centre

AFC/M23 spokesperson Lawrence Kanyuka described the cohort of recruits as an “elite unit” composed of former FARDC soldiers who joined the movement during the capture of Goma and Bukavu, alongside Mai-Mai Wazalendo combatants and newly recruited fighters.¹¹⁹



Screenshot from video depicting the graduation ceremony at Rumangabo training center, on 14 September 2025. Source: <https://youtu.be/uzqcJFdmDz8?si=1ILD117c-3c5r2Tt>

Most of the recruits trained at Rumangabo had been captured or recruited following the fall of Goma and Bukavu in January–February.¹²⁰ The Group could not independently confirm the precise number of 7,437 announced by AFC/M23. While security and intelligence sources indicated that the numbers were likely inflated by AFC/M23, the imagery published by AFC/M23 shows several thousand combatants wearing new M23/ARC uniforms.

The graduation ceremony was presided over by AFC/M23-ARC¹²¹ commander “General” Sultani Makenga (CDi.008) and AFC’s Political Coordinator, Corneille Nangaa. In his address, Nangaa stated that the cohort would form four brigades of “commando” units and claimed that an additional 12,000 recruits would undergo the next phase of ARC military and ideological training. This was the largest group of newly trained M23-ARC combatants documented to date.

¹¹⁹ https://x.com/lawrencekanyuka/status/1967311327652913270?s=46&t=_n75XfLAIYYaxKQtM7ZzVg

¹²⁰ AFC/M23 sources including former recruits, UN, FARDC, intelligence and security sources, civil society, researchers.

¹²¹ M23’s military component is known as the Congolese Revolutionary Army/Armée Révolutionnaire Congolaise (ARC)

Two days after the pass-out ceremony, on 16 September, sources reported the deployment of at least 15 fully loaded trucks with AFC/M23 combatants coming from the AFC/M23-ARC training camp in Rumangabo in Kirumba, near Kanyabayonga, in Lubero territory.¹²²

On 24 September, FARDC's 3rd Defense Zone command reported that it received 30 alleged AFC/M23-ARC combatants, including two minors, who surrendered voluntarily to the FARDC, while 15 others were captured during clashes in North Kivu and South Kivu.¹²³

- **AFC/M23 announced the graduation of additional 9,350 “commandos” at the Tchanzu training center on 1 October 2025**

On 4 October, AFC/M23 released a video showcasing new recruits from Tchanzu training centre, during the graduation ceremony (pass-out), where it claimed that the newly graduated 9,350 “commando troops” were ready to deploy.¹²⁴



¹²² UN, FARDC, security and intelligence sources, civil society sources.

¹²³ Also UN sources.

¹²⁴ https://x.com/lawrencekanyuka/status/1974609027645714916?s=46&t=_n75XfLAIYYaxKQtM7ZzVg



Tchanzu

Plus de 9 350 nouvelles recrues intègrent l'Armée Révolutionnaire Congolaise**End of military training: More than 9,350 new recruits join the Congolese Revolutionary Army**Kivu Top Info
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Tchanzu

Plus de 9 350 nouvelles recrues intègrent l'Armée Révolutionnaire Congolaise**End of military training: More than 9,350 new recruits join the Congolese Revolutionary Army**Kivu Top Info
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


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Source: screenshots depicting the graduation ceremony of AFC/M23 recruits at Tchanzu training centre on 1 October 2025. Screenshots taken by the Group from open-source video <https://youtu.be/H5KFhXu5VfA?si=HYMatsLCvFmI1E5U>

“General” Sultani Makenga presided over the ceremony, which was attended also by “Colonel” Léon Kanyamibwa, AFC/M23 commander in charge of trainings (S/2025/446, para. 24). During his speech, “General” Makenga called on the troops to march as “real liberators of the country” and that they will join troops already deployed on the frontlines to help them topple the “bad regime” of Tshisekedi.



Source: screenshot taken by the Group from open-source video <https://youtu.be/H5KFhXu5VfA?si=HYMatsLCvFmI1E5U>. Captions automatically generated (from original spoken language Swahili).



Inscription 'REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO
AFC/M23
ARMÉE RÉVOLUTIONNAIRE CONGOLAISE (ARC)
CYANZU BASIC MILITARY TRAINING CENTER'

visible in the background. 'General' Sultani Makenga is seen holding a microphone in the foreground (lower right) of the image.

Source: screenshot taken by the Group from open-source video
<https://youtu.be/H5KFhXu5VfA?si=HYMatsLCvFmIIE5U>




Image depicting AFC/M23 “Colonel” Léon Kanyamibwa, commander in charge of trainings and training centers, (S/2025/446, para. 24), with recruits in the background. Source: screenshot taken by the Group from open-source video <https://youtu.be/H5KFhXu5VfA?si=HYMatsLCvFmI1E5U>

Annex 10 (para. 26)

Announcement on the graduation of 242 Local Defense Personnel in Nyiragongo, 23 September 2025

Annonce relative à la remise de diplômes de 242 membres de la Défense locale à Nyiragongo, le 23 septembre 2025



Source: <https://x.com/kivunews24/status/1970494944260317483?s=46&t=n75XfLAIYYaxKQtM7ZzVg>¹²⁵

¹²⁵ See also <https://kivumorningpost.com/2025/09/23/nyiragongo-242-jeunes-formes-par-la-fc-m23-en-defense-locale-presentes-a-kibati/>

Annex 11 (para. 28)

Announcement on the creation of AFC/M23's Police Révolutionnaire Congolaise (M23/PRC)**Annonce de la création de la Police révolutionnaire congolaise (M23/PRC) de l'AFC/M23**

On 24 August 2025, "General" Makenga (CDi.008) unveiled AFC/M23's 'elite police force', named Police Révolutionnaire Congolaise (M23/PRC).¹²⁶ According to AFC/M23, the new police brigade was composed of new recruits as well as former Congolese police (PNC) elements.

Sous le commandement du Général-Major Sultani Makenga, le dimanche 24 août 2025, l'Alliance Fleuve Congo a officiellement présenté sa nouvelle force de Police d'Élite, bien entraînée et hautement professionnelle, qui s'engage à protéger et servir le Peuple, dans la discipline, l'intégrité et le respect des droits humains. La confiance du Peuple est notre véritable légitimité.

Vidéo 

youtu.be/DRDCsLsi-6c?si...

Translate post



Screenshot depicting "General" Makenga at the graduation ceremony of new AFC/M23 police brigade.

Source: Screenshot taken by the Group from

https://x.com/lawrencekanyuka/status/1960742523909103636?s=46&t=_n75XfLAIYYaxKQtM7ZzVg

According to the promotional footage released by AFC/M23, the training programme for the police units comprised specializations in riot control, traffic regulation, and forensics (medico-legal analysis).¹²⁷

- **Training in riot control:**

¹²⁶ https://x.com/lawrencekanyuka/status/1960742523909103636?s=46&t=_n75XfLAIYYaxKQtM7ZzVg

¹²⁷ Confirmed by AFC/M23 sources.



Source: screenshot depicting AFC/PRC riot control units. Screenshot taken by the Group from open-source video <https://youtu.be/DRDCsLsi-6c?si=J9SAF06TKerc4tfP>

- Training in traffic control :



Source: screenshot taken by the Group from open-source video <https://youtu.be/DRDCsLsi-6c?si=J9SAF06TKerc4tfP>

- Training in forensics - crime scene management and medico-legal analysis



Source: screenshot taken by the Group from open-source video <https://youtu.be/DRDCsLsi-6c?si=J9SAF06TKerc4tfP>

Annex 12 (para. 30)

Unlawful replacement of the Mwami of Bashali *chefferie* by AFC/M23

Remplacement illégal du Mwami de la chefferie de Bashali par l'AFC/M23

The replacement of customary authorities with individuals loyal to AFC/M23 continued (S/2025/446, para. 27), including the unlawful appointments of new *mwami* to the thrones in Bakumu *chefferie* in Nyiragongo territory¹²⁸ and in the Bashali *chefferie* in Masisi territory,¹²⁹ in contravention of traditional succession procedures. Local actors also deplored the protracted absence of customary chiefs from all but two of the 23 localities of the Bashali *chefferie* since AFC/M23 took control.

On 9 October, AFC/M23 installed Bashali Luanda Jaques on the throne of the Bashali *chefferie* during a ceremony in Kitchanga, in contravention of traditional succession procedures and despite objections from the Bashali royal family representing the legitimate Mwami, Bashali N'siyi Minihihi Roger.

Letter by the Bashali royal family on behalf of the legitimate Mwami, objecting to the AFC/M23-appointed replacement:

¹²⁸ <https://kivumorningpost.com/2025/05/15/nyiragongo-intronisation-de-mwami-butsitsi-kahembe-iv-isaac-sous-la-fc-m23/>

¹²⁹ <https://youtu.be/XpFIVMKn8Pg?si=RTWEig1auG2D39Nh>

AIR

Lettre de contestation

À l'attention de l'Autorité provinciale compétente

En copie : à toutes les instances coutumières et administratives concernées



Objet : Contestation de la désignation de Monsieur **BASHALI Luanda Jacques** comme Chef coutumier de la Chefferie de **BASHALI**

Excellence Monsieur le Gouverneur,

Nous, membres de la famille **BASHALI**, avons l'honneur de porter à votre connaissance notre vive préoccupation concernant la désignation de Monsieur **BASHALI Luanda Jacques** en qualité de Chef coutumier de la Chefferie de **BASHALI**.

Après un examen attentif de cette désignation, nous estimons, au regard de notre coutume, qu'elle ne respecte pas les règles établies et risque de compromettre l'unité ainsi que la cohésion de notre communauté.

En effet, le trône de la Chefferie n'est pas vacant : le Mwami **BASHALI N'SIYI MWINIHIRO Roger** est toujours en vie.

Éléments de contestation :

- Trône de la Chefferie :** Ne peut être intronisé Mwami et Grand Chef coutumier de la Chefferie de **BASHALI** que l'héritier disposant d'un Groupement, en l'occurrence celui de **BASHALI/MUKOTO**, fief du Mwami **BASHALI N'SIYI MWINIHIRO Roger**.
- Transmission du pouvoir coutumier :** Conformément à nos us et coutumes, la succession au trône se fait en ligne directe de père en fils. Or, le récipiendaire contesté n'est pas un fils du Mwami **BASHALI MUKOTO NYANGUBA**, mais son petit-fils.
- Principe d'unicité d'intronisation par succession :** Il ne peut y avoir plus d'une intronisation par succession à un même Mwami. Actuellement, la Chefferie de **BASHALI** dispose déjà d'un Chef coutumier légitime : le Mwami **BASHALI N'SIYI MWINIHIRO Roger**.
- Incompatibilité liée à une progéniture multiple :** Selon notre coutume, nul ne peut prétendre au trône s'il a une progéniture gémellaire ou multiple. Or, Monsieur **BASHALI Luanda Jacques** est père de triplés.
- Autres considérations :** Il ne remplit aucune des conditions requises pour accéder au trône, surtout que lui-même est signataire du PV de Conseil de famille désignant l'actuel Mwami et participé aux cérémonies coutumières intronisant ce dernier.

De ce qui précède, il apparaît clairement que Monsieur **BASHALI Luanda Jacques** ne remplit pas les conditions requises pour accéder au trône de la Chefferie de **BASHALI**.

Excellence Monsieur le Gouverneur, notre démarche vise exclusivement à défendre le respect

de nos traditions ancestrales et à prévenir toute source de division ou de conflit au sein de notre communauté.

Le maintien de la paix, de l'harmonie et de la cohésion sociale dans la Chefferie de **BASHALI** dépend du respect strict de ces règles coutumières.

En conséquence, nous sollicitons avec humilité mais également avec fermeté : -

l'annulation de la désignation de Monsieur **BASHALI Luanda Jacques**, - et le rétablissement des principes coutumiers légitimes dans le processus de succession.

Veuillez agréer, Excellence Monsieur le Gouverneur de Province, l'expression de notre très haute considération.

Fait à Goma, le 02 octobre 2025

Les membres de la famille **BASHALI**

BASHALI Mupfano Chantal



BASHALI HUBUYA KISHALI Brigitte

BASHALI KATIBITO-FRANCINE



Annex 13 (para. 31)

AFC/M23's usurpation of core state functions

Usurpation par l'AFC/M23 des fonctions essentielles de l'État

Creation of new administrative entities and land administration structures

AFC/M23 initiated the transformation of several entities previously governed under customary law into administrative entities through the conversion of villages into towns or communes, including in Sake, Ngungu, Rubaya and Bweremana, in Masisi territory,¹³⁰ abolishing all customary rights.¹³¹ In August, AFC/M23-appointed North Kivu governor Bahati Erasto announced plans to subdivide Goma into four communes instead of the existing two.¹³²

On 19 June, AFC/M23-appointed North Kivu governor Bahati Erasto authorized the resumption of operations within the land registry and property title divisions in North Kivu. He ordered the reopening of property registry offices in North Kivu and deployed civil servants to land administration districts, effectively interfering with land administration, including taxation and property registrations.¹³³ According to Dieudonne Birate, head of the property division in Rutshuru territory, the governor approved the deployment of 60 civil servants per land administration district, notably in Goma, Karisimbi, Nyiragongo, Rutshuru and Masisi.¹³⁴

On 25 July, Emmanuel Birato Rwihimba, AFC/M23-appointed governor of South Kivu issued land management laws, including new procedures for obtaining building permits and cadastral documents.¹³⁵

Assumption of state functions

AFC/M23 began controlling entry and exit from territories under its control like a sovereign state entity, stamping passports and issuing visas, including to foreigners working for the UN and other international and non-governmental organizations. These measures had an impact on regional travelers, including on Congolese citizens who were refused entry to Burundi because of AFC/M23 exit stamps in their passports.¹³⁶

On 16 June, AFC/M23 appointed Jean-Damascène Mwigimba as provincial director for its own iteration of the Commission Nationale pour les Réfugiés (CNR), overseeing cross-border refugee movements (see below).¹³⁷

¹³⁰ UN, diplomatic sources, community leaders, researchers.

¹³¹ UN and civil society sources. See also <https://www.radiookapi.net/2025/04/09/actualite/securite/des-villages-transformes-en-cites-ou-communes-masisi>

¹³² <https://x.com/michombero/status/1951381131472830532?s=20>

¹³³ UN and civil society sources.

¹³⁴ Idem.

¹³⁵ <https://x.com/ProvSudKivu/status/1948706702036967429?s=20>; <https://laprunellerdc.cd/sud-kivu-le-gouverneur-m23-patrick-busu-bwa-ngwi-fixe-les-nouvelles-modalites-dobtention-des-autorisations-de-batir-et-documents-cadastraux/>

¹³⁶ International and local residents, Congolese authorities, diplomatic sources. See also <https://x.com/afrikarabia/status/1924516214316949637?s=20>

¹³⁷



Source: <https://x.com/michombero/status/1935338023958298787>

Interference in educational affairs

AFC/M23 oversaw state exams in schools,¹³⁸ introduced new report cards and school fees,¹³⁹ and announced reforms to the educational system in areas under its control.¹⁴⁰ AFC/M23 also ordered universities to sever ties with the Congolese Ministry of Higher and University Education in Kinshasa.¹⁴¹

¹³⁸ <https://x.com/NordKivu4716/status/1940305516418453671?s=20>

¹³⁹ <https://www.radiookapi.net/2025/07/22/actualite/societe/nord-kivu-le-m23-impose-ses-bulletins-scolaires-aux-ecoles-de-goma>

¹⁴⁰ https://x.com/wembi_steve/status/1932789211431587937?s=20

¹⁴¹ <https://www.radiookapi.net/2025/05/28/actualite/education/la-ministre-de-lesu-condamne-les-mesures-du-m23-concernant-la-gestion>

Annex 14 (para. 32)

AFC/M23 - Establishment of parallel financial administration

AFC/M23 – Mise en place d’une administration financière parallèle

Since the drafting of the Group’s Final report, normal banking activity remained suspended in AFC/M23 controlled territories, which has deepened previously reported cash shortages (S/2025/446, paras 30-33). AFC/M23 pursued its goal to replace the DRC Government’s tax collection and financial administration by further developing its own tax and land-revenue mechanism, and diverted liquidity.

At the time of the takeover of Goma and Bukavu, the areas controlled by the AFC/M23 held about 5 percent of DRC’s total banking sector assets, or \$900 million.¹⁴² Since then, the DRC Central Bank (BCC) halted cash shipments to the Goma and Bukavu branches¹⁴³ and redirected the regular liquidity envelope to government-held Beni, Butembo and Bunia.¹⁴⁴

AFC/M23 also sought to stimulate trade and investment, including by relaxing certain financial regulations.¹⁴⁵ Sources within AFC/M23 revealed ongoing discussions with foreign economic actors and investors. In June, the former South Kivu governor, Birato Rwihimba Emmanuel, was reassigned to lead a department dedicated to the study, planning and promotion of investments.¹⁴⁶

Bank closure and cash shortage in areas controlled by AFC/M23

At the time of writing, areas under AFC/M23 control faced severe liquidity shortage, affecting particularly the lives of the civilian population. Most of the population in the areas controlled by AFC/M23 relied on cash for their daily transactions, as the economy remained largely informal.¹⁴⁷

AFC/M23 kept denouncing the liquidity crisis as a stranglehold strategy by the DRC Government.¹⁴⁸ Multiple sources agreed that the liquidity crisis significantly affected AFC/M23 finances, since AFC/M23 was depleting resources quicker than its capacity to generate them through taxes and other revenues from the areas they controlled (see S/2025/446, para. 112). Additionally, the paralysis of formal banking has affected AFC/M23’s cash reserves. Multiple sources reported that, given the current cash depletion rate, AFC/M23 would not be able to survive without financial support from Rwanda.¹⁴⁹

Branch closures in the areas controlled by AFC/M23 have eroded the trust of the population in the banking system, with a risk of disorderly deposit run once these banks physically reopen.¹⁵⁰ Furthermore, on 8 April 2025, the BCC issued Instruction 44 imposing financial institutions to restructure non-performing loans from the mentioned areas, which has put additional stress on the banks’ liquidity (see below excerpts). Although finance experts did not foresee the risks of a systemic and nationwide liquidity crisis as a direct consequence of the situation in the East, they agreed that the banking system will likely deteriorate in the near future, particularly in terms of consumer trust, increase in non-performing loans, and reduced ability of banks to overcome financial stress.¹⁵¹

¹⁴² Banque Centrale du Congo, UN, Association Congolaise des Banques. 92 to 97 percent of these assets were in USD.

¹⁴³ CENAREF, Association Congolaise des Banques (ACB), UN, Economic actors, civil society.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹⁴⁵ AFC/M23 sources, UN sources and researchers.

¹⁴⁶ <https://x.com/LawrenceKanyuka/status/1930322202986979419?s=20>

¹⁴⁷ Civil society, researchers, economic actors, BCC, ACB. In the DRC only 30 – 35 percent of the population use alternatives to cash (i.e. banks accounts, mobile money, credit cards). The percentage of people holding a bank account is much lower, at around 15 percent.


¹⁴⁸ Diplomatic sources, social media, UN, civil society, researchers, intelligence sources.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ UN, ACB, intelligence sources.

¹⁵¹ UN, ACB, intelligence sources, researchers, economic actors.

- Excerpts from Banque Centrale du Congo instruction 44



Source : https://www.bcc.cd/system/files_force/dsif/instruction_44_modification_2.pdf?download=1

Attempt by AFC/M23 to use the Caisse Générale d'Épargne du Congo (CADECO) as a parallel central bank in AFC/M23-territories

On 7 April, Corneille Nangaa publicly and unilaterally declared the resumption of banking activities by *Caisse Générale d'Épargne du Congo* (CADECO) to serve as a parallel central bank, operating in the AFC/M23 controlled area (S/2025/446, para. 33).

However, CADECO in Kinshasa immediately denied the resuming of operations, declaring that these would be “illegal and will constitute a direct threat to the clients’ financial security and institutional integrity” (see below).

- *CADECO press communiqué, 5 April 2025*



Document provided by CADECO

Before this press release, CADECO had withdrawn all signing authority from the managers in Goma and Bukavu and told correspondent banks not to honor their mandates. Furthermore, CADECO disconnected its Goma and Bukavu offices from its national clearing system, asked all staff to restrain from opening local offices or going to work, and handed over all the liquidity held in its coffers to the BCC (see below).¹⁵² At the time of writing, still no bank was operating in areas controlled by AFC/M23.

- *Kinshasa-based CADECO withdrawing signature rights from CADECO managers*



Source: Document provided by CADECO

Despite the precautionary measures taken by CADECO, AFC/M23 administration issued tax receipts bearing false CADECO account numbers in USD and Congolese Francs and directed payers to deposit funds there (see below).

- *AFC-M23 tax receipts with CADECO accounts*

¹⁵² CADECO, intelligence and UN sources. CADECO informed that only the equivalent of a day of operations, or 170 Million Congolese Francs (\$60.000), remained in Goma that could not be handed over to the BCC.

Document provided by confidential sources

Interviewees told the Group that collections were taken door to door in cash because most households did not hold CADECO accounts.¹⁵³ In July 2025, CADECO told the Group that no such accounts existed in their books.¹⁵⁴ The use of CADECO's name by AFC/M23 appears thus a tentative to give the appearance of legitimacy to a cash-in-hand system run by AFC/M23 agents.

In March 2025, Corneille Nangaa met with the association of money change agents in Goma, asking them to be the pillar of the AFC/M23 financial system in the occupied areas. In parallel, AFC/M23 encouraged the population to resort to mobile money systems for their transactions.¹⁵⁵

Civil servants in the public health and education sectors continued to receive their salaries from the DRC Government on banks accounts. Payments to other civil servants and members of the security forces were also authorised by the Government on a case-by-case basis.¹⁵⁶ As banks and ATMs remained closed in areas under AFC/M23 control, holders of these accounts only had a few ways to turn electronic balances into cash:

(i) Forex dealers: by using their credit or debit cards to withdraw cash in Rwanda, then converting Rwandese Francs to Congolese Francs at a premium. The USD exchange rates in the areas controlled by AFC/M23 were on average 10 to 15 percent less favorable, since money exchange agents coming from abroad were the only ones who still had cash available.¹⁵⁷ This also explained why money exchange agents became paramount in areas controlled by AFC/M23.

(ii) Resort to mobile money: Although agents cashing in virtual money have become rarer and charged high fees (S/2025/446, annex 19), their kiosks have become the main source of notes and coins.¹⁵⁸ Other virtual money platforms, notably stablecoins, were reportedly used but on a negligible scale.¹⁵⁹

(iii) Informal cash runners: through funds sent by mobile transfer to individuals in Beni or Butembo, where banks still operated. Individuals in those locations withdrew cash and carried it

¹⁵³ Goma dwellers, economic actors, researchers, civil society, UN, intelligence sources.

¹⁵⁴ CADECO.

¹⁵⁵ Goma dwellers, economic actors, researchers, Association Congolaise des Banques (ACB), UN, intelligence sources.

¹⁵⁶ UN, researchers, economic actors.

¹⁵⁷ In Kinshasa, 2,850 Congolese Francs are needed to purchase a USD. In areas controlled by AFC/M23, the same USD can be purchased against 3,000 to 3,200 Congolese Francs.

¹⁵⁸ Goma dwellers, economic actors, researchers, ACB, UN, intelligence sources.

¹⁵⁹ Researchers, civil society, Goma dwellers, intelligence sources.


back to the areas under AFC/M23 control. Volumes remained small and journeys risky, but the channel partly offset the liquidity gap.

Tax collection by AFC/M23

AFC/M23 replaced tax collectors of the DRC Government and started to levy charges on individuals, businesses, civil society organizations, and national and international NGOs.¹⁶⁰ Before the takeover by AFC/M23, central-government revenues collected by the DGDA (customs), the DGI (domestic taxes) and the DGRAD (royalties and other duties) in Goma and Bukavu accounted to about 5 percent of the DRC's national tax receipts, or \$380 to 400 million.¹⁶¹ Closure of customs and tax offices in the areas controlled by AFC/M23 reduced central government revenues by about 0.4 per cent of GDP.¹⁶² The shortfall was partly contained because many businesses active in AFC/M23-held territory, but with offices in Government-controlled areas, chose to remit their taxes to the Government rather than to AFC/M23.¹⁶³ Furthermore, traditionally the areas now controlled by AFC/M23 contributed little to national tax collection and GDP, especially when compared to other provinces rich in copper and cobalt production.¹⁶⁴

Even so, if AFC/M23 managed to collect a sufficient share of the \$380 – 400 million previously levied by DGDA, DGI and DGRAD, it would be able to self-finance itself. AFC/M23 was therefore pressing ahead with a parallel tax collection system. Although the national economy was highly dollarized, and household taxes receipts were levied by the AFC/M23 in USD (see below images), these were collected in Congolese Francs by the already cash-impoorished population, due to the limited availability of USD in AFC/M23 controlled territories, as described above.

- *Household tax initially foreseen at \$5 by AFC/M2 and then levied at \$2*



¹⁶⁰ Goma and Bukavu dwellers, civil society, researchers, UN, intelligence sources.

¹⁶¹ UN, BCC, intelligence sources.

¹⁶² International Monetary Fund, Democratic Republic of Congo: First Review Under the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement, Requests for Waivers of Non-Observance of Performance Criteria, Modification of Quantitative Performance Criteria, and Financing Assurances Review, IMF Country Report No. 25/195 (Washington, D.C., 16 July 2025), paras 19 and 26–27. See [<https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2025/07/16/Democratic-Republic-of-the-Congo-First-Review-Under-the-Extended-Credit-Facility-568683>].

¹⁶³ UN, economic actors, civil society, researchers. Taxes contributed to 14 percent of DRC GDP.

¹⁶⁴ Idem. DRC extractive sector alone contributed to 50 percent of the overall tax collection. Copper and cobalt contributed to 94 percent of the extractive sector taxes (57 and 37 percent respectively), while the tax contribution of minerals subject to UN GoE traceability remained negligible (4 percent for gold, 1 percent for cassiterite and 0.5 percent for coltan). The extractive sector contributed to 30 percent of the national GDP, with copper and cobalt contributing 21 percent.



Documents provided by confidential sources

In addition to the taxes documented in the Group's previous reports (S/2025/446, para. 31 and annex 18) the Group collected evidence of the following taxes imposed in Goma by AFC/M23:

- (i) Household tax (*taxe d'assainissement/menage*): initially imposed at \$5 per household per month, it was soon lowered to \$2 and collected door-to-door on Sundays (see above receipts).
- (ii) Fines and taxes related to forced labor (*salongo*): AFC/M23 introduced *salongo* (S/2025/446, Annex 69), a compulsory Saturday work scheme. Participation was proven by a small, perforated token with the date of the day of work. Patrols verified these tokens every week. Those who could not produce a token were beaten and fined 5,000 Congolese francs. The Group also collected receipts of a tax labelled *salongo* imposed on schools for the value of 200,000 Congolese francs (see below images).

- *AFC/M23 forced labor ("salongo") token*



Document provided to the Group by confidential sources

- *AFC/M23 forced labor ("salongo") receipt on schools*

MAIRIE DE GOMA

Titre de perception N° 30701 MG/FINANCES/ 20.25

Référence du texte légal Ordonnance N° 18/004 du 13 mars 2018 fixant la nomenclature des Impôts, Droit, Taxes et Redevances de la province et de l'Entité Territoriale Décentralisée ainsi que les modalités de leur répartition.

Nom ou Raison sociale
Adresse physique
OBJET

[redacted]

Amo
ctionnelles de
SALONGO

CDF 20000000
USD

En lettre : Deux cents mille francs congolais

Service d'assiette

L'Ordonnateur
Ordonnateur

Le paiement doit intervenir au plus tard dans les 48 heures de la réception et versé à la comptabilité de la Mairie de Goma. Dépassant ce délai, l'assujéti sera soumis au paiement les pénalités.

Date d'ordonnancement 25.05/20.25

POUR RECEPTION
Goma, le 25/05/20.25

Le Percepteur CHIST
Nom et signature du percepteur

Le Receveur OK

Pièces jointes

MAIRIE DE GOMA

Titre de perception N° 30701 MG/FINANCES/ 20.25

Référence du texte légal Ordonnance N° 18/004 du 13 mars 2018 fixant la nomenclature des Impôts, Droit, Taxes et Redevances de la province et de l'Entité Territoriale Décentralisée ainsi que les modalités de leur répartition.

Nom ou Raison sociale
Adresse physique
OBJET

[redacted]

Amo
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CDF 20000000
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En lettre : Deux cents mille francs congolais

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Le paiement doit intervenir au plus tard dans les 48 heures de la réception et versé à la comptabilité de la Mairie de Goma. Dépassant ce délai, l'assujéti sera soumis au paiement les pénalités.

Date d'ordonnancement 25.05/20.25

POUR RECEPTION
Goma, le 25/05/20.25

Le Percepteur CHIST
Nom et signature du percepteur

Le Receveur OK

Pièces jointes

Documents provided by confidential sources

(iii) AFC/M23 has tried to broaden its revenue base by imposing taxes and utility charges on businesses, NGOs and United Nations entities (S/2025/446, para. 31). However, the results remained poor as most taxpayers continued to file and pay in Government-controlled zones, and

NGOs continued to settle their electricity and water bills with the State providers located outside rebel territory, to avoid the risks of being sanctioned for financing a UN-sanctioned armed group.¹⁶⁵ AFC/M23 forged the reopening of an unauthorized CADECO branch in Goma and fabricated fictitious CADECO accounts in its favor. These non-existent accounts enabled AF/M23 to collect tax payments from individuals and small businesses under a veneer of legitimacy. According to the same sources, the taxes were taken exclusively in cash, in Congolese francs (CDF).

Establishment by AFC/M23 of the Autorité de Régulation du Secteur Économique, Financier et des Assurances (AREFA)

Early October, AFC/M23 established a new body, the *Autorité de Régulation du Secteur Économique, Financier et des Assurances* (AREFA) tasked with supervising all activities previously governed by Congolese financial-sector regulators¹⁶⁶, including banks, insurance companies, microfinance institutions, savings and credit cooperatives, and money-transfer services.

On 3 October 2025, AREFA Director General Cédric Fiéma Punduyange publicly announced the “*official relaunch of the financial system*” in the M23-controlled territories, stating that AREFA had been created to “restore discipline, confidence, and financial sovereignty”.¹⁶⁷ He announced new rules for currency-exchange rates, withdrawal limits, and transfer fees. On 9 October 2025, AREFA made registration or licensing compulsory for all financial-sector entities and individuals operating in AFC/M23-controlled areas. It required those holding licenses previously granted by Congolese authorities to register under AREFA’s authority, within a thirty-day period, under penalty of closure.¹⁶⁸

- *AREFA announcement on making registration and/or licensing compulsory for Banks:*

¹⁶⁵ CADECO, UN, economic actors, intelligence sources. CADECO collects at the national level taxes paid by small businesses to the DGDA, DGRAD and DGI. Bigger economic actors instead pay their taxes directly to the Direction des Grandes Entreprises at the Ministry of Finance.

¹⁶⁶ https://x.com/AREFA_AFCM23/status/1974145829171826754.

¹⁶⁷ https://x.com/AREFA_AFCM23/status/1974145829171826754

¹⁶⁸ https://x.com/AREFA_AFCM23/status/1974145829171826754


DIRECTION GENERALE
L'Autorité de Régulation du secteur Économique, Financier et des Assurances

COMMUNIQUÉ OFFICIEL N°002/AREFA/DG/2025

BANQUES

L'Autorité de Régulation du secteur Économique, Financier et des Assurances (AREFA), agissant en vertu des pouvoirs lui conférés par la décision N°016/COORD/AFG - N23/2025 du 07 avril 2025, ainsi que les textes légaux et réglementaires en vigueur, notamment la loi n°022/069 du 27 décembre 2022 qui encadre l'activité et le contrôle des établissements de crédit, informe par le présent communiqué toute personne morale exerçant les activités bancaires ou y assimilées dans les zones libérées par l'AFCM23, qu'il est obligatoire de se conformer aux procédures suivantes:

1. Obtention d'un agrément

Tout opérateur souhaitant exercer des activités bancaires doit obligatoirement introduire une demande d'agrément auprès de l'AREFA.

2. Enregistrement d'un agrément

L'institution disposant déjà d'un agrément ou d'une licence délivrée par une autre autorité doit se présenter auprès de l'AREFA afin qu'il soit procédé à son enregistrement.

Cette démarche vise à garantir la conformité des opérateurs avec la réglementation spécifique en vigueur dans les zones libérées par l'AFCM23.

3. Délais de réglementation

Un délai de 21 jours calendaires, à compter de la date de publication du présent communiqué, est accordé pour l'initiation des démarches susmentionnées.

1

Autorité de Régulation du secteur Économique, Financier et des Assurances (AREFA)
Direction Générale ; Quartier Les Volcans, Av. Beni ; N° 025 ; +243 995 566 561


DIRECTION GENERALE
L'Autorité de Régulation du secteur Économique, Financier et des Assurances

4. Lieu de dépôt des demandes

Les demandes sont à déposer au siège de l'AREFA ou auprès de l'une de ses représentations locales autorisées.

L'AREFA rappelle son engagement à instaurer un cadre bancaire sain, sécurisé et conforme aux standards internationaux de conformité, de transparence et de stabilité financière.

Fait à Goma, le 03 octobre 2025

Pour l'AREFA,
Cedoc FIEMA PUNDUTANGÉ
Directeur Général




2

Autorité de Régulation du secteur Économique, Financier et des Assurances (AREFA)
Direction Générale ; Quartier Les Volcans, Av. Beni ; N° 025 ; +243 995 566 561

Source: AREFA - https://x.com/arefa_afcm23/status/1976196270638223538?s=46&t=_n75XfLAIYYaxKQtM7ZzVg

- *AREFA announcement on making registration and/or licensing compulsory for Microfinances:*



Source: AREFA - https://x.com/arefa_afcm23/status/1976196270638223538?s=46&t=n75XfLAIYYaxKQtM7ZzVg

- *AREFA announcement on making registration and/or licensing compulsory for insurance companies:*


DIRECTION GENERALE
L'Autorité de Régulation du secteur Economique, Financier et des Assurances

COMMUNIQUE OFFICIEL N°001/AREFA/DG/2025

ASSURANCES

L'Autorité de Régulation du secteur Economique, Financier et des Assurances (AREFA), agissant en vertu des pouvoirs lui conférés par la décision N°016/COORD/AFIC - M23/2025 du 07 avril 2025, ainsi que les textes légaux et réglementaires en vigueur, notamment la loi n°15/005 du 17 mars 2015 portant code des Assurances en République Démocratique du Congo, informe par le présent communiqué toute personne morale exerçant une activité d'assurance ou y assimilée dans les zones libérées par l'AFIC/M23, qu'il est obligatoire de se conformer aux procédures suivantes:

- 1. Obtention d'un agrément**
Tout opérateur souhaitant exercer une activité d'assurance (assurance vie, non-vie, courtage, agence, réassurance, etc) doit obligatoirement introduire une demande d'agrément auprès de l'AREFA.
- 2. Enregistrement d'un agrément**
L'institution disposant déjà d'un agrément ou d'une licence délivrée par une autre autorité doit se présenter auprès de l'AREFA afin qu'il soit procédé à son enregistrement.
Cette démarche vise à garantir la conformité des opérateurs avec la réglementation spécifique en vigueur dans les zones libérées par l'AFIC/M23.
- 3. Délais de réglementation**
Un délai de 21 jours calendaires, à compter de la date de publication du présent communiqué, est accordé pour l'initiation des démarches susmentionnées.

1

Autorité de Régulation du secteur Economique, Financier et des Assurances (AREFA)
Direction Générale - Quartier Les Volcans, Av. Beni - N° 025 - +243 995 588 661


DIRECTION GENERALE
L'Autorité de Régulation du secteur Economique, Financier et des Assurances

Passé ce délai, toute activité non régularisée sera considérée comme illégale et exposera son auteur à des sanctions administratives et/ou pénales.

4. Lieu de dépôt des demandes
Les demandes sont à déposer au siège de l'AREFA ou auprès de l'une de ses représentations locales autorisées.
L'AREFA rappelle son engagement à instaurer un cadre assurantiel sain, sécurisé et conforme aux standards internationaux de conformité, de transparence et de stabilité financière.

Fait à Goma, le 03 octobre 2025

Pour : AREFA,
Général FIEMA PUNDUYANGE
Directeur Général



2

Autorité de Régulation du secteur Economique, Financier et des Assurances (AREFA)
Direction Générale - Quartier Les Volcans, Av. Beni - N° 025 - +243 995 588 661

Source: AREFA - https://x.com/arefa_afcm23/status/1976196270638223538?s=46&t=n75XfLAIYYaxKQtM7ZzVg

- AREFA announcement on the relaunching of the financial sector in AFC/M23 territories



Source: AREFA - https://x.com/arefa_afcm23/status/1976196270638223538?s=46&t=_n75XfLAiYYaxKQtM7ZzVg

Establishment of a General Inspectorate of Governance (IGG) by AFC/M23

On 4 November 2025, AFC/M23 announced the establishment of the “General Inspectorate of Governance” (IGG), mandated to ensure financial oversight across all AFC/M23 departments, conduct internal audits, evaluate administrative and financial management, and promote good governance practices, including the reporting of irregularities.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁹ https://x.com/m23_twirwaneho/status/1985655510818001325?s=46&t=_n75XfLAiYYaxKQtM7ZzVg ; https://x.com/afcongo/status/1989066726080692569?s=46&t=_n75XfLAiYYaxKQtM7ZzVg.

Annex 15 (para. 33)


AFC/M23's establishment of a parallel judicial system

La mise en place par l'AFC/M23 d'un système judiciaire parallèle

On 29 May, AFC/M23 announced the creation of an arbitration court for local conflicts in Goma.¹⁷⁰

On 12 August, AFC/M23 created a 25-member *Commission pour la Restauration de la Justice* (CRJ), presided by Delion Kimbulungu Mutangala, AFC/M23 permanent secretary (S/2025/446, annex 1), to oversee the process of establishing civil and military courts and tribunals, and the recruitment of magistrates.¹⁷¹ Délion Kimbulungu defended this initiative by referring to Article 19 of the Congolese Constitution, which he said guarantees every citizen access to justice and the neutrality of the judiciary.¹⁷²

On 3 November 2025, the CRJ announced the results of the recruitment process for magistrates held in Goma on 14 September 2025. The results of the recruitment process, listing 378 successful candidates, are on file with the Secretariat.



Confidential source

¹⁷⁰ <https://x.com/KadimaYassin/status/1928169797751087559?s=20>

¹⁷¹ <https://x.com/LawrenceKanyuka/status/1955329448481349723?s=20>

¹⁷² <https://youtu.be/n7wZy4VOg6E?si=TAzXlwcwBfkHI3Ix>

Annex 16 (para. 33)

DRC Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature statement declaring all judicial acts undertaken by AFC/M23 as violation of the DRC's constitutional order, 12 September 2025

Déclaration du Conseil supérieur de la magistrature de la RDC considérant que tous les actes judiciaires entrepris par l'AFC/M23 constituent une violation de l'ordre constitutionnel de la RDC, le 12 septembre 2025



Document provided by DRC Government source

Annex 18 (para. 41)

Analysis of photographic evidence, satellite imagery and NASA's fire-sensing system corroborating incidents of AFC/M23-RDF burning civilian infrastructure, between April and October 2025

Analyse des preuves photographiques, des images satellites et du système de détection des incendies de la NASA corroborant des incidents d'incendie d'infrastructures civiles par l'AFC/M23-RDF, entre avril et octobre 2025

Methodology

The Group used NASA's **Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS)** to corroborate reported incidents of AFC/M23-RDF burning civilian infrastructure. Due to time constraints, the Group was yet unable to conduct analysis on all reported incidents. The findings below represent a selection of incidents where the location was thoroughly corroborated and could be easily geolocated.

FIRMS uses satellite-based thermal detection to identify active fires and other heat sources on the Earth's surface. FIRMS relies primarily on data from NASA's MODIS and VIIRS instruments, which scan the planet several times per day and record thermal anomalies—areas that are significantly hotter than their surroundings. These detections are processed in near-real time (within minutes to hours) and made available as georeferenced points indicating the location, time, and confidence level of a heat event.

While FIRMS cannot determine the cause of a fire, it reliably indicates when and where burning occurred, including in remote or inaccessible areas. When combined with satellite imagery, local reporting and field information, FIRMS data helps corroborate patterns of burning consistent with village destruction, agricultural fires, or conflict-related incidents.

(1) On 28 May 2025, fires were detected in Marangara (1°11'04.1"S 29°17'17.3"E), Tongo *groupement*, Rutshuru territory, coinciding with attacks on Marangara on 27 and 28 May 2025, in Bwito *chefferie*, with multiple civilians killed and widespread burning of civilian homes

On 27 May 2025, RDF and AFC/M23 attacked FDLR positions in Marangara, an FDLR stronghold. Civilians were killed and houses set on fire during the clashes. On 28 May, RDF and AFC/M23 redeployed around Tongo, Bukombo and Mutanda, firing, setting fire to homes allegedly belonging to FDLR or CMC combatants or relatives. On 28 May, RDF and AFC/M23 accused inhabitants of Marangara, Lukara, and Kirumba of hiding FDLR in their houses. In retaliation, livestock and household items were looted, houses burnt, causing massive displacement.¹⁷³

Map below:

- Fires burning for 6-12 hours are depicted with orange squares
- Fires burning for 12-24 hours are depicted with yellow squares

¹⁷³ UN, intelligence sources, FARDC, civil society, local researchers.




Source: NASA-FIRMS <https://firms.modaps.eosdis.nasa.gov/map/#t:tsd;d:2025-05-28;@29.237,-1.186,12.132z> (Date accessed: 20 November 2025)

NASA-FIRMS Disclaimer:

<https://www.earthdata.nasa.gov/data/projects/lance#disclaimer~:text=Data%20Use%20Guidance%20and%20Disclaimer>

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

The fires in Marangara reported on 27-28 May 2025 are visible also on satellite imagery captured on 28 May 2025 (same geolocation used for NASA's FIRMS and the Copernicus satellite imagery): see white smoke around the marked location.



Source: Copernicus Browser Dataspace, 28 May 2025, location 1°11'04.1"S 29°17'17.3"E

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

- (2) On 6 October 2025, fire was detected at -1.07767 (latitude) 29.18622 (longitude), coinciding with attacks reported between Muliki and Kauma, Tongo *groupement*, with AFC/M23 attacks reported in both locations on 6 and 7 October 2025¹⁷⁴



¹⁷⁴ UN, intelligence sources, FARDC, civil society, local researchers.

Source: NASA-FIRMS <https://firms.modaps.eosdis.nasa.gov/map/#t:tsd;d:2025-10-04..2025-11-03;@29.269,-1.177,11.793z>

(Date accessed: 20 November 2025)

NASA-FIRMS Disclaimer:

<https://www.earthdata.nasa.gov/data/projects/lance#disclaimer~:text=Data%20Use%20Guidance%20and%20Disclaimer>

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

- **19 October 2025, fire detected at -1.1976 (latitude) 29.20749 (longitude), coinciding with location of fires reported near Kamena, targeted by AFC/M23 attacks on the same day¹⁷⁵:**



Source: NASA-FIRMS <https://firms.modaps.eosdis.nasa.gov/map/#t:tsd;d:2025-10-04..2025-11-03;@29.269,-1.177,11.793z>

(Date accessed: 20 November 2025)

NASA-FIRMS Disclaimer:

<https://www.earthdata.nasa.gov/data/projects/lance#disclaimer~:text=Data%20Use%20Guidance%20and%20Disclaimer>

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

¹⁷⁵ Idem.

Annex 19 (para. 42)**AFC/M23 denying access to civilians to their lands leading to loss of livelihoods and famine****Le refus par l'AFC/M23 de permettre aux civils d'accéder à leurs terres, entraînant une perte de moyens de subsistance et la famine**

UN sources, humanitarian actors, civil society and local leaders have denounced AFC/M23's practice of expelling civilians and subsequently denying access to their lands, notably in Rutshuru and Masisi territories, in a direct correlation with ongoing hostilities in the area. Lack of access to land, and often AFC/M23 ordering civilians to hand over their crops to feed AFC/M23 troops has led to an alarming increase in famine and famine-like conditions.¹⁷⁶

The Conseil territorial de la jeunesse du territoire de Rutshuru denounced the targeting of civilians in Binza *groupement*, Bwisha *chefferie*, Rutshuru territory, routinely accompanied by killings, the expulsion of civilians from their areas, destruction of homes, interdiction of accessing agricultural fields, and the forced recruitment of youth:

¹⁷⁶ See also <https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/latest/patients-describe-massacres-civilians-binza-dr-congo>; <https://radio-oasis.cd/nord-kivu-long-badilika-denonce-des-cas-de-confiscation-de-terres-et-denrolement-force-de-civils-par-le-m23/>; <https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/wfp-fao-call-urgent-action-hunger-deepens-drc>; <https://www.wfp.org/news/more-people-are-driven-their-homes-drc-food-insecurity-worsens-creating-heightened>; <https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/hunger-soars-drc-wfp-regional-chief-urges-joint-action-reverse-course>; <https://www.unognewsroom.org/story/en/2902/dr-congo-crisis-wfp-07-november-2025>.



**CONSEIL TERRITORIAL DE LA JEUNESSE
DU TERRITOIRE DE RUTSHURU**

E-mail : presidencecjrutshuru2020@gmail.com

Tél : +243 974 003 973, +243 844 029 223.

Adresse locale : Rutshuru Centre, Q.Remera, Voir P.N.A.



Binza en train de mourir et cimetière à ciel ouvert : un génocide orchestré par le M23-RDF sous l'œil complice du silence

L'horreur absolue à Binza : crimes de guerre massifs, zéro protection.

Depuis le 11 juillet 2025 jusqu'à ce jour, le Conseil Territorial de la Jeunesse de Rutshuru suit de très près, minute par minute, la situation sécuritaire et humanitaire extrêmement alarmante qui prévaut dans le Groupement de Binza, Chefferie de Bwisha, Territoire de Rutshuru, Province du Nord-Kivu.

Les faits documentés sur le terrain font état d'un véritable carnage perpétré par les rebelles du M23-RDF-AFC, **Au moins 296 personnes ont été exécutées sommairement** dans les Localités de Kisegoro, Katwiguru, Kisharo, Busesa, Congo, Kigaligali, Nyabanira, Gasave et Kihito, précisément à Nyerengé. **Parmi les victimes figurent des femmes et des enfants.** Ces exécutions ont été justifiées, selon les assaillants, par de prétendues affiliations des victimes aux FDLR - une accusation non prouvée, mais utilisée comme prétexte de massacre.

Des corps sans vie ont été jetés dans la rivière Rutshuru (appelée localement Kitshuru), d'autres ont été **brûlés dans leurs abris provisoires construits au champ**, et de nombreux cadavres non enterrés sont en décomposition, devenus la proie d'animaux charognards surnommés localement « **Bibombobonbo** ». À cette tragédie s'ajoutent **des recrutements forcés massifs** de jeunes, estimés à plus de 315 personnes, à Kisharo, Katwiguru, Nyabanira, Nyamilima. Le cas le plus récent a été signalé à Ishasha le 31 juillet 2025, où une cinquantaine de jeunes ont été recrutés de force.

Des arrestations arbitraires sont également en hausse : hommes et femmes sont arrêtés sans preuve, sous prétexte d'être liés ou mariés aux FDLR. **Des maisons de civils ont été systématiquement démolies** à Kisharo et Katwiguru, accusées faussement d'appartenir aux FDLR.

Par ailleurs, **les rebelles du M23-RDF-AFC ont contraint les populations des villages de Nyabanira, Kisave, Kihito et Nyamitembe de quitter leurs habitations.** Ces familles, chassées de force, sont désormais **en situation de déplacement**, livrées à elles-mêmes, sans assistance humanitaire suffisante. Une partie de ces déplacés a trouvé refuge à Kiwanja, dans des conditions extrêmement précaires, sans accès à la nourriture, aux soins ou à la protection. Plus grave encore, les rebelles du M23-RDF-AFC **interdisent à la population l'accès à leurs champs**, condamnant ainsi des milliers de familles à la famine. « Tu descends de deux mètres vers le champ pour chercher à manger, ta récompense, c'est la mort », témoignent les rescapés.

Il est crucial de rappeler qu'en septembre et octobre 2024, plus de 300 personnes avaient été massacrées dans la même zone, à Kisegoro et Katwiguru, dans un silence inquiétant de la communauté internationale.

Le Conseil Territorial de la Jeunesse de Rutshuru :


- **Dénonce avec la plus grande fermeté les crimes de guerre, crimes contre l'humanité et les violations graves du droit international humanitaire perpétrés par le M23-RDF-AFC ;**
- **Demande à la communauté internationale, aux Nations Unies, à l'Union Africaine, à la CIRGL, et aux organisations nationales et internationales de défense des droits humains, d'ouvrir une enquête urgente et indépendante pour établir les responsabilités ;**
- **Exige des sanctions ciblées contre les auteurs de ces atrocités et la mise en place immédiate d'un mécanisme de protection des civils dans les zones occupées, notamment à Binza, Bwisha et Bwito.**

*Le silence tue. Ne pas agir, c'est être complice !!!!!
Nous ne resterons pas silencieux. L'histoire jugera !!!!!
Binza crie. Binza saigne. Binza meurt.*

Fait le 03 août 2025

Pour le Conseil Territorial de la Jeunesse de Rutshuru

TWIZERE SEBASHITSI Patient
Président




Confidential civil society source

Annex 20 (para. 42)

Refugee arrivals from Rutshuru territory to Uganda, coinciding with start of AFC/M23-RDF anti-FDLR operations end of April – May

Arrivées de réfugiés en provenance du territoire de Rutshuru en Ouganda, coïncidant avec le début des opérations anti-FDLR de l'AFC/M23-RDF



Source: UNHCR <https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/117675>

Reflects data recorded until 22 July 2025

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Key figures

**73k**Estimated New Arrivals
from DRC since Jan 2025**65k**People Relocated to
Plots in Settlement

Demographic




Context

Since January 2025, around 73,000 people arriving in Uganda from the Democratic Republic of Congo are in need of international refugee protection.

The government, UNHCR and partners provide protection and assistance to these individuals who are part of the 1.94M refugees who call Uganda home.

Most arrivals are from Nord Kivu, Sud Kivu and Ituri regions.

Total new arrivals (cumulative since 1 Jan. 2025)



Arrival & relocation

⊗ Border entry points		✦ Transit Centers		👤 Reception Centers		🚐 Relocations from reception centres to settlements	
	New arrivals		Current population		Current population	From	
Bunagana	42,133	Bubukwanga	64	Kabazana	470	Kabazana	59,851
Busanza	1,553	Matanda	69	Mahani	439	Mahani	1,832
Butogota	1,978	Sebagoro	11	Kagoma	549	Kagoma	4,021
Ishasha/Kihihi	2,829	Nyakabande	263	Sweswe	227	Sweswe	51
Kashenyi	7,671						
Kyeshero	3,262						
Mpondwe	230						
Nteko	1,982						
Paidha	3,225						
Sebagoro	5,207						
Other locations	3,342						

Source: UNHCR <https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/118858>
 Reflects data collected until 21 September 2025

Annex 21 (para. 46)

Strategic importance of the Kashebere and the Nyabiondo–Kashebere axes at the boundary between Masisi and Walikale territories

Importance stratégique de Kashebere et des axes Nyabiondo–Kashebere à la frontière des territoires de Masisi et de Walikale

From late May 2025, AFC/M23 and RDF deployed reinforcements into Masisi territory along the Masisi–Kashebere and the Nyabiondo–Kashebere axes, at the boundary with Walikale territory, with the objective of taking Walikale centre.

These routes constitute the shortest and most operationally viable approach from Masisi to Pinga, a strategic gateway to Walikale centre. Control of these axes allows to sustain prolonged military operations through rapid troop movements and supply. Securing these roads would allow AFC/M23–RDF to encircle Pinga from multiple directions with the aim of taking Walikale, connecting their positions and projecting force simultaneously across Masisi, Rutshuru, and Walikale territories.

Annex 22 (para. 50)**Public statements by senior AFC/M23 officials announcing intention of further territorial expansion towards Butembo, Beni and Kisangani****Déclarations publiques de hauts responsables de l'AFC/M23 annonçant leur intention de poursuivre l'expansion territoriale en direction de Butembo, Beni et Kisangani**

Bahati Erasto, North Kivu's AFC/M23-appointed governor, during visits to Kanyabayonga and Kirumba between 9–11 June, claimed that Lubero, Butembo, and Beni would soon fall under AFC/M23 control.¹⁷⁷

On 8 September, “Brigadier General” Baudoin Ngaruye, commander of AFC/M23's ‘First Defense Zone’ covering the Goma–Rutshuru–Kanyabayonga–Kirumba axis, declared in Kirumba that AFC/M23 intended to resume hostilities aimed at capturing Butembo and Kisangani.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁷ UN, intelligence sources, civil society sources.

¹⁷⁸ UN, intelligence, and civil society sources. See also <https://youtu.be/1XoBoRxaz4?si=3HrZkZ1WTcuHGSMp>.

Annex 23 (para. 52)**Strategic importance of Kamanyola, Katogota, Nyangezi, Luhwinja and Kaziba for AFC/M23–RDF operations in South Kivu¹⁷⁹****Importance stratégique de Kamanyola, Katogota, Nyangezi, Luhwinja et Kaziba pour les opérations de l’AFC/M23–RDF au Sud-Kivu**

The axis formed by Kamanyola, Katogota, Nyangezi, Luhwinja and Kaziba constitutes a critical north–south and east–west transit network linking the Ruzizi Plain to the Walungu–Mwenga highlands and onward toward the Uvira Hauts Plateaux. Kamanyola, situated on the Rwanda–Burundi–DRC tri-border, functions as a principal entry point for cross-border troop and logistical movements and anchors supply lines from Rwanda into South Kivu. Katogota, at the northern gate of the Ruzizi Plain on RN5 national road, controls access between Uvira and the highlands in the Moyens- and Haux Plateaux. Nyangezi, along the key Bukavu–Walungu axis, is a junction enabling rapid redeployment westward toward Walungu/Kaziba or south toward Katogota and Kamanyola. Further inland, Luhwinja and Kaziba sit on the highland crest leading into Mwenga and the Uvira Hauts Plateaux while providing access to economically significant mining zones. Kaziba also represents a critical corridor through the Moyens Plateaux towards Twirwaneho-held territories in the Haux Plateaux.

Together, these locations form mutually reinforcing corridors that allow an armed group to circulate personnel, equipment and supplies between the Ruzizi lowlands, Bukavu, Walungu and Mwenga, while also enabling to manoeuvre around FARDC/FDNB defensive lines on the Ruzizi Plain. Control of this network therefore provides operational, logistical, and strategic access to population centres and mineral-rich areas.

Notably, control of Katogota and surrounding heights strengthens AFC/M23’s influence over the northern ‘gate’ of the Ruzizi Plain and offers options of advancing toward Uvira by bypassing strong FDNB and FARDC/Wazalendo blocking positions along RN5.

¹⁷⁹Assessment informed by contextual analysis of troop movements and operational developments, terrain and geographic positioning, as well as consultations with military experts.

Annex 24 (para. 52)

Strategic importance of the Tubimbi – Luhwinja corridor in South Kivu

Importance stratégique du corridor Tubimbi–Luhwinja au Sud-Kivu

Tubimbi, located in Walungu territory, is connected by road and track corridors to the Luhwinja *chefferie* in Mwenga territory. Luhwinja is a significant mining hub and a key commercial transit point. The Tubimbi–Luhwinja axis links the Walungu territory to the Mwenga highlands and to the mining areas further west and south, thereby forming a strategic corridor from Walungu into the interior mining zones of Mwenga.


Strategic importance

Control of the Tubimbi–Luhwinja axis provides significant military and economic advantages. The corridor functions as a key supply and reinforcement route, enabling the movement of troops, materiel and resources from Walungu toward central Mwenga, while also allowing for the disruption of enemy supply lines. Its importance is further heightened by the presence of gold and cassiterite deposits in Luhwinja,¹⁸⁰ which gives the axis both strategic and economic value.

The corridor also enhances operational mobility, facilitating the rapid movement of armed elements across Walungu, Uvira, Mwenga and the Hauts Plateaux.

Moreover, AFC/M23–RDF positions along RN2 and the Kaziba–Tubimbi–Mwenga axis provide direct access to the broader mining belt, including the Twangiza and Kamituga zones, where ongoing clashes and FARDC drone strikes underscore the area’s strategic significance.

¹⁸⁰ <https://www.international-alert.org/app/uploads/2021/09/DRC-Natural-Resources-Conflict-EN-2010.pdf>, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/320429069_Competition_between_industrial_mining_and_agricultural_exploitation_in_South_Kivu_Case_of_the_Luhwindja_Chiefdom_Community



Map showing location of strategic mining areas around Nzibira and Tubimbi


Source: IPIS

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Annex 25 (para. 53)

MRDP-Twirwaneho-controlled areas in the Hauts Plateaux, South Kivu

Enclaves protégées par le MRDP-Twirwaneho dans les Hauts Plateaux du Sud-Kivu



Map depicting main positions under Twirwaneho control (red) – with FARDC (blue), FDNB (green) and Wazalendo (pink) positions around

Source with annotations: UN, September 2025.

Base map: Google Earth. Imagery source: Landsat/Copernicus. Imagery date: 1/01/2021

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Annex 26 (para. 57)**Assessment of 3T production share AFC-M23 controlled areas in South Kivu****Évaluation de la production de 3T dans les zones du Sud-Kivu sous contrôle d'AFC-M23**

Approximately half of South Kivu's cassiterite and coltan production, and over two-thirds of its wolframite output originates from the territories currently under AFC/M23 control. This assessment is based on production trends observed over the past four years.¹⁸¹ According to statistics emanating from the Congolese Ministry of Mines, in 2024 South Kivu produced approximately 3000 tons of cassiterite and 200 tons of wolframite, representing 20 and 60 percent, respectively, of artisanal mineral exports at national level.¹⁸² Prior to its capture by the AFC/M23, approximately 40 tons of cassiterite and wolframite were traded through Nzibira each month – or close to 480 tons yearly.¹⁸³

¹⁸¹ Internal statistics of Congolese mining services.


¹⁸² DRC Ministry of Mines, « Statistiques minières exercice 2024 », <https://ctepm.cd/fr/wp-content/uploads/simple-file-list/statistiques/STATISTIQUES-MINIERES-EXERCICE-2024.pdf>

¹⁸³ Mining officials, internal statistics of Congolese mining services.

Annex 27 (para. 59)

Development of the Luhithi gold mining site

Développement du site minier d'or de Luhithi




Comparative images from 15 February 2025 (left) and 20 September 2025 (right), showing the expansion of the Luhithi mine site from approximately 110,000 sq meters to 660,00 sq meters

Source map with annotations: UN Group of Experts (4 November 2025)

Annex 28 (para. 61)

Receipts issued by AFC/M23 for the transport of ore in Luhihi

Quittances délivrées par l'AFC/M23 pour le transport du minerai à Luhihi



Documents provided to the Group by confidential sources

Annex 29 (para. 63)**Strategic importance of Twangiza gold mine and Twangiza Mining SA announcing suspension of activities after AFC/M23 takeover****Importance stratégique de la mine d'or de Twangiza et annonce par Twangiza Mining SA de la suspension des activités après la prise de contrôle par l'AFC/M23***Strategic importance of the mine*

The Twangiza gold mine, an industrial highland long-term open-pit gold mine, in South Kivu Province, approximately 45 kilometres south of Bukavu, represents one of the most industrialized and historically significant gold assets in eastern DRC.

Developed initially by Banro Corporation as the first large-scale industrial gold operation in the Kivu provinces, Twangiza's processing facilities, road infrastructure, and heavy equipment installations constitute a rare concentration of mining capital in an area otherwise dominated by artisanal production. Its geographical position—linking the mineral-rich territories of Mwenga, Walungu and Uvira to cross-border trade corridors with Rwanda and Burundi—grants it exceptional logistical and economic leverage.

Twangiza Mining SA declaring suspension of activities

Internal correspondence obtained by the Group from Twangiza Mining SA, dated 8 May 2025, indicated the suspension of all activities at the site following orders by the new administration installed in South Kivu. It informed workers not to present to work and specified that engines and vehicles had been parked in designated areas pending further instructions from the company's management.

- *Communique on the suspension of Twangiza Mining SA activities as a result of injunctions issued by the new authorities in South Kivu:*



TWANGIZA MINING SA

COMMUNIQUE

Aux : Employés de Twangiza Mining SA (TOUS)
 De : Chao Xianfeng, Directeur Général
 Date : 08 mai 2025
 Objet : **Suspension des activités de Twangiza Mining**

Chers Tous,

Nous portons à votre connaissance que, sur injonctions de la nouvelle administration en place dans la Province du Sud-Kivu, la société Twangiza Mining SA est dans l'obligation de suspendre ses activités.

Raison pour laquelle tous nos engins et véhicules sont placés en stationnement dans différents parkings en attendant les nouvelles directives de la Direction Générale.

Ainsi, la réduction du nombre d'employés résidant dans les différents camps d'hébergement de la société s'impose. Quant aux non-résidents concernés, il leur est demandé de ne pas se présenter au lieu du travail durant toute cette période.

Par conséquent, les Chefs de départements sont priés d'identifier les employés concernés et de transmettre les différentes listes au Département des Ressources Humaines pour dispositions utiles.

Nous vous tiendrons informés de l'évolution de la situation au moment opportun.

Chao Xianfeng

Directeur Général



[Signature]
 08/05/2025

ID NAT 01-80900-N429606; RCCM KIN/RCCM/14-B-4514
 Siège Social : 33, Boulevard du 30 Juin, Immeuble Ex-Solena 504, Gazele, Kinshasa, RDC
 Siège Administratif : Local 08C, Galérie Buziga, Avenue PE Lumumba, Ndendene, Itanda, Bukavu, Sud-Kivu, RDC
 Siège d'Exploitation : Concession Minière de Twangiza Mining SA, Groupement de Luciga, Chertier de Lushwinda, Territoire de Mbanga, Sud-Kivu, RDC
 Tél. : +243 (0) 99 43 63 565

1 | Page

Source: Twangiza Mining SA

- *Resumption of mining operations on AFC/M23 orders, June 2025*

In early June 2025, AFC/M23 ordered the resumption of mining operations, using local technicians to collect geological data, and summoned local technical staff, including some who had remained in Bukavu, to return to the site that was now under AFC/M23 supervision.¹⁸⁴


¹⁸⁴ Twangiza employees.

Annex 30 (para. 64)

Satellite imagery analysis showing a high level of activity between 10 May and 28 August 2025

Analyse d'imagerie satellitaire montrant un niveau d'activité élevé entre le 10 mai et le 28 août 2025

Satellite imagery analysis showing a high level of activity between 10 May and 28 August 2025, notably repair works on roads as well as a large number of engines and dump trucks active on the site.



Compared satellite imagery collected on 21 February, 10 May and 28 August 2025 to determine the activities on the mine site. On the 21 February 2025 and 10 May 2025 imagery, the mine site appeared non-operational, with deteriorated or damaged roads. Some roads were blocked by landslides. On the 28 August 2025 imagery, mining activities appear to have resumed since. Apparently new and repaired roads are visible, landslides cleared and possible excavation machinery and trucks were observed at different locations within the mine site

Source: UN Group of Experts (1 November 2025)

Annex 31 (para. 65)

FARDC airstrikes on Twangiza on 15 and 23 October 2025

Frappes aériennes des FARDC sur Twangiza le 15 et 23 octobre 2025

Images of damage caused by the aerial strike carried out by FARDC on Twangiza on 15 October 2025, damaging power-generation facilities:¹⁸⁵



Photograph depicting burning generators at Twangiza mine, after the airstrike
Confidential source

¹⁸⁵ Photographs and satellite imagery, testimonies from former workers.

Images of the burning fuel tanks after the airstrike on 23 October 2025:



Photograph of burning fuel tank.
Confidential source

Imagery analysis showing damage caused by air strikes on Twangiza on 15 and 23 October

On 15 October 2025, FARDC carried out an aerial strike on the Twangiza site at approximately 04:00 a.m., targeting power-generation facilities.¹⁸⁶ No civilian casualties were reported. AFC/M23 replaced the damaged generators rapidly. A second series of strikes on 23 October 2025, at 01:03 am, destroyed two fuel-storage tanks and a portion of the processing plant, rendering industrial operations inoperable.¹⁸⁷

Satellite imagery showing triangulation between the mine site infrastructure and a photograph of the burning generators.

¹⁸⁶ Photographs and satellite imagery, testimonies from workers.

¹⁸⁷ Photographs and satellite imagery, testimonies of Twangiza workers..



The location of the mine site infrastructure was triangulated using a photograph of burning generators. The visual benchmarks visible in the photo — including two possible fuel tanks, three generators with exhaust pipes, a concrete pad in front of the generators, and three linear features — appear to correspond with features identified on the 28 August 2025 satellite imagery. This suggests a high probability that the photograph was taken at the Twangiza mine site.

It should be noted that the satellite imagery was collected prior to the publication of the photographs of the damage following the airstrikes.

Source: UN Group of Experts (1 November 2025)

Annex 32 (para. 66)

AFC/M23 responses to allegations regarding pillaging of resources and environmental damage caused by AFC/M23 at Twangiza

Réponses de l'AFC/M23 aux allégations de pillage des ressources et de dommages environnementaux causés à Twangiza

On 21 September 2025, Reuters published an article reporting on allegations made by Twangiza Mining SA, accusing AFC/M23 of having looted at least 500 kilograms of bullion since seizing the mine in May, accusing some of its own employees of aiding the theft.¹⁸⁸

In response, AFC/M23 published a communiqué on 27 October 2025, denying the accusations:



**RÉPONSE AUX ALLÉGATIONS FORMULÉES PAR REUTERS FAISANT ETAT DU
PILLAGE DE 500 KILOS D'OR D'UNE VALEUR DE 70000000\$**

N°	Accusations formulées	Observations et clarifications
1	500 kg d'or pillés depuis mai 2025	<p>Twangiza Mining, Namoya, Lugushwa, Kamituga et BCM étaient des filiales de Banro Corporation (Canada), avant leur rachat par des groupes chinois, dont BAIYIN International Investments Ltd pour Twangiza et Strategos (SMX) pour d'autres sites. Depuis 2018, Baiyin avait investi dans la modernisation de Twangiza, mais les contraintes liées à la Covid-19 et les attaques contre des ressortissants chinois à Mwenga et Fizi ont conduit le gouvernement chinois à exiger le retrait de son personnel, plaçant la mine en suspension technique, donc en arrêt effectif d'exploitation.</p> <p>Par sa lettre du 8 mai 2025, le CEO Chao Xianfeng a annoncé la suspension des opérations, ce qui impliquait un arrêt provisoire des activités en attendant des conditions favorables à la reprise. Il ne s'agissait donc pas d'une fermeture définitive. L'information diffusée par Reuters sur le transfert d'or à Kindu semble provenir d'une confusion avec Namoya Mining, qui se trouve au Maniema, alors que Twangiza relève du Sud-Kivu. Depuis octobre 2025, le site a subi de nombreux bombardements des FARDC par des drones d'attaque, endommageant gravement les installations minières.</p>
2	Transport clandestin de minerais par canaux souterrains	<p>Cette accusation est techniquement infondée. Twangiza est une mine à ciel ouvert, dont toutes les installations, usine, raffinerie, salle de coulée et zones de stockage, sont construites en surface, selon les standards internationaux de sécurité et de traçabilité.</p> <p>Aucun tunnel ni canal souterrain n'existe dans la conception du site, et le gisement souterrain identifié n'a jamais été exploité. Les allégations de transport secret de minerais relèvent d'une méconnaissance du modèle industriel de Twangiza Mining, dont les opérations sont strictement encadrées et auditées.</p>

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¹⁸⁸ <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/m23-rebels-loot-70-million-worth-gold-congo-mine-since-may-company-says-2025-10-21>

3	Expulsion des habitants	<p>Les tensions observées dans la région proviennent essentiellement de la présence du groupe armé Mai-Mai Malaika, actif dans le secteur de Kahambare/Salamabila, autour du site de Namoya Mining au Maniema. Les enlèvements de ressortissants étrangers en 2018 avaient conduit à la fermeture temporaire de plusieurs filiales de Banro. Twangiza, elle, a maintenu ses activités jusqu'à la suspension intervenue au mois de mai 2025 décidée pour des raisons de sécurité et d'exploitation.</p> <p>Depuis la libération de la zone par l'AFC/M23, la stabilité s'était améliorée. Mais les bombardements récents des FARDC, Wazalendo et FDLR, notamment les 15 et 23 octobre courant, ont provoqué de nouveaux déplacements de civils. Il ne s'agit pas d'expulsions liées à la société, mais de mouvements de population dus aux frappes militaires.</p>
4	Démolition d'églises	<p>Les destructions d'églises et d'infrastructures civiles autour du site de Twangiza résultent exclusivement des bombardements aveugles de l'aviation militaire du régime de Kinshasa. Ces frappes, menées sans discernement, ont touché des zones habitées, des écoles et des lieux de culte.</p> <p>Twangiza Mining ou les forces locales n'ont mené aucune opération susceptible d'endommager ces structures. Les destructions constatées sont des conséquences collatérales des attaques aériennes, et non des actes d'exploitation minière ou de contrôle territorial.</p>
5	Utilisation de techniciens rwandais	<p>Cette allégation s'inscrit dans une campagne de stigmatisation des populations de l'Est, souvent accusées à tort d'être des "Rwandais". Une telle généralisation constitue une dérive politique et médiatique qui alimente la division nationale.</p> <p>Twangiza Mining a toujours recruté des techniciens congolais, chinois et sud-africains selon des procédures officielles et traçables. Aucun élément ne prouve la présence de techniciens rwandais. L'agence Reuters, en relayant ces propos sans vérification, viole les principes fondamentaux du journalisme éthique et impartial.</p>
6	150 ouvriers injoignables	<p>Les vérifications effectuées sur place montrent qu'aucun membre du personnel n'est porté disparu. La suspension technique du 8 mai 2025 a entraîné la mise en congé technique des employés, conformément aux pratiques du secteur minier. Cette situation peut expliquer l'absence de contact temporaire avec certains ouvriers.</p> <p>En affirmant sans preuve que 150 travailleurs étaient injoignables, Reuters a diffusé une information erronée, contraire</p>

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E-mail : revolutionconstitutionnelle@gmail.com

		à la rigueur journalistique. Twangiza Mining demeure responsable de son personnel et assure le suivi administratif de tous ses agents placés en congé technique.
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CONCLUSION GÉNÉRALE

Les affirmations de Reuters apparaissent largement inexactes et procédant d'une mauvaise compréhension de la situation réelle. La lettre du 8 mai 2025 du CEO Chao Xianfeng atteste que Twangiza Mining a suspendu ses activités, c'est-à-dire effectivement arrêté l'exploitation, mais sans intention de fermeture définitive. Cette nuance, arrêt temporaire pour raisons techniques et sécuritaires, est essentielle pour distinguer une décision d'ajustement industriel d'une cessation d'activité.

Fait à Goma, le 27 octobre 2025
 Alliance Fleuve Congo



Lawrence KANYUKA
 Chef de Département de la Communication

Confidential source

Annex 33 (para. 71)**Continued Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) jamming and spoofing in and around AFC/M23 and RDF controlled areas in North Kivu****Poursuite des brouillages et usurpations de signaux du système mondial de navigation par satellite (GNSS) dans et autour des zones sous contrôle de l'AFC/M23 et des RDF au Nord-Kivu.***Enduring patterns of airspace interference*

Since mid-2024, the Group has been reporting on the existence of sophisticated radio-frequency interference and spoofing systems disrupting Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) operations throughout eastern DRC, notably in regions controlled by M23/AFC and RDF (S/2025/446, para. 48, and annex 26).¹⁸⁹

Since May 2024, the Group observed that recurrent losses of GPS signal accuracy impacted military and civilian aircraft traveling over the areas of Goma, Sake, and Masisi (S/2024/969, para. 54 and annex 25). These instances were reinforced by the findings in the Group's final report, which verified that RDF utilized electronic warfare devices proficient in jamming and spoofing GPS signals. The report indicated that RDF personnel received training in Israel to operate these systems, with jamming units stationed in Gisenyi and Rusizi in Rwanda, and mobile emitters located at Sake, Karuba (DRC), and Iwawa Island in Rwanda (S/2025/446, para. 48, and annex 26).

Simultaneously, the United States Embassy in Kinshasa publicly released security alerts in January 2025, cautioning about persistent GPS signal outages impacting aviation navigation and humanitarian efforts in the provinces of North and South Kivu.¹⁹⁰

Mapping of GNSS interference patterns over North Kivu

Open-source mapping data captured from GPSJam in September 2025¹⁹¹ further substantiated the Group's previous findings, revealing enduring GNSS interference patterns focused along the Goma–Kalembe–Walikale corridor, with the strongest signals captured around Goma. The map, derived from data collected from commercial aircraft, illustrates persistent, red-coded regions indicative of compromised satellite signal reception (see maps below). These align with high intensity jamming or intentional spoofing emissions. The map presented in the current appendix illustrates an identical interference corridor to those previously documented in the above cited reports and in UN reports.¹⁹²

¹⁸⁹ Findings validated through technical investigation, equipment recovery in the field, and diplomatic reports.

¹⁹⁰ <https://cd.usembassy.gov/travel-alert-disruptions-to-gps-systems-for-aircraft-landing-in-eastern-drc-15-january-2025/>

¹⁹¹ <https://gpsjam.org/?lat=-1.48603&lon=29.10778&z=10.2&date=2025-09-13>

¹⁹² S/2024/863, para. 82.



The red triangles on the map represent zones of high GPS interference (above 10%) detected on 13 September 2025. They are concentrated mainly around Goma, Sake, and the Nyiragongo area, indicating strong electronic jamming activity in that corridor.

Source: GPSJam

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.



The red triangles indicate areas of intense GPS interference (>10%) recorded on 13 September 2025, concentrated along the Goma–Sake axis and extending toward Nyiragongo and the Rwandan border near Gisenyi, suggesting localized electronic jamming activity in that corridor

Source: GPSJam

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.



The red triangles indicate areas of high GPS interference (>10%), showing strong jamming activity mainly around Masisi, Sake, and Nyiragongo, suggesting deliberate electronic disruption.

The brown triangles represent medium-level interference (2–10%), forming a broader belt from Nyabiondo through Masisi to Rubaya and Mushaki, consistent with sustained but less intense GPS signal disturbance.

Source: GPSJam

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Jamming incidents affecting Emirates aircraft EK794 flying over Goma airspace

On **25, 26, 27, and 28 October 2025**, significant jamming incidents transpired involving Emirates aircraft EK794 (Luanda–Dubai), which demonstrated irregular flying conduct while traversing eastern DRC airspace. Analysis of ADS-B telemetry derived from publicly available flight tracking data¹⁹³ revealed a prolonged holding pattern and signal interruption at coordinates roughly 1°35'S, 29°10'E — the identical area where GNSS deterioration had been previously documented, around Goma.

The event did not cause a safety violation but illustrates the operational consequences of persistent jamming.

¹⁹³ Flight history for Emirates flight EK794 at <https://www.flightradar24.com/data/flights/ek794> (Date accessed: 20 November 2025).



Image captured from Flightradar24.com at <https://www.flightradar24.com/data/flights/ek794#3cd31e16> demonstrating EK794 aircraft's irregular flight conduct on 25 October 2025 due to signal interference, particularly over Goma airspace
(Date accessed: 20 November 2025)

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.




Image captured from Flightradar24.com at <https://www.flightradar24.com/data/flights/ek794#3cd61bca>, demonstrating EK794 aircraft's irregular flight conduct on 26 October 2025 due to signal interference, particularly over Goma airspace
(Date accessed: 20 November 2025)

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.




Image captured from Flightradar24.com at <https://www.flightradar24.com/data/flights/ek794#3cd96688> demonstrating EK794 aircraft's irregular flight conduct on 27 October 2025 due to signal interference, particularly over Goma airspace

(Date accessed: 20 November 2025)

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.




Image captured from Flightradar24.com at <https://www.flightradar24.com/data/flights/ek794#3cdcf057>, demonstrating EK794 aircraft's irregular flight conduct on 28 October 2025 due to likely signal interference, particularly over Goma airspace

(Date accessed: 20 November 2025)

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

The convergence of these elements – documented GNSS jamming and spoofing, anomalous ADS-B data from EK794 – establishes a coherent evidentiary basis affirming the continued existence of organized and technically proficient jamming operations in eastern DRC. The interference pattern fits within established AFC/M23 and RDF operational zones and aligns with the same temporal frame as the January 2025 multi-source jamming occurrences documented in S/2025/446.

The Group assesses that the available evidence substantiates the existence of a coordinated electronic warfare network comprising both stationary and mobile emitters. The system operates with sufficient power and synchronization to interfere with civil and military GNSS-based operations throughout North and South Kivu.

The findings, subject to further technical verification and diplomatic clarification, indicate a potential violation of the arms embargo and warrant continued investigations into external support channels and end-user accountability.

Annex 34 (para. 71)**Technical assessment of Tadiran RT-7106 (PRC-710) tactical radio seized from RDF soldier in Masisi territory (North Kivu, March 2025)****Évaluation technique de la radio tactique Tadiran RT-7106 (PRC-710) saisie sur un soldat des RDF dans le territoire de Masisi (Nord-Kivu, mars 2025)**

In March 2025, an RDF combatant apprehended in the Masisi territory in North Kivu, had in his possession a Tadiran RT-7106 (PRC-710) tactical VHF/FM manpack radio (see images below). The RDF soldier had been deployed to the DRC in late February 2025 as part of a 26-person RDF detachment.¹⁹⁴

Photographic analysis of the radio reveals a configuration consistent with the standard PRC-710 family manufactured in Israel. The device retained an intact keypad, LCD display, dual power/handset connectors, and a flexible antenna socket, corresponding to the factory design of the series. The Tadiran identification plate, though partially illegible, bore the marking “RT-7106 TADIRAN COMMUNICATIONS.”

The device’s display interface and channel selector configuration indicate the presence of factory firmware and pre-programmed channels within the 30–88 MHz band., confirming that the unit was operational and retained its original manufacturer configuration. The accompanying TEL-718B lithium-ion battery carried the imprint “LITHIUM-ION RECHARGEABLE – TEL-718B – P/N 11400000A 14.4 V – CAT No 20540920 – DATE CODE 1123,” indicating manufacture within a post-2022 logistic batch, approximately November 2023, thereby supporting the conclusion that the equipment originated from a recent production cycle.¹⁹⁵

Serial number 75838 also indicates that the unit was manufactured and distributed recently, rather than being a legacy surplus, according to an analytical assessment based on open-source serial-pattern comparison and manufacturer production timelines. Open-source intelligence also shows that units of the PRC-710 series were circulated in East and Central Africa via regional brokers and authorized distributors.¹⁹⁶

Technical specifications also included frequency-hopping capability, FM voice/data modulation, a nominal battery voltage of 14.4 V DC, and a manpack output of about 5 W, amplifiable to 50 W when paired with vehicular or relay modules. The unit is compatible with C-710 and C-720 accessories, including chargers and antennas conforming to NATO tactical field communication standards.^{197 198} The seized radio and associated components are currently in the possession of the Congolese authorities.

The Group has formally requested serial and batch verification from the Israeli authorities, including the manufacturer. The Group will incorporate any official replies and technical results into its final report.

¹⁹⁴ Interview of RDF soldier by the Group, in March 2025.

¹⁹⁵ <https://power-time.en.made-in-china.com/product/OZcGlomUEMVh/China-Tadiran-Prc-710-Radio-Battery-Li-ion-14-4V-7-5ah.htm>

¹⁹⁶ Small Arms Survey (2024): Regional Arms Flows in the Great Lakes Region, Geneva.

¹⁹⁷ NATO Standard STANAG 4204 (VHF FM Combat Net Radio) – interoperability requirement for VHF FM band (30–88 MHz).

¹⁹⁸ [Elbit Systems | Advanced Defense Technology](#)



Tadiran RT-7106 (PRC-710) tactical VHF/FM radio transceiver. The attached TEL-718B battery unit is visible at the base.

Confidential source



Close-up view of the Tadiran RT-7106 (PRC-710) control panel, showing selector knobs for CLR/SEC/AJ (Clear, Secure, Anti-Jamming) communication modes and an intact display window. The markings and wear indicate active operational deployment and prolonged field handling.

Confidential source

Annex 35 (para. 77)

FARDC press communique instructing FDLR to disarm and surrender

Communiqué de presse des FARDC appelant les FDLR à désarmer et à se rendre



Source: Document from intelligence source.

Annex 36 (para. 78)

Private military company Agemira / Congo Aviation ending its contract in DRC

The private military company Agemira – renamed Congo Aviation after the fall of Goma – had planned to conclude its activities in the DRC by September 2025 (S/2025/446, para. 74). Prior to July 2025, the then FARDC Chief of Staff¹⁹⁹ requested that 150 Congo Aviation contractors remain deployed in Kisangani and Kinshasa until at least early 2026 to refurbish DRC’s military air assets and increase support to air operations,²⁰⁰ as per Agemira’s initial engagement (S/2023/431, annex 23).

Until July 2025, Congo Aviation operated seven Mi-24 helicopters,²⁰¹ three Mi-17 helicopters,²⁰² one Mi-8 helicopter, four Sukhoi SU-25 airplanes,²⁰³ two L-39 military jet trainer aircraft,²⁰⁴ one AN-26 military transport aircraft, and five CH-4 drones.²⁰⁵

Congo Aviation – alongside twenty-five senior military officers under investigation by the DRC Government – began facing accusations of responsibility for the “FARDC debacle” during the AFC/M23 take-over of Goma and Bukavu, eventually prompting the termination of Congo Aviation’s contract at the end of July 2025.²⁰⁶

¹⁹⁹ Tshiwewe Songesha Christian was removed from his functions and is currently under investigation by the DRC Government.

²⁰⁰ FARDC, intelligence, PMC source.

²⁰¹ Three in Kinshasa and four in Beni, Bunia and Kisangani.

²⁰² One in Kinshasa and two in Beni and Bunia.

²⁰³ Two in Kisangani and two in Kinshasa (one was non-operational at the time of drafting).

²⁰⁴ In Kinshasa.

²⁰⁵ Two in Kisangani and three in Kinshasa.


²⁰⁶ FARDC, intelligence, diplomatic sources, and PMC sources.

Annex 37 (para. 80)


AFC/M23 as the main perpetrator of IHRL abuses and violations documented

AFC/M23 en tant que principal auteur des abus et violations du droit international des droits de l'homme (DIDH) documentés


Statistics on extrajudicial or summary executions, listing consistently indicating M23 as main perpetrator throughout the reporting period, with a reduction noted after the peak of anti-FDLR operations in Rutshuru territory (paras. 36-39, 41):



Statistics on **extrajudicial or summary execution** by perpetrators in **May 2025** – AFC/M23 is listed as the main perpetrator responsible for extrajudicial or summary executions, surpassing the Wazalendo, ADF, CODECO and FARDC combined.
UN source.




Statistics on **extrajudicial or summary executions** by perpetrators in **August 2025**, in all DRC conflict-affected provinces – showing AFC/M23 as the actor responsible for most of the violations (35,6%), surpassing ADF, CODECO and Wazalendo groups.
UN source (August 2025)



Statistics on IHRL abuses and violations by type and by province in **August 2025** – showing **extrajudicial killings or summary executions** in North Kivu as the most frequently recurring violation.

UN source (August 2025)


In September, there has been a drop in extrajudicial or summary executions by AFC/M23, coinciding with a lower intensity anti-FDLR operations in Rutshuru territory (Bwito and Bwisha *chefferies*) and the redeployment of RDF:



Statistics on **extrajudicial or summary executions** by perpetrators in **September 2025**, in all DRC conflict-affected provinces – showing a reduction in AFC/M23 violations (9,47%), surpassed by ADF (36,09%), CODECO (16,57%) and FARDC (10,65%).
UN source

In October, there has again been a notable increase in summary executions attributed to M23:

Fig 4: Victims of extrajudicial and summary executions by perpetrator



Statistics on **extrajudicial or summary executions** by perpetrators in **October 2025**, in all DRC conflict-affected provinces – showing an increase in M23-attributed killings (to 19,8%) compared to September. UN source (October 2025)

Sexual violence:




Fig. 5 : Breakdown of conflict-related sexual violence victims by alleged perpetrator.

Statistics on conflict-related sexual violence for **July** (figure 1) and **August** (figure 2), listing M23 as the main perpetrator, surpassing the FARDC and Wazalendo, including a significant number of minor girls among the victims (labeled in orange on both figures).

UN source – July and August 2025

Annex 38 (para. 82)**Wazalendo human rights abuses against civilians in South Kivu, including a surge in conflict-related sexual violence****Abus des droits humains commis par les Wazalendo contre les civils au Sud-Kivu, y compris une recrudescence des violences sexuelles liées au conflit***Human rights abuses against civilians at roadblocks*

In South Kivu, Wazalendo armed groups have set up an expansive network of roadblocks across Uvira, Fizi and Mwenga territories, which significantly inhibited civilian movement across these areas and led to the commission of widespread and systematic abuses against civilians, including extortion, sexual violence, and summary executions reported at these roadblocks.

According to witnesses interviewed by the Group, Wazalendo groups have established an ever-increasing number of roadblocks in and around Uvira, including along major and secondary roads including up to the border with Burundi. Wazalendo imposed lucrative taxes ranging from 5,000 to 50,000 Congolese francs for road users, traders and citizens.²⁰⁷ For example, between March and September, on the Misisi-Lulimba axis, at least 10 roadblocks were identified. On the RN5, a 60-kilometre stretch between Uvira and Luvungi had at least 12 roadblocks, while on the RN2, along the Bwahungu-Kamituga axis there were a total of 8 roadblocks,²⁰⁸ six of which were controlled by the Wazalendo, while the remaining two by the AFC/M23.²⁰⁹

On several occasions, competition over control and resources frequently led to armed clashes among Wazalendo groups. In early September, competition over the control of roadblocks in Mwenga sparked violence among Wazalendo groups, notably Mai Mai Corbeau and Mai Mai Malaika. This forced the FARDC to intervene to dismantle the growing number of barriers.²¹⁰

²⁰⁷ UN, civil society, researchers, FARDC, humanitarian sources.

²⁰⁸ At Kilungutwe, Lwindi, Kasika, Kibumba, Mwenga center, and Bilalo mbili

²⁰⁹ UN, civil society, researchers, FARDC, humanitarian sources.

²¹⁰ UN, civil society, researchers, FARDC and intelligence sources.



Roadblock tariffs imposed by P.A.P.CO armed group in Mwenga territory, South Kivu, on 29 August 2025. P.A.P.CO claims to act on behalf of the Reserve Armée de la Défense (RAD), Etat-Major Général in Mwenga.

Provided to the Group by a confidential source.

Alarming surge in conflict-related sexual violence

In areas under the control of Mai-Mai Yakutumba and affiliated Wazalendo armed groups in Uvira and Fizi territories, the recent months were marked by a sharp escalation in human rights violations, including conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV), extortion, and summary executions of civilians accused of collaborating with AFC/M23. Clashes between Yakutumba combatants and AFC/M23 resulted in civilian casualties. The security vacuum created by the absence of FARDC, and the prevailing climate of impunity has enabled various armed groups – predominantly Raia Mutomboki and other factions aligned with Yakutumba – to expand their operations and perpetrate abuses with little restraint.²¹¹

Verified reports – gathered through field-based inquiries conducted by national NGOs, trained, and supported by the UN – revealed a significant underreporting of CRSV incidents in areas under DRC Government control in South Kivu. Between January and June 2025, at least 325 cases of sexual violence affecting over 400 victims were documented in South Kivu province alone, exceeding the total figures recorded in all other provinces combined for the same period. The number of incidents peaked in March, followed by a slight decline in May and June, reportedly linked to constraints in documentation rather than an actual reduction in violence.²¹²

²¹¹ Idem.

²¹² UN and humanitarian sources.

Annex 39 (para. 86)

Forcible transfer of civilians belonging to the Hutu community to Rwanda, in May 2025, and subsequent repatriations raising concerns about continued presence of coercive factors**Transfert forcé de civils appartenant à la communauté hutue vers le Rwanda, en mai 2025, et rapatriements ultérieurs suscitant des préoccupations quant au maintien de facteurs coercitifs**

In the context of the ongoing offensive military operations aimed primarily at dislodging FDLR and affiliated groups (paras. 36-44), AFC/M23 conducted systematic roundups of civilians, primarily targeting members of the Hutu community suspected of having ties to the FDLR. Often carried out in the context of cordon-and-search activities, these operations culminated in the forced transfer of 1,798 individuals to Rwanda between 17 and 22 May 2025, under circumstances coordinated and controlled by AFC/M23 elements.²¹³

The civilians repatriated in May had been forcibly displaced by AFC/M23 weeks earlier from villages near Virunga National Park, including from Karenga, Mugando, Kwamamfu and Kwasimoni, and sought refuge in collective centers around Goma and Sake.²¹⁴ On 24 February, AFC/M23 forces had issued an ultimatum to residents of Karenga – who had returned to Karenga after the dismantling of IDP camps around Goma, in early February – to leave by the next day, or be shot.²¹⁵ Following these threats, the population of Karenga and surrounding villages have sought refuge in collective shelters in Sake. On 12 May, AFC/M23 rounded up over 2,000 civilians from these centers and forcefully transferred them to the UNHCR-managed transit center for refugees in Goma, known as the Centre Chrétien du Lac Kivu (CCLK).²¹⁶

In Sake, prior to transferring the refugees to Goma, AFC/M23 screened the refugees, separating women and children from men, among reports of physical violence. At least 180 men accused of FDLR affiliation were separated and brought to Stade de l'Unité in Goma. From there, they were taken to an unknown location and their whereabouts remain unknown.²¹⁷

AFC/M23 also interfered with UNHCR screening of the refugees at the transit center in Goma, under armed supervision. Witnesses reported that AFC/M23 personnel imposed the screening of individuals under armed supervision, preventing civilians from leaving the site. Interviews were conducted by local agents working for the *Commission Nationale pour les Réfugiés* (CNR) whose Goma-based coordinator had defected to AFC/M23 and was thus in their service at the time.²¹⁸

Witnesses confirmed that AFC/M23, through its coordinator for humanitarian affairs, Chantal Murekatete, had threatened UNHCR agents on 15 May 2025, accusing them of bad intentions and stalling for having attempted to supervise screenings, claiming that AFC/M23 had already completed the screenings and demanding that civilians at the CCLK center be immediately transferred to Rwanda.²¹⁹

Due to this AFC/M23 intervention, the UNHCR-led screening of 96 individuals among the 1,798 could not be completed before their transfer on 17, 19 and 22 May 2025. In addition, Chantal Murekatete threatened to close the UNHCR office in Goma and announced that AFC/M23 will create its own CNR agency. Soon thereafter, AFC/M23 appointed their own CNR coordinator, Jean-Damascène Mwigimba (see annex 40 below).

²¹³ According to UNHCR, a total of 1,798 individuals were repatriated on 17, 19 and 22 May, with 360 people repatriated on 17 May, 802 on 19 May, and 636 on 22 May 2025. Of this total, only 125 individuals were already at the UNHCR-managed transit center for refugees in Goma, before more than 2,000 individuals were forcibly transferred by AFC/M23 from Sake.

²¹⁴ UN, humanitarian, governmental sources, civil society, researchers, confidential sources working on refugee-related matters, interviewed by the Group.

²¹⁵ Idem.

²¹⁶ Idem.

²¹⁷ UM, humanitarian and civil society sources. See also <https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1689074/politique/en-rdc-le-m23-expulse-des-civils-vers-le-rwanda/>.

²¹⁸ According to a DRC-CNR official interviewed by the Group.

²¹⁹ Confidential sources working on refugee-related matters, including in Goma, interviewed by the Group. Also civil society, researchers, and UN sources.

AFC/M23 confiscated identification documents, including voter cards and land titles of the refugees, and publicly burned them²²⁰ in the presence of AFC/M23 officials – including AFC/M23 spokesperson Oscar Balinda, military spokesperson Willy Ngoma, and Goma’s military commander, “Colonel” Nsanze Nzamuye Jimmy (S/2024/432, annex 24), and in the presence of local media.²²¹

Despite AFC/M23 publicly framing the operation as a “voluntary return” of Rwandan nationals, most individuals were denied the opportunity to confirm or contest their nationality status or express their objection to the transfer. At least 72 Congolese nationals transferred to Rwanda were returned to the DRC after successfully demonstrating their Congolese citizenship. However, other Congolese citizens were unlawfully deported to Rwanda, without having been given the opportunity to prove their citizenship.²²² In addition, prior to the raid on the collective centers in Sake by AFC/M23 on 12 May, the displaced civilians living in these centers were surveyed by protection actors, with 90% of interviewees indicating their preference for returning to their villages in Rutshuru territory.

The transfers on 17, 19 and 22 May 2025 were carried out in coordination with Rwandan authorities. On 17 May, Rwanda’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Olivier Nduhugirehe, stated that the transferred individuals were “previously held hostages by the FDLR genocidal force.”²²³ AFC/M23 spokesperson Lawrence Kanyuka echoed this statement shortly thereafter.²²⁴ Rwanda’s involvement in facilitating these transfers raises concerns, given its documented influence, control, and direction over AFC/M23, and the continued presence of RDF personnel on Congolese territory (S/2025/446, paras. 34-55).

Repatriations resumed following this incident, under the supervision of UNHCR and in coordination with AFC/M23 and Rwandan authorities.²²⁵ Since January 2025, at least 5,798 individuals were repatriated to Rwanda, primarily from Masisi territory, but also from Rutshuru territory.²²⁶

Sources interviewed by the Group indicated that since the incident of forced repatriations documented in May, AFC/M23 continued to exert pressure on civilians to go to transit centers and return to Rwanda. A confidential source with direct knowledge of repatriation operations in Goma, with direct access to the refugees, reported that even recent repatriations – including the repatriation of 227 Rwandan refugees on 23 October, primarily Hutu women and children from Masisi and Rutshuru territories affected by the ongoing violence²²⁷ – reported continued pressure exerted on them by AFC/M23. This information was corroborated by a separate individual involved in the screening process.

UNHCR did not report any subsequent coerced returns since May. However, considering the systematic violations targeting vulnerable Hutu populations in Rutshuru and Masisi (paras. 35-45),²²⁸ coupled with UNHCR’s restricted operating environment, and AFC/M23’s continued presence during repatriations, it cannot be objectively concluded that returns occurred in the absence of coercive factors.

²²⁰ Witnesses, UN and humanitarian sources, civil society sources, researchers.

²²¹ UN and humanitarian sources, civil society sources, researchers.

²²² Idem.

²²³ <https://x.com/onduhungirehe/status/1923668943643812054>

²²⁴ <https://x.com/LawrenceKanyuka/status/1925586037801136238>

²²⁵ <https://actualite.cd/2025/09/10/rdc-plus-de-250-autres-refugies-rwanda-rapatries-par-le-hcr-dans-leur-pays-partir-de?utm> ; <https://www.radiookapi.net/2025/09/25/actualite/societe/rapatriement-de-plus-300-refugies-rwanda-partir-de-goma?utm>

²²⁶ UNHCR

²²⁷ <https://diplomatesafricains.com/rapatriement-silencieux-de-277-refugies-rwanda-depuis-goma/?utm>

²²⁸ According to UN statistics, civil society reports, and reports by researchers, the majority of those repatriated were women and children from the Hutu community, from areas affected by sustained military operations by RDF and AFC/M23, including reports of forced evictions, livelihood destruction, and forcible conscription or killing of men.

Annex 40 (para. 88)

AFC/M23's facilitation of the covert return of alleged Congolese refugees from Rwanda

La facilitation par l'AFC/M23 du retour clandestin de prétendus réfugiés congolais depuis le Rwanda

Population movements from Rwanda to DRC

Population movements from Rwanda, predominantly into Masisi territory, but also towards Rutshuru and Nyiragongo territories, continued (S/2025/446, annex 17). In areas such as Kilolirwe, Kitchanga, Bwiza, Burungu, Mweso, Katale, the local population reported that individuals arriving from Rwanda have taken over vacated lands and properties, commercial activities, and local taxation posts.²²⁹

These movements occurred discretely, outside the framework of the Tripartite Agreement on voluntary repatriations (see full text of the joint communiqué on the Tripartite Agreement) and without oversight by UNHCR, making it difficult to determine whether the individuals concerned were returning Congolese refugees or Rwandan nationals settling in DRC.²³⁰ Local populations continued identifying Rwandan nationals among the returnees, based on their lack of familiarity with the local currency, languages, and culture (S/2025/446, annex 17).

The Congolese Interior Minister accused RDF of ethnic cleansing including through taking possession of the lands belonging to local populations, notably in the Bahunde et Bashali *chefferies* (Mubambiro, Sake, Kilolirwe, Mushaki, Rubaya, Burungu, Kitshanga, Busumba) in Masisi territory; in the Bwisha and Bwito *chefferies* (Bwiza, Kahe, Bishusha, Bunagana, Jomba) in Rutshuru territory, and in the Bukumu *chefferie* (Kibumba, Buhumba, Munigi) in Nyiragongo territory.²³¹

In May and June 2025, the Congolese government accused AFC/M23 and Rwanda of ethnic cleansing by resettling "Rwandan families" with Rwandan identity cards in eastern DRC (see documents below, also available online).²³² One year earlier, AFC coordinator Corneille Nangaa publicly stated that M23's mission included helping Congolese refugees to reclaim and protect the lands that were historically theirs, which were seized by the FDLR and their local allies the Wazalendo.²³³

Local interlocutors alleged that these efforts were part of broader settlement strategies. The absence of independent monitoring mechanisms, combined with ongoing displacement of local populations and AFC/M23's arbitrary management of land allocation, heightened mutual hostility between local and returning populations (S/2025/446, annex 17). Humanitarian organizations, civil society, community leaders, human rights defenders, and the local community have been warning that if remained unaddressed, these practices will likely trigger a large-scale and protracted intercommunal violence, with regional spillover.

²²⁹ Local residents, researchers, confidential sources working in the area.

²³⁰ UN and humanitarian sources, civil society sources.


²³¹ Communiqué officiel no25/CAB/VPM/MININTERSEDECAC/SLBJ/05/2025; 29 March 2025, seen by the Group.

²³² Also available online at <https://x.com/StanyBujakera/status/1922751265525710986>.

²³³ <https://x.com/LawrenceKanyuka/status/1788259609561505861?t=1UCoO39b-bQYL6jXMNAR1A&s=19>.


Referenced documents:

Official communique by DRC Minister of Interior of 14 May 2025, accusing Rwanda of orchestrating an ethnic cleansing and repopulation operation



Source: published on X

Official communiqué by DRC Minister of Interior of 18 June 2025, accusing Rwanda of orchestrating the repopulation of refugees




Confidential source

AFC/M23-implemented measures to facilitate the return of refugees from Rwanda

To assert control over refugee repatriations and return processes, the AFC/M23-appointed coordinator for humanitarian affairs, Chantal Murekatete Kayitaba threatened to close the UNHCR office in Goma²³⁴ and announced the establishment of AFC/M23's own iteration of the Congolese refugee agency, the Commission nationale pour les réfugiés (CNR). On 16 June, AFC/M23 appointed Jean-Damascène Mwigimba as AFC/M23-CNR coordinator:

REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO

PROVINCE DU NORD-KIVU Goma, le 17 JUIN 2025


Le Gouverneur

N°01/ 021/CAB/GP-NK/2025

REÇU LE
17 JUN 2025
UNHCR
Section des Services Généraux

TRANSMIS copie pour information à :

- Monsieur le Vice-Gouverneur chargé des Questions Politiques, Administratives et Juridiques ;
- Madame la Conseillère Principale en charge des Affaires Sociales et Humanitaires ;
- Monsieur le Directeur Provincial de la CNR/Nord-Kivu ;
- Monsieur le Chef d'Antenne de la CNR ; (TOUS) à GOMA.-

OBJET :
Information.

A Monsieur le Chef de Sous-Délégation de UNHCR à GOMA.-


Monsieur le Chef de Sous-Délégation,

J'ai l'honneur de porter à votre connaissance que par Arrêté Provincial n°01/019/CAB/GP-NK/2025 du 16 juin 2025, je viens de désigner Monsieur MWIGIMBA Jean-Damascène en qualité de Directeur Provincial de la Commission Nationale pour les Réfugiés « CNR » en sigle, en Province du Nord-Kivu.

Dorénavant, pour toute question relative à l'organisation et au fonctionnement de la Commission Nationale pour les Réfugiés « CNR », je vous demande de vous référer à ce dernier.

Tout en vous souhaitant une bonne collaboration, je vous prie d'agréer, Monsieur le Chef de Sous-Délégation, l'expression de mes sentiments distingués.

= : **BAHATI MUSANGA Erasto** :=



Adresse : Avenue du Lac, Quartier Himbi, Commune de Goma, Goma/RDC
GouvernoratNK2025@gmail.com

Document received from confidential source

²³⁴ Confidential sources, eyewitnesses.

Since June 2025, AFC/M23 also discussed with local interlocutors their intention to establish transit centres to facilitate the return of Congolese refugees from abroad.²³⁵ Local sources confirmed that in July 2025, AFC/M23 begun the construction of such a centre in Karenga, Masisi territory – the area affected by the forced expulsions documented in February (see para.) – including a transit site, a school, and a health centre. According to statements made publicly by AFC/M23, reported to the Group by local sources with direct knowledge of the matter²³⁶ - the facilities were intended to accommodate Congolese refugees who may seek to return soon from Rwanda.

The planning and construction of the centres were being conducted without the involvement of UNHCR. UNHCR has also not been informed or involved in any returns of refugees from Rwanda to the AFC/M23-controlled areas in the DRC.²³⁷

Issue of return of the refugees in the Washington and Doha peace agreements

The Washington Agreement and the Doha Principles both referenced the issue of refugee returns to be guided by the Tripartite Agreement on the Voluntary Repatriation of Congolese and Rwandan Refugees, signed between Rwanda, DRC and UNHCR.²³⁸

The Governments of the DRC and Rwanda, together with UNHCR, held a Tripartite Commission Meeting in Addis Ababa on 22–24 July to discuss the voluntary repatriation of refugees between the two countries. The meeting culminated in the endorsement by both Rwanda and DRC of a joint communiqué,²³⁹ which emphasized the vital link between sustainable return and broader peacebuilding efforts in the Great Lakes region, building upon the recent political commitments outlined in the Washington Peace Agreement and the Doha Declaration of Principles.

Joint Rwanda-DRC-UNHCR communiqué on the Tripartite Agreement on the voluntary repatriation of refugees with UNHCR oversight, 24 July 2025

²³⁵ Three confidential sources with direct knowledge of the matter, operating in Goma as well as Masisi territory, including the areas of Karenga, and Kitchanga.

²³⁶ In addition, intelligence, and civil society sources.

²³⁷ UNHCR, confidential sources with direct knowledge of the matter

²³⁸ <https://www.unhcr.org/africa/news/speeches-and-statements/unhcr-welcomes-renewed-commitment-voluntary-return-refugees-drc-and>

²³⁹ <https://www.unhcr.org/africa/fr/media/joint-communique-tripartite-high-level-ministerial-meeting-between-government-democratic>



COMMUNIQUE JOINT

Réunion ministérielle tripartite de haut niveau entre le Gouvernement de la République Démocratique du Congo (RDC), le Gouvernement de la République du Rwanda et le Haut-Commissariat des Nations Unies pour les Réfugiés (HCR) sur le rapatriement volontaire des réfugiés

Addis-Abeba, République Fédérale Démocratique d'Éthiopie

24 juillet 2025

1. Conformément aux **Accords Tripartites sur le rapatriement volontaire des réfugiés congolais vivant en République du Rwanda et des réfugiés rwandais vivant en République Démocratique du Congo**, signés le 17 février 2010, et aux principes consacrés par la **Convention de 1951 relative au statut des réfugiés**, son **Protocole de 1967** et la **Convention de l'OUA de 1969 régissant les aspects propres aux problèmes des réfugiés en Afrique**, le Gouvernement de la République Démocratique du Congo (RDC), le Gouvernement de la République du Rwanda et le Haut-Commissariat des Nations Unies pour les Réfugiés (HCR) ont organisé une **réunion ministérielle de haut niveau** à Addis-Abeba, en République Fédérale Démocratique d'Éthiopie, le **24 juillet 2025**.
2. La réunion s'est tenue dans le cadre des efforts en cours visant à poursuivre la recherche de solutions durables pour les réfugiés et en tenant compte des récents développements politiques, notamment **l'Accord de Paix de Washington entre**

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le Gouvernement de la RDC et le Gouvernement du Rwanda, signé le 27 juin 2025, et la **Déclaration de principes de Doha entre le Gouvernement de la RDC et l'Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC)/Mouvement du 23 mars (M23)**, signée le 19 juillet 2025.

3. Les Parties ont exprimé leur appréciation pour le rôle joué de manière continue par l'Union Africaine et l'Organisation des Nations Unies dans la promotion de la paix, de la sécurité et du dialogue dans la région.
4. Les Parties ont passé en revue le rapport de la réunion du Groupe de Travail Technique Tripartite entre le Gouvernement de la RDC, le Gouvernement de la République du Rwanda et le HCR sur le rapatriement volontaire des réfugiés et souligné que le retour durable des réfugiés est un pilier vital de la paix et de la stabilité, et est essentiel pour faire avancer le relèvement et la reconstruction post-conflit dans la région des Grands Lacs, et en RDC en particulier. Dans ce contexte, la situation et les besoins des personnes déplacées internes devront être également pris en considération.
5. Les Parties ont réaffirmé leur engagement en faveur du retour volontaire, sûr, digne et éclairé des réfugiés, comme pierre angulaire des solutions durables, et considéré ceci comme une contribution à la consolidation de la paix et à la stabilité régionale.
6. Les Parties ont reconnu le rôle du HCR en tant qu'acteur neutre, impartial, et humanitaire, mandaté par la communauté internationale pour fournir une protection internationale et rechercher des solutions durables pour les réfugiés.
7. Les Parties ont convenu d'être guidées dans leurs actions par les décisions suivantes :

- (a) Réaffirmer le droit de tous les réfugiés à retourner volontairement dans leur pays d'origine en toute sécurité, dignité, et sans contrainte ;

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(b) Veiller à ce que les retours soient menés conformément aux Accords Tripartites du 17 février 2010 et aux normes internationales de protection ;

(c) Veiller à ce que les réfugiés et les rapatriés reçoivent des informations actualisées, pertinentes, crédibles et impartiales, et que les mécanismes de consultation et de retour d'information avec les communautés soient renforcés ;

(d) Reconnaître la nécessité d'explorer les voies d'interaction constructive, conformément à la Déclaration de principes entre la RDC et l'AFC/M23 signée le 19 juillet 2025 à Doha, afin de garantir que les retours volontaires puissent recommencer au regard des Accords Tripartites du 17 février 2010;

(e) Procéder au rapatriement volontaire des 600 réfugiés rwandais actuellement présents au centre de transit à Goma, pendant que d'autres voies en faveur de solutions durables continueront d'être explorées. Cela, avec l'implication des administrations légalement établies de la RDC, sous la coordination du HCR ;

(f) Créer des conditions propices pour les réfugiés et les agences humanitaires lorsque cela apparaît pertinent pour faciliter des retours sûrs et respectueux des principes du droit international, cela sans préjudice de la préservation de l'autorité souveraine des deux Etats parties ;

(g) Réaffirmer la nécessité d'une vérification appropriée de l'identité et de la nationalité des réfugiés candidats au rapatriement volontaire, tout en prévenant les risques d'apatridie ;

(h) S'engager à une planification de la réintégration qui est inclusive et par zone, garantissant l'accès au logement, à l'éducation, aux moyens de

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[Signature]

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[Signature]



subsistance, aux soins de santé, à la documentation civile et à l'inclusion dans les cadres de développement locaux et nationaux ;

(i) Renforcer la coordination transfrontalière, par des réunions virtuelles ou en présentiel, le partage des données et la planification conjointe des activités de rapatriement volontaire ;

(j) Renforcer la sensibilisation et la communication auprès des réfugiés et des communautés locales dans les zones de retour, y compris en utilisant des outils numériques afin d'instaurer la confiance et la transparence ;

(k) Impliquer les donateurs, les institutions financières internationales et les partenaires de développement pour assurer un soutien durable au retour volontaire et à la réintégration, ainsi qu'au relèvement et à la reconstruction post-conflit, en soutien à l'Accord de Paix de Washington du 27 juin 2025 et à la Déclaration de principes de Doha du 19 juillet 2025.

8. Les Parties ont adopté la **feuille de route 2025-2026 du Groupe de Travail Technique Tripartite sur le rapatriement volontaire et la réintégration**, décrivant les étapes opérationnelles, les responsabilités, les délais de mise en œuvre, de suivi et de revue.

9. Les Parties ont convenu de convoquer des réunions de suivi régulières du Groupe de Travail Technique dans le cadre du Mécanisme Tripartite et ont affirmé leur volonté de se réunir à nouveau en principe dans six mois au niveau ministériel pour évaluer les progrès et fournir des orientations stratégiques autant que nécessaire.

10. Les Parties ont exprimé leur gratitude au Gouvernement de la République Fédérale Démocratique d'Éthiopie pour avoir accueilli la réunion.

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11. Les Parties ont exprimé leur gratitude aux participants du Groupe de Travail Technique Tripartite qui s'est tenu à Addis-Abeba, en Ethiopie, les 22 et 23 juillet 2025 pour les travaux préparatoires entrepris en vue de la réunion ministérielle de haut niveau.

FAIT à Addis Abeba, en Ethiopie, en ce 24^{ème} jour du mois de juillet 2025 **en langues anglaise et française**, les deux textes faisant également foi.

**Pour le Gouvernement de la République
Démocratique du Congo**

S.E. SHABANI Lukoo Bihango Jacquemain
Vice-Premier Ministre, Ministre de
l'Intérieur, Sécurité, Décentralisation et
Affaires Coutumières
République Démocratique du Congo

**Pour le Gouvernement de la République
du Rwanda**

S.E. Maj Gen (Rtd) Charles KARAMBA
Ambassadeur de la République du Rwanda
auprès de l'Ethiopie et de Djibouti, et
Représentant Permanent auprès de l'UA et
de la CEA
République du Rwanda

Pour le Haut-Commissariat des Nations Unies pour les Réfugiés


Raouf MAZOU

Haut-Commissaire Assistant chargé des Opérations

Annex 41 (para. 89)

Excerpts from the Extraordinary meeting of the ICGLR ministries in charge of mines

Extraits de la réunion extraordinaire des ministères de la CIRGL chargés des mines



6. DECISIONS

Following extensive deliberations, the meeting decided as follows:

- 6.1. Took note of the Republic of Rwanda's reservation about including the agenda item on the DRC's allegations of mineral smuggling between the DRC and Rwanda, and further noted that the reservations were also made during the opening ceremony of the 26th meeting of the Audit Committee held in Nairobi.
- 6.2. Adopted the report of the 30th meeting of the Regional Committee on the illegal exploitation of natural resources.

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


- 6.3. Adopted the Terms of reference for the investigations with amendments, with the inclusion of the word "alleged" in paragraph 1(a) and deletion of the words "armed groups and Rwandan Defence Forces" on paragraph 2.2 (i).
- 6.4. In the spirit of cooperation, the meeting established an ad hoc ministerial committee comprising the United Republic of Tanzania, the Republic of Uganda, and the Republic of Zambia supported by the Conference Secretariat, to undertake official visits to both the DRC and Rwanda and engage in constructive dialogue with the respective Ministers.

7. VOTE OF THANKS

The Ministers expressed appreciation to Paul Chanda Kabuswe, Minister of Mines and Minerals Development and the Government of the Republic of Zambia for the facilities put in place to ensure the success of the meeting.

Done in Lusaka, 2nd May 2025



HON. PAUL CHANDA KABUSWE, MP
MINISTER OF MINES AND MINERALS DEVELOPMENT
REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA

Documents provided to the Group by confidential sources

Annex 42 (para. 90)

Letter dated 23 May 2025 from Rwanda to the Security Council to rebut the creation of the ICGLR ad hoc committee

Lettre datée du 23 mai 2025 du Rwanda au Conseil de sécurité pour réfuter la création du comité ad hoc de la CIRGL



Source: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4082910?v=pdf>.

The reply dated 27 May 2025 from the Democratic Republic of the Congo with the actual deliberation of the ICGLR and the terms of reference of the ad hoc committee is on: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4084018/files/S_2025_329-EN.pdf

Annex 43 (para. 90)

Excerpts from the Report of the 8th Ordinary Meeting of Ministers of Mines of the ICGLR

Extraits du rapport de la 8^e réunion ordinaire des ministres des Mines de la CIRGL



**RAPPORT DE LA 8^{EME} REUNION ORDINAIRE DES MINISTRES EN
CHARGE DES MINES DE LA CIRGL**

**31 JUILLET 2025
HOTEL HILTON
KINSHASA, REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO**

A handwritten signature in black ink, with the date "31/7/2025" written above it.

5.4. République du Rwanda

- 5.4.1. Le représentant du ministre a exprimé son appréciation et a demandé des éclaircissements concernant le point 4.5.2 relatif à la création d'une commission d'enquête ad hoc. Elle a souligné que la République du Rwanda fait une distinction ferme entre le Comité



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ministériel ad hoc et la Commission d'enquête proposée. Ces deux organes ont des mandats fondamentalement différents, et leur amalgame risque de compromettre les résultats clairs établis lors de la Réunion ministérielle de Lusaka. Elle a noté que la République du Rwanda réitère son plein engagement en faveur d'un dialogue constructif, comme recommandé par le Comité ministériel ad hoc, et dans l'esprit de la coopération régionale. Cet engagement reste leur principe directeur.

- 5.4.2. La Représentante a toutefois indiqué que la République du Rwanda réitérait son objection catégorique à la création de la Commission d'enquête. Elle a réitéré l'engagement de la République du Rwanda en faveur d'un processus régional pacifique, transparent et fondé sur des principes.

5.5.2.2 Il a indiqué que si la mise en œuvre du Mécanisme Régional de Certification avait commencé, la délivrance de certificats n'avait pas encore été lancée, car les cadres juridiques étaient en cours d'alignement. Un système de suivi numérique des minerais, en particulier de l'or artisanal, est en cours de développement pour assurer la traçabilité de l'extraction à l'exportation. Il a souligné les projets de raffinerie d'or à Kakamega et a confirmé son soutien à la coopération commerciale transfrontalière et aux projets conjoints à valeur ajoutée. Le représentant a conclu en confirmant son soutien au mécanisme d'autofinancement de la CIRGL par le biais de prélèvements de certificats et de contributions annuelles continues au Secrétariat, tout en restant déterminé à mettre en œuvre des cadres de gouvernance minière et à soutenir la coopération régionale pour un développement minier responsable.

5.6. A la suite des exposés et des délibérations, les Ministres ont décidé ce qui suit :

5.6.1 Exhorter les Etats membres et le Secrétariat de la Conférence à accélérer la mise en œuvre des décisions de la réunion des Ministres chargés des mines tenue à Lusaka.

5.6.2 Réitérer leur décision prise lors de la réunion extraordinaire des ministres chargés des mines, tenue à Lusaka le 2 mai 2025, d'établir deux comités : un comité ministériel ad hoc composé de la République-Unie de Tanzanie, de la République de l'Ouganda et de la République de Zambie, chargé d'effectuer des visites officielles en RDC et au Rwanda, et d'engager un dialogue constructif avec les ministres respectifs ; et la commission technique ad hoc d'enquête, conformément au mandat de l'enquête sur la contrebande présumée de minerais vers le Rwanda.

5.6.3 Exhorter les Etats membres à accélérer l'opérationnalisation de la base de données régionale de la CIRGL.

5.6.4 Exhorter la République-Unie de Tanzanie et le Secrétariat de la Conférence à accélérer la mise en service du laboratoire régional d'Analyse par Empreinte Minière (AFP) en Tanzanie afin de renforcer la crédibilité du MRC.




Annex 44 (para. 91)

Decision concerning the establishment of the ICGLR ad hoc Commission of Inquiry

Décision concernant la création de la Commission d'enquête ad hoc CIRGL

SECRETARIAT
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
ON THE GREAT LAKES REGION



SECRÉTARIAT
CONFÉRENCE INTERNATIONALE
SUR LA RÉGION DES GRANDS LACS

**DECISION N°003/ES/ICGLR CONCERNING THE ESTABLISHMENT
OF THE AD HOC COMMISSION OF INQUIRY ON THE ALLEGED
MINERAL SMUGGLING BETWEEN DRC AND RWANDA**

The Executive Secretary,

- i. Pursuant to the Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region signed in Nairobi, Kenya, on 15 December 2006, specifically in its Articles 9, 18-c and 26,
- ii. Considering the Protocol on the Fight against the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources of 30 November 2006,
- iii. In view of the Declaration of the Special Summit of ICGLR Heads of State and Government on the Fight against the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources in the Great Lakes Region, signed in Lusaka, Zambia, on 15 December 2010,
- iv. Taking into account the decisions 6.2 and 6.3 of the Extraordinary Meeting of ICGLR Ministers in charge of Mines held in Lusaka, Zambia on 2nd May 2025 on the mineral smuggling allegations between DRC and Rwanda,
- v. In line with item 7 "The Investigation Team" of the Terms of Reference on the DRC request for the investigation and precautionary measures against mineral smuggling into Rwanda as approved by the Extraordinary Meeting of ICGLR Ministers in charge of Mines held in Lusaka, Zambia on 2nd May 2025,
- vi. Based on the letter N/Ref: 760.07/785/OBM/2025 dated 11th June 2025 of the Chair of the ICGLR Regional Committee against the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and the letter dated 3rd July 2025 of the Chair of the ICGLR Audit Committee both nominating their respective members to represent the two Committees in the Ad hoc Commission of Inquiry on the alleged mineral smuggling between DRC and Rwanda,

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Tel : +257 22 25 6824/5/7/9, Mob +257 79 344 901 Fax : (00257) 22 25 6828
Email : secretariat@icglr.org Website: www.icglr.org

DECIDES AS FOLLOWS:

1. An Ad hoc Commission is hereby established to undertake the following tasks as outlined in the Terms of Reference under item 3: "Scope of Work":
 - (i) To investigate allegations of smuggling of 3TG between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo as granted by Articles 25 and 34 of the Protocol against the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Section III Clause 35 of the Regional Certification Mechanism.
 - (ii) To propose concrete measures to be taken against individual exporters or Member States based on the evidence gathered and the investigation findings.
 - (iii) To agree on objectives, regional scope, documents to be reviewed, counterparts to talk to and the timeline of their intervention.
 - (iv) To consider the corrective and precautionary measures proposed by the DRC Government in accordance with the investigation's findings.
 - (v) To engage an external expert with a background in similar types of investigations to assist the Commission with the drafting of a detailed concise, clear, and practical investigation protocol to facilitate and expedite its task.
 - (vi) To mobilize financial and technical resources necessary for conducting the investigation through the Member States' annual contributions to ensure the region's total independence and ownership of the process.
2. The following are nominated as members of the Ad hoc Commission:
 - i. The alternate member of the ICGLR Regional Committee against the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources from Republic of Burundi
 - ii. The member of the ICGLR Audit Committee from the United Republic of Tanzania
 - iii. The member of the ICGLR Audit Committee from the Republic of Uganda
 - iv. The Commander of the ICGLR Extended Joint Verification Mechanism (EJVM) representing the ICGLR Specialised Centres, and
 - v. The Representative of the ICGLR Regional Women Forum in the ICGLR Regional Committee against the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources.

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3. The investigation will cover the financial years 2022 through 2024 and 2025 year to date. The investigation will examine mineral supply chains in eastern DRC and in Rwanda and transit routes within the Member States.
4. This decision shall take effect on the date of its signing.

Done in Bujumbura, on 3rd August 2025 in the English, Portuguese and French Languages, all texts being equally authentic.



Ambassador João Samuel Caholo
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

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Documents provided to the Group by confidential sources